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This dissertation focuses on immigrants living in the United States and their experience in the 
U.S. labor market.  In Chapter 2, I use the policy variation provided by the welfare reform of 
1996 to examine how the most recent immigrant cohorts (those arriving after 1996) adjust 
their health insurance status and labor supply in response to the eligibility requirements of the 
reform.  I examine the wages of foreign-born workers whose employers sponsor them for 
green cards, measuring the magnitude of the wage premium associated with receiving a green 
card in Chapter 3.  The effect of job displacement on immigrants is the focus of Chapter 4, 
with the duration of unemployment and the re-employment wages as the outcomes of 





Health Insurance and Labor Supply among Recent Immigrants following the 1996 




The Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunity Reconciliation Act (PRWORA or 
welfare reform) of 1996 significantly altered the relationship between the welfare system and 
non-citizen immigrants, particularly non-citizen immigrants who arrived in the United States 
after the passage of the bill.  In addition to other eligibility requirements, immigrants who 
arrived after PRWORA (post-enactment immigrants) had to reside in the U.S. for five years 
before they could receive almost all types of federally-funded welfare benefits.1  Some states 
used their own funds to provide welfare benefits for these immigrants during the first five 
years of residence; but other states did not offer such replacement programs. 
Consider Medicaid, a welfare program that provides health insurance primarily to 
three categories of low-income individuals – families with dependent children, the elderly, 
and the disabled.  Twelve states and the District of Columbia continued to offer Medicaid 
benefits to post-enactment non-citizen adult immigrants who otherwise met the Medicaid 
eligibility requirements but who had not yet lived in the U.S. for five years (Chin, Dean, and 
Patchan, 2002).  I refer to these twelve states and D.C. as “more generous” states, while the
                                                 
1 Undocumented immigrants are not eligible for any federally-funded welfare benefits, with the exception of 
emergency Medicaid benefits. 
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remaining thirty-eight states, those that did not provide Medicaid benefits to post-enactment 
non-citizen adult immigrants, I refer to as “less generous” states.  Table 2.1 lists the more and 
less generous states.  Note that, of the six traditional gateway states that are home to the 
majority of immigrants in the U.S., two are classified as more generous – California and New 
Jersey – and four are classified as less generous – Florida, Illinois, New York, and Texas. 
Using the variation across states in the provision of Medicaid for post-enactment non-
citizen adult immigrants, I estimate the effects of the five-year residence requirement on 
Medicaid coverage, private health insurance coverage and labor supply among recent 
immigrants.  I use nine March supplements to the Current Population Survey (CPS), from 
1998 through 2006, and a difference-in-differences framework to assess the change in the 
trends of health insurance coverage and labor supply among the immigrant cohorts who 
arrived after the 1996 welfare reform. 
 The majority of the research on the impacts of the welfare reform on the immigrant 
population has focused on the time period directly after the passage of PRWORA.  In studies 
that compare welfare use among immigrants before and after the 1996 welfare reform, the 
samples consist mainly of immigrants who were already living in the U.S. when PRWORA 
was enacted (pre-enactment immigrants) (see, for example, Borjas, 2003).    Certain 
provisions of the welfare reform – work requirements and time limits for receiving benefits – 
affected all residents of the U.S.  However, pre-enactment immigrants were not subject to the 
five-year residence requirement that affected post-enactment immigrants.  In this paper, I 
focus on immigrants who arrived in the U.S. after the passage of PRWORA. 
In the first few years after arriving in the U.S., immigrants experience fairly rapid 
growth in wages (LaLonde and Topel, 1992).  The longer immigrants live in the U.S., the 
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more they learn about the U.S. labor market and the more they are able to move to better and 
higher-paying jobs.  With improving labor market outcomes, immigrants are more likely to 
have access to health insurance through their employers, or to be able to afford private health 
insurance on their own.  For example, in my analysis I document that each additional year of 
residence in the U.S. increases the probability that an immigrant will have employer-
sponsored or other private health insurance.  
 Each additional year in the U.S. also exposes immigrants to information about 
available welfare benefits.  As new immigrants interact with previous cohorts of immigrants, 
they learn more about the availability and eligibility requirements of safety-net programs 
such as Medicaid.  Borjas and Hilton (1996) use panel data from the Survey of Income and 
Program Participation to show that immigrants increase their use of welfare programs the 
longer they live in the United States.  They also provide evidence that an immigrant’s 
country of origin is correlated with welfare use, as recent immigrants are more likely to use 
the particular welfare programs that are most common among existing populations from the 
same country of origin. 
 The introduction of the five-year residence requirement in PRWORA has the 
potential to affect the trends in Medicaid coverage for immigrants, particularly among those 
living in less generous states.  This, in turn, could affect their labor supply and private health 
insurance coverage.  Borjas (2003) used the implementation of PRWORA in 1996 as a policy 
experiment to examine health insurance and labor supply outcomes for a sample of 
predominantly pre-enactment immigrants.  Using CPS data from before and after 1996, he 
finds that the passage of the welfare reform led to a decrease in Medicaid coverage among 
immigrants living in less generous states, relative to immigrants in more generous states.  
 
 5
Since pre-enactment immigrants did not face any actual restrictions from Medicaid following 
PRWORA, Borjas (2003) attributes this decrease in Medicaid to the “chilling effect” of the 
1996 welfare reform where, despite being eligible, immigrants are less likely to seek out 
welfare benefits due to concerns that receiving benefits could affect their eligibility to stay in 
the United States (Fix and Passel, 1999).  Borjas (2003) also shows that, during the same 
time period, the decrease in Medicaid coverage among immigrants in less generous states 
was offset by increases in their private health insurance coverage and labor supply. 
 This paper contributes to the literature by taking advantage of the policy experiment 
provided by the five-year residence requirement for non-citizen immigrants who arrived after 
the passage of PRWORA.  Because immigrants are much more likely to be uninsured than 
native U.S. citizens, this study informs the policy debate over the question of how to increase 
health insurance coverage in the U.S. population.  Camarota and Edwards (2000) estimate 
that immigrants who arrived in the U.S. in the 1990s were responsible for more than half of 
the growth in the uninsured population over that same time period.  If the results in Borjas 
(2003) hold for post-enactment immigrants, then expansions in Medicaid may not be an 
effective means of increasing the proportion of immigrants with health insurance. 
I use the cross-state variation in Medicaid eligibility requirements for post-enactment 
immigrants to identify the effects of the five-year residence requirement of PRWORA on the 
trends in non-citizen immigrants’ Medicaid and private health insurance coverage.  
Consistent with the five-year residence requirement imposed by the 1996 welfare reform, I 
find no increase in Medicaid coverage among recent immigrants in less generous states 
during their first five years in the U.S.  While post-enactment immigrants in more generous 
states experience a rise in the probability of Medicaid coverage for each additional year in 
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the U.S., those in less generous states have no growth in Medicaid coverage.  Unlike Borjas 
(2003), I do not find evidence of increased private health insurance coverage or increased 
labor supply among immigrants who were restricted from Medicaid.  If immigrants in less 
generous states were responding to the Medicaid restrictions by obtaining private health 
insurance and working more, we would expect to find higher trends in these outcomes for 
immigrants in those states.  However, the growth in private health insurance and in labor 
supply is not higher among immigrants in less generous states.  The five-year residence 
requirement does not appear to affect the labor supply and private health insurance coverage 
of immigrants who arrived in the U.S. after PRWORA. 
I use a different population of immigrants (post-enactment immigrants as opposed to 
pre-enactment immigrants) from Borjas (2003), and also a different policy experiment, each 
of which contributes to the differences in the results.  However, the findings in Borjas (2003) 
are largely due to a composition effect (see Christian, 2004).  As I show in my empirical 
analysis, private health insurance coverage and labor supply among non-citizen immigrants 
increase the longer that they live in the U.S., particularly in the first five years.  After those 
first few years of growth, private health insurance and labor supply for these immigrants do 
not increase significantly from year to year.  In Borjas’ (2003) sample, the immigrant 
population in less generous states contains a much larger fraction of individuals with less 
than five years of U.S. residence, compared to the population in more generous states.  Since 
there are more immigrants in less generous states who are experiencing the steep growth 
associated with the first five years of U.S. residence, Borjas (2003) finds increases in labor 
supply and private health insurance for immigrants in less generous states relative to those in 
more generous states.  As Borjas (2003) himself acknowledges, his findings are largely 
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driven by the immigrants who have lived in the U.S. for less than ten years.2  However, 
Borjas (2003) would not have been able to do a more focused analysis on the most recent 
cohorts of immigrants given the data available to him at the time.  Only now, with many 
more cohorts of recent immigrants followed in the CPS, is this analysis possible. 
To account for the fact that recent immigrants are such a dynamic population, in my 
analysis, I focus on the trends in health insurance coverage and labor supply before and after 
these immigrants reach five years of residence.  Using the cross-state variation in the 
provision of Medicaid as a result of the five year residence requirement of PRWORA, I then 
compare the trends in Medicaid coverage, private health insurance coverage, and labor 
supply between immigrants in more and less generous states. 
 The remainder of the paper is organized as follows.  I next present the theoretical 
framework to guide intuition.  In Section 3, I describe the data I employ in my empirical 
analysis.  The details of the econometric strategy follow in Section 4, and the results are 
presented in Section 5.  I further provide evidence in Section 6 that cross-state migration is 
not likely to account for the differences in the trends in Medicaid coverage which I 
document.  The last section concludes. 
 
2 Framework 
 Cutler and Gruber (1996), among others, document how the government provision of 
health insurance (i.e. Medicaid) can reduce the purchase of health insurance through an 
employer or in the private insurance market, a phenomenon called crowd-out.  To graphically 
illustrate this framework, consider individual i who maximizes his utility over two goods, c 
and h, where c is a consumption good and h is health insurance.  The price of h is denoted by 
                                                 
2 See discussion on page 948 of Borjas (2003). 
 
 8
p, and the price of c is normalized to 1.  Individuals maximize their utility subject to the 
budget constraint c + ph = m, where m is total income.  If an individual buys only the 
consumption good c, then c = m; if an individual buys only health insurance h, then h = m/p.  
As depicted by the indifference curves in Figure 2.1, some individuals choose to spend most 
of their income on c (see indifference curve U1), consuming a bundle such as (chigh, hlow), 
while others choose much higher levels of h (see indifference curve U2), consuming a bundle 
such as (clow, hhigh). 
 The budget constraint changes when the government offers free health insurance in 
the amount of h = hg, illustrated by point A in Figure 2.1.  Individuals can now devote all of 
their income to the consumption good and still have health insurance, locating at point A.  
Note that if individuals desire h > hg, they are not allowed to receive hg from the government, 
but must purchase the entire amount of desired h in the private market.3  Those who would 
have originally purchased little or no health insurance in the private market consume the 
bundle (m, hg) once the government offers free health insurance hg.  This is an example of 
crowd-out – individuals who were purchasing some health insurance in the private market 
choose instead to receive the government insurance (compare indifference curves U1 and U1* 
in Figure 2.1). 
 In contrast to this typical crowd-out model, I use a simple framework to illustrate why 
the introduction of a government health insurance program might not lead to a significant 
amount of crowd-out of private insurance, or, conversely, why the discontinuation of a 
government health insurance program might not lead to an equivalent increase in the 
                                                 
3 This is an accurate description of the Medicaid program.  Unlike Medicare, where various “Medi-Gap” 
insurance policies can be purchased to supplement the coverage of Medicare, Medicaid coverage is restricted to 
those who have no other source of private health insurance coverage. 
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consumption of health insurance in the private market, as my empirical results imply.4  The 
central assumption in this model is that health insurance in the private market is not a 
continuous good, but rather, can only be purchased at discrete levels.  This is a realistic 
assumption – among employers, who are the primary source of private health insurance, 98 
percent of those who offer private health insurance coverage offer only one or two health 
insurance plans to their employees (Kaiser Family Foundation, 2007). 
For simplicity, assume that individuals have only one option for health insurance, hp, 
which comes at a price of p.  The budget constraint is no longer a line but two discrete points 
(see points B and C in Figure 2.2).  Individuals can choose to buy health insurance at price p, 
and spend the remainder of their income (m – p) on the consumption good; or they can 
choose not to have health insurance and spend their entire income m on the consumption 
good.  Each individual i chooses the greater of ui(m – p, hp) and ui(m, 0). 
 Assume also that there are two types of individuals, H and L.  Type H has a stronger 
preference for health insurance, while type L has a weaker preference for health insurance.  
As depicted in Figure 2.2, type H consumes the bundle (m – p, hp) and type L consumes the 
bundle (m, 0), implying that type L is uninsured. 
  When the government introduces a free health insurance plan hg, where hp > hg > 0, 
the budget constraint becomes points B (m – p, hp) and D (m, hg) in Figure 2.2.  Type L will 
locate at point D (moving from indifference curve UL to indifference curve UL*), consuming 
health insurance hg.  Because hg is significantly smaller that hp, type H will prefer to remain 
at budget point B, consuming the bundle (m - p, hp).  Hence, in this framework, government 
provision of health insurance does not crowd-out private consumption.  This occurs because 
                                                 
4 In Borjas (2003), the results indicate that the decrease in Medicaid is completely offset by an equivalent 
increase in private health insurance. 
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the price of health insurance in the private market is relatively high, so type L does not 
purchase it, and because the plan provided by the government hg is less desirable to type H 




For my empirical analysis, I use data from nine of the March supplements to the CPS, 
from 1998 through 2006.  I focus on adult non-citizen immigrants who arrived in the U.S. 
after the passage of the 1996 welfare reform.  The immigration questions in the CPS were 
first introduced in 1994, and they provide information on citizenship status (native, 
naturalized, or non-citizen), country of birth, mother’s country of birth, father’s country of 
birth, and year of arrival into the U.S.  I use only the non-citizen immigrants, excluding those 
immigrants who have become naturalized citizens, because the five-year residence 
requirement of PRWORA only applies to non-citizen immigrants.5  All U.S. citizens, 
regardless of whether they are native citizens or naturalized citizens, face the same eligibility 
requirements for welfare benefits; only non-citizen immigrants must reside in the U.S. for 
five years to be eligible for welfare. 
Ideally the data would include only legal non-citizen immigrants.6  All other 
categories of non-citizens, such as international students, foreign workers with temporary 
                                                 
5 A foreign-born individual must accumulate five years as a permanent resident (green card holder) before being 
eligible to apply for U.S. citizenship, unless that individual is married to a U.S. citizen (three years) or serving 
in the Armed Forces (one year).  Therefore, it is unlikely that an immigrant could evade the five-year residence 
requirement by becoming a U.S. citizen.  For 1998-2006 CPS, only 4.8 percent of the foreign-born individuals 
who have been in the U.S. for less than 5 years are citizens, whereas the proportion is 12.5 percent for those 
who have been in the U.S. for 5 years or more. 
6 Technically, the term “immigrants” is reserved for those who are legal permanent residents of the U.S. (green 
card holders).  All other foreign-born residents of the U.S. are considered by the Bureau of Citizenship and 
Immigration Services (BCIS) to be temporary aliens. 
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work visas, and undocumented aliens, are ineligible to receive all but emergency Medicaid 
benefits, regardless of their length of residence in the U.S. and regardless of their eligibility 
under other criteria.  Unfortunately, the CPS does not ask its respondents about their visa 
status, so I am unable to limit my sample only to legal permanent residents who could be 
eligible for Medicaid if they meet the categorical and income requirements.   
The state generosity measure I create incorporates the replacement of Medicaid 
benefits to adult non-citizen immigrants, and so I limit the sample to those non-citizen 
immigrants who were at least 15 years old at the time of the CPS survey.  I use adults only 
because many states that did not replace the missing Medicaid benefits for adults did in fact 
have replacement programs for immigrant children. 
In my analysis, in addition to the CPS data, I also use data on state unemployment 
rates from the Bureau of Labor Statistics (BLS).  I match these unemployment rates to each 
individual based on their state of residence and the year of the CPS survey. 
Summary statistics for non-citizen immigrants age 15 and older who arrived in the 
U.S. in 1996 or subsequent years are provided in Table 2.2.  The summary statistics are 
reported separately for non-citizens who reside in more and less generous states.  The 
observable characteristics for the two sub-samples of non-citizens are very similar.  The two 
exceptions are residence in a metropolitan area and Medicaid coverage.  Almost all 
immigrants in more generous states live in metropolitan areas (97 percent); while for less 
generous states, the proportion of immigrants in metropolitan areas is somewhat lower at 89 
percent. 
The other noticeable difference between these two groups of non-citizen immigrants 
is in their Medicaid coverage.  In the more generous states, 11 percent of adult non-citizens 
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report Medicaid coverage, whereas in less generous states, that figure is only 6 percent.  This 
difference between more and less generous states is not surprising, considering the residence 
requirement of PRWORA that restricts Medicaid coverage among recent immigrants in less 
generous states. 
Two exceptions to the five-year residence requirement likely account for the majority 
of the 6 percent of Medicaid coverage seen in the less generous states. First, Medicaid covers 
emergency health care (including childbirth) in all states, regardless of an immigrants’ length 
of residence in the U.S.   Second, refugees and those granted asylum in the U.S. are not 
required to meet the five year residence requirement before receiving Medicaid and other 
welfare benefits.  They are also more likely to seek out such benefits, compared to other 
categories of immigrants (Borjas and Hilton, 1996). 
 I limit my sample to those immigrants who arrived in the U.S. in 1996 or later 
because I want to focus my analysis on the welfare reform’s impact on immigrants who were 
restricted by the five-year residence requirement.  However, I cannot eliminate from my 
sample a very small fraction of pre-enactment immigrants (approximately 8 percent of the 
sample) who arrived between in 1996 but before the month of August, when PRWORA 
became law, because the year-of-entry information in the CPS is reported in two-year 
intervals.  The presence of these pre-enactment immigrants might inflate the size of the 
estimated trend in Medicaid coverage in less generous states.  This would reduce the 
estimated difference in trends in Medicaid coverage between the more and less generous 
states for immigrants with less than five years of U.S. residence.  Thus, my estimate of this 
difference in trends should be considered a lower bound of the true effect (see the Appendix 
for more details). 
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 Trends in health insurance coverage for non-citizen immigrants in more and less 
generous sates who arrived after the passage of PRWORA are illustrated in Figures 2.3 
through 2.5.  Medicaid coverage is increasing for immigrants in more generous states in their 
first five years of residence, but for immigrants in less generous states, Medicaid coverage is 
fairly flat throughout the first five years of U.S. residence (Figure 2.3).  This pattern is 
consistent with the five-year residence requirement of the 1996 welfare reform, which 
restricts non-citizen immigrants in less generous states from Medicaid until they have lived 
in the U.S. for five years.  Private health insurance coverage increases for immigrants in both 
more and less generous states the longer that they live in the U.S. (Figure 2.4). Not 
surprisingly, Figure 2.5 documents that the rise in overall health insurance coverage is higher 
for immigrants in more generous states, particularly in the first five years of U.S. residence, 
because both their Medicaid coverage and their private health insurance coverage are 
increasing. 
 Trends in labor supply are shown in Figure 2.6 (labor force participation), Figure 2.7 
(employment rates among those who are in the labor force), and Figure 2.8 (full-time work 
among those who are employed).  For all three outcomes, the patterns among non-citizen 
immigrants in more and less generous states are very similar.  Labor force participation 
among post-enactment immigrants grows over time, particularly in the first few years.  
Employment and full-time work also increase the longer that non-citizen immigrants reside 
in the U.S. 
 In my empirical analysis, I use the post-enactment immigrants in more generous 
states as a control group for the post-enactment immigrants in less generous states.  Another 
useful comparison group might be non-citizen immigrants (in less generous states) who 
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arrived in the U.S. prior to the 1996 welfare reform.  Unfortunately, 1994 was the first year 
in which the country-of-birth and citizenship questions were included in the CPS 
questionnaire.  The amount of data for non-citizen immigrants who are in their first few years 
of U.S. residence prior to the 1996 welfare reform is thus greatly limited.  Additionally, for 
those cohorts of immigrants who entered the U.S. in the early 1990s, the 1996 welfare reform 
interrupts their trends in Medicaid coverage.  Although I cannot use these immigrants as a 
control group in my empirical strategy, they are useful in the cross-section to illustrate the 
trends that existed in Medicaid coverage, private health insurance, and labor supply before 
PRWORA. 
 The health insurance and labor supply patterns of pre-enactment adult non-citizen 
immigrants are illustrated in Figures 2.9 through 2.14.  In contrast to the graphs for the post-
enactment immigrants, these figures do not show the same cohorts over time, but rather a 
cross-section of cohorts from the 1994-1996 CPS.  Figure 2.9 illustrates that Medicaid 
coverage is consistently higher among non-citizen immigrants in more generous states, but 
the coverage rates follow similar trends over time.  Medicaid coverage increases for 
immigrants in both more and less generous states in their first few years of residence, unlike 
the case after the 1996 welfare reform, when Medicaid increases only for immigrants in more 
generous states (see Figure 2.3). 
Private health insurance coverage is higher for immigrants in less generous states, but 
grows for all, as seen in Figure 2.10.  Overall health insurance coverage grows for non-
citizen immigrants in both types of states (see Figure 2.11), but is higher for those in less 
generous states because they have higher private health insurance coverage, which more than 
compensates for their lower levels of Medicaid coverage.  This again is in contrast to the 
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pattern among post-enactment immigrants, where those in less generous states have lower 
overall insurance coverage due to the restrictions on Medicaid in those states.  Trends in 
labor supply are similar for non-citizen immigrants in more and less generous states (see 
Figures 2.12, 2.13, and 2.14) prior to the 1996 welfare reform. 
 
4 Methodology 
Using the following difference-in-differences-in-trends linear probability model, I 
identify how an additional year of residence in the U.S. affects Medicaid coverage for non-
citizen immigrants: 
 
(1)  Pistj = γ1 Yistj + γ2 LGs + γ3 Ristj + γ4 (Yistj* LGs) + γ5 (Yistj* Ristj) +  
 + γ6 (LGs*Ristj) + γ7 (Yistj * LGs* Ristj) + Xistj β + κs + τt + ηj + εistj, 
 
where Pistj is an indicator variable equal to unity if non-citizen immigrant i, living in state s, 
surveyed in year t, born in country j, reported having Medicaid coverage; Yistj is the number 
of years the immigrant has lived in the United States; LGs is an indicator variable equal to 
unity if individual i lives in a less generous state that does not provide Medicaid benefits to 
its post-enactment adult non-citizen immigrants with less than five years of residence; and 
Ristj is an indicator equal to one if individual i has met the five-year residence requirement 
(see the Appendix for more information on Pistj, Yistj, and Ristj). 
The interaction terms are the variables of interest.  They capture the difference, if any, 
in the patterns of Medicaid coverage between immigrants in more and less generous states, 
before and after they have reached the five-year residence requirement.  The coefficient γ1 
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captures the effect of an additional year of residence in the U.S. on the probability of having 
Medicaid coverage for immigrants in more generous states who have lived in the U.S. for 
less than five years.  The sum of γ1 and γ4 captures the effect for immigrants in less generous 
states with less than five years of residence.  If there is no difference in the effects of an 
additional year of residence between more and less generous states, then γ4 will be zero. 
 For immigrants who have been in the United States for five years, long enough to 
meet the residence requirement of PRWORA, there may be different patterns of Medicaid 
coverage.  The sum of γ1 and γ5 gives the effect of an additional year of residence on the 
coverage of Medicaid for immigrants in more generous states who have at least five years of 
residence.  For immigrants in less generous states with at least five years of residence, the 
effect of an additional year of residence is given by the sum of γ1, γ4, γ5, and γ7. 
The matrix Xistj contains socio-demographic characteristics including age, age 
squared, gender, marital status, educational attainment categories (no high school, high 
school drop-out, some college education, bachelor’s degree, and advanced degree, where 
high school graduate is the omitted category), metropolitan area resident status, and finally 
the state unemployment rate, which is intended to absorb cyclical state-wide shocks. 
I include fixed effects for state of residence, year of the survey, and country of birth – 
κs, τt, and ηj respectively.  State fixed effects control for any differences across states that 
would affect access to Medicaid (i.e., the number of locations in a state where you can apply 
for Medicaid, the income ceiling for benefit eligibility, etc.).  Year of the survey fixed effects 
absorb aggregate economy-wide shocks that affect Medicaid coverage.  Additionally, starting 
in the year 2000, the CPS adjusted the health insurance questions, thereby increasing the 
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reported percentages of all types of health insurance (Nelson and Mills, 2001).  Year of the 
survey fixed effects control for that survey change and ensure that the results are not driven 
by changes in the CPS questionnaire. 
Country-of-birth fixed effects, ηj, are included for three reasons.  First, immigrants 
from some countries may be more likely to seek out welfare benefits such as Medicaid.  
Borjas and Hilton (1996) use SIPP data to demonstrate that immigrants who have recently 
arrived in the U.S. are more likely to enroll in the particular types of welfare programs that 
are more common among previous cohorts of immigrants from the same country of origin.  
Second, immigrants who are refugees are exempt from the provisions of PRWORA that limit 
welfare use in the first five years of residence in the U.S.  Since the CPS does not report 
immigrants’ refugee status and refugees tend to emigrate from certain countries, country-of-
birth fixed effects also serve to effectively control for refugee status.  Lastly, undocumented 
aliens are likely present in the CPS sample, but they are not eligible to receive anything 
except emergency Medicaid benefits.7  Similar to refugees, undocumented immigrants tend 
to emigrate from certain countries – mainly Mexico and Central American nations.  Passel 
(2006) estimates that more than 80 percent of the Mexican immigrants who entered the U.S. 
between 1995 and 2005 were undocumented.  Hence, country-of-birth effects help to control 
for the presence of undocumented immigrants in the CPS sample.  Note that the use of 
country-of-birth effects precludes the use of race and ethnicity indicators as controls in the 
matrix Xistj.  Race and ethnicity indicators, if included, would be largely collinear with the 
country-of-birth fixed effects. 
                                                 
7 Undocumented aliens are significantly under-represented in the CPS.  See, for example, Findeis et al. (2002) 
for a comparison of the foreign-born agricultural workers in the CPS and those in the National Agricultural 
Workers Survey (NAWS). 
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The error term εistj is assumed to have mean zero, and I calculate heteroskedasticity 
robust standard errors.  Individuals interviewed in the CPS have the potential to appear in 
two consecutive March supplements, due to the sampling design.  It is important, therefore, 
to control for the potential serial correlation associated with multiple observations of the 
same individual.  Because individuals in the CPS do not have a unique identifier, I create one 
by matching individuals based on their household identifier, as well as their state of 
residence, gender, race, ethnicity, age, education, and country of birth.  See the Appendix for 
further details on the matching methodology.  Creating the unique identifier allows me to 
cluster the standard errors by individual.8   
I estimate linear probability models similar to equation (1) with private health 
insurance coverage and overall health insurance coverage as the dependent variables.  
Additionally, I examine labor supply for this population, using the linear probability model in 
equation (1) for the dependent variables of labor force participation, employment status, and 
full-time work. 
 The choice of an estimating equation that is linear in the years of U.S. residence 
variable, Yistj, is supported by the data.  I have estimated specifications which include 
quadratic terms in Yistj and the relevant interactions, as well as both quadratic and cubic terms 
in Yistj and the relevant interactions.  I tested if higher-order these terms are jointly significant 
for all six health insurance and labor supply outcomes.  Using both a robust Wald test and a 
robust Lagrange multiplier test, I cannot reject (at the 5 percent confidence level) the null 
hypothesis that the coefficients on these higher order terms are equal to zero. 
                                                 
8 An alternative choice of standard errors would be using the hc2 option.  However, clustering the standard 
errors is the more conservative approach, so the reported standard errors are clustered. 
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When using a linear probability model, it is important to keep in mind that extreme 
values of the covariates may cause the fitted values from the OLS regression to fall below 
zero or to be greater than one.  Therefore, I compare the results of the linear probability 
model to the results from nonlinear models, whose fitted values are always between zero and 
one.  To this end, I estimate both probit and logit specifications similar to equation (1); the 
results of these regressions are reported in the Appendix, Tables 2.A1 through 2.A6.  The 
trends in the health insurance and labor supply outcomes are remarkably similar across 
specifications.  For better comparisons to Borjas (2003), who employs the linear probability 
model in his analysis, and for simplicity, the linear probability model remains the preferred 
specification, and the results reported are all estimated using the linear model. 
 
5 Results 
I estimate equation (1) using the entire population of post-enactment non-citizen 
immigrants 15 years of age and older.  Table 2.3 presents the results from this first regression 
with Medicaid coverage as the dependent variable.  In the first specification (2.3.1), I include 
only the difference-in-differences-in-trends variables.  In 2.3.2, I add the covariates in Xistj to 
the regression.9  Finally, in 2.3.3, I report the coefficients from the full model, which includes 
the covariates as well as country-of-birth, state-of-residence, and year-of-the-survey fixed 
effects.  Across all three specifications, the coefficients on the trends of interest (in bold) 
remain remarkably similar. 
Individuals are coded as having Medicaid coverage if they reported only Medicaid 
coverage and no other type of health insurance.  Both Cutler and Gruber (1996) and Borjas 
                                                 
9 For robustness, I have also estimated specifications which include an interaction between female and married, 
and specifications which include an indicator for whether or not the individual has children.  The inclusion of 
these variables does not affect the estimated coefficients of the trends in Medicaid coverage. 
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(2003) use a different measure, where those who reported Medicaid and also other types of 
health insurance coverage are counted as having Medicaid coverage.  My primary motivation 
for using the “only Medicaid” measure as opposed to the “any Medicaid” measure found in 
previous studies is that the “only Medicaid” measure allows me to see more clearly 
demonstrate how the availability of Medicaid affects overall insured/uninsured rates.  In my 
analysis using the “only Medicaid” measure, an increase in the percentage of the population 
with Medicaid translates into a same-size decrease in the percentage who are uninsured.  
Using an “any Medicaid” measure, the magnitude of changes in Medicaid coverage would be 
larger than the magnitude of changes in overall insurance rates, since some of the Medicaid 
population also report other health insurance coverage.  For robustness, I also use the “any 
Medicaid” measure found in the previous literature (results not shown).  The patterns in 
Medicaid coverage between immigrants in more and less generous states are very similar, 
regardless of the measure chosen. 
In Table 2.4, I present the estimated coefficients from a regression with private health 
insurance coverage as the dependent variable.  Overall health insurance coverage is the 
dependent variable in Table 2.5.  In both of these tables, I report results from the three 
specifications – with no covariates, with covariates but no fixed effects, and with both 
covariates and fixed effects. The coefficients on the trends of interest are very similar across 
the three specifications. 
I am primarily interested in the effect of an additional year of residence on 
immigrants’ health insurance coverage.  Thus, I use the estimates in Tables 2.3, 2.4, and 2.5 
to compute the trends for immigrants in more and less generous states before and after they 
have spent five years in the U.S.  Table 2.6 summarizes these trends for the four groups of 
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non-citizen immigrants in Medicaid coverage, private health insurance coverage, and overall 
health insurance coverage. 
The first column of Table 2.6 reports the coefficient on Yistj., which is the number of 
years an immigrant has spent in the U.S.; this trend represents the effect of an additional year 
of residence for immigrants living in more generous states who have not yet met the five-
year residence requirement.  For the estimates in column 2.6.2, the reported trend is the sum 
of the coefficient on Yistj and the coefficient on Yistj * LGs, the interaction between the number 
of years lived in the U.S. and the indicator for living in a less-generous state. These values in 
the second column represent the trends in health insurance for immigrants in less generous 
states with less than five years of U.S. residence.  To calculate the trend for immigrants 
living in more generous states who have five years or more of U.S. residence, I add the 
coefficients on Yistj and Yistj * Ristj, which is the interaction between the number of years lived 
in the U.S. and the indicator for having reached the five-year residence requirement; these 
trends are reported in column 2.6.3.  In the final column of Table 2.6, I sum the coefficients 
on Yistj, Yistj * LGs, Yistj * Ristj, and Yistj * LGs * Ristj in order to generate the trends for 
immigrants in less generous states with at least five years of U.S. residence. 
For immigrants in more generous states, each additional year of residence in the first 
five years results in a 0.74 (std. dev. 0.27) percentage points increase in Medicaid coverage, 
which is a seven percent increase at the mean.  This estimate is similar to previous research 
showing that the longer immigrants live in the U.S., the more likely they are to participate in 
welfare programs (see, for example, Borjas and Hilton, 1996).10   However, for immigrants in 
less generous states, there is no increase in Medicaid coverage in the first five years of 
                                                 
10 This pattern is also consistent with the cross-sectional patterns of Medicaid coverage among pre-enactment 
non-citizen immigrants; see Figure 9 for comparison.   
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residence; instead there is a 0.41 (std. dev. 0.15) annual percentage points decrease.  The 
restrictions of PRWORA are effective in eliminating growth in Medicaid coverage among 
non-citizen immigrants in less generous states.  The estimates in 2.6.3 and 2.6.4 show that 
there is no significant trend in Medicaid coverage for immigrants in either type of states once 
they have reached the five-year residence requirement.  In addition, there is no discrete jump 
in Medicaid coverage when immigrants in less generous states reach five years of U.S. 
residence, even though they have become eligible for it (see coefficients on Ristj and on LGs* 
Ristj in Table 2.3).  These results may be evidence of a lack of information among recent 
immigrants about their eligibility, or to a continued “chilling effect” of the welfare reform 
(Fix and Passel, 1999).  Although they may now qualify for Medicaid, these immigrants in 
less generous states may be concerned that receiving welfare benefits such as Medicaid could 
negatively affect their eligibility to live and work in the U.S. 
The results indicate that private health insurance coverage increases significantly for 
immigrants in both more and less generous states in their first five years of U.S. residence.  
In more generous states, each additional year of residence in the first five years leads to a 
3.15 (std. dev. 0.42) percentage point increase in private health insurance coverage, and in 
less generous states, the increase is 2.43 (std. dev. 0.33) percentage points per year.  Though 
these estimates are not statistically significantly different from one another, it is interesting to 
note that the trend for immigrants in less generous states is slightly smaller in magnitude than 
that for immigrants in more generous states.  If immigrants in less generous states seek out 
private health insurance because of their ineligibility to receive Medicaid (see Borjas, 2003), 
the results should have shown a significantly larger increase in private health insurance for 
immigrants in less generous states compared to immigrants in more generous states.  These 
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estimates confirm that the basic trends in private health insurance coverage are similar for 
non-citizens in more and less generous states, just as they appeared to be in Figure 2.4.  After 
five years of U.S. residence, an additional year in the U.S. does not affect private health 
insurance coverage for immigrants in either more or less generous states. 
While all immigrants experience an increase in the probability of having some type of 
health insurance with each additional year in the U.S., those who live in more generous states 
have a significantly larger increase in overall health insurance coverage – 4.18 (std. dev. 
0.43) percentage points compared to 1.95 (std. dev. 0.34) for those in less generous states in 
the first five years of U.S. residence.  By limiting immigrants’ access to Medicaid in less 
generous states, PRWORA also effectively limited their growth in overall health insurance 
coverage.  Again, after five years of U.S. residence, there is no significant increase in the 
probability of having overall insurance associated with an additional year of living in the 
U.S., and there is no difference between immigrants in more and less generous states. 
Lack of access to Medicaid (and other welfare) benefits could motivate new 
immigrants to increase their labor supply (Borjas 2003), which could enable them to afford 
private health insurance or to access private health insurance through their employers.  
Overall, my results for the labor supply of post-enactment immigrants do not support that 
hypothesis.  Table 2.7 presents the results for equation (1) using labor force participation as 
the dependent variable.11  Estimates for the probability of being employed are reported in 
Table 2.8, and Table 2.9 reports the results for full-time work.  As with the health insurance 
outcome variables, the results for each of these three dependent variables are reported with 
                                                 
11 Typically, labor force participation equations are estimated separately for males and for females.  F-tests 
indicate that there are no significant differences between the coefficients on the covariates of interest (the years 
in the U.S. variable and interaction terms) between males and females in the labor force participation equation.  
In fact, there are no significant differences between males and females in these coefficients for any of the 
insurance or labor supply outcome variables.  Therefore, I keep the males and females pooled in the analysis. 
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no covariates, with covariates but no fixed effects, and with both covariates and fixed effects.  
Table 2.10 summarizes the labor supply results and translates the coefficients from Tables 
2.7, 2.8, and 2.9 into the trends for immigrants in more and less generous states before and 
after they reach five years of U.S. residence. 
Overall, two thirds of the immigrants in the sample report being in the labor force at 
the time of the survey (Table 2.2).  Labor force participation increases significantly with each 
additional year of residence in the U.S. in the first five years, for immigrants in both more 
and less generous states.  Column 2.10.1 reports that in more generous states, the probability 
of being in the labor force increases by 2.12 (std. dev. 0.41) percentage points for each 
additional year of U.S. residence; in less generous states, the increase is 1.30 (std. dev. 0.32) 
percentage points (column 2.10.2).  These two trends are not statistically different from one 
another.  If post-enactment immigrants were more likely to enter the labor force in response 
to the restrictions of PRWORA, we would expect to find larger growth in labor force 
participation among immigrants in less generous states.  In fact I find no significant 
difference between the trends for immigrants in more and less generous states.  Once 
immigrants have lived in the U.S. for at least five years (columns 2.10.3 and 2.10.4), there is 
no longer a significant change in their labor force participation associated with an additional 
year of U.S. residence for immigrants in both more and less generous states. 
For post-enactment immigrants who are in the labor force, the likelihood of 
employment increases by 1.31 (std. dev. 0.33) percentage points annually in the first five 
years for those in more generous states.  This effect is very similar for immigrants in less 
generous states (column 2.10.2) – their employment increases by 1.03 (std. dev. 0.23) 
percentage points per year.  Once immigrants in both more and less generous states have 
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lived in the U.S. for at least five years, there is no significant change in the probability of 
being employed with an additional year of U.S. residence (see columns 2.10.3 and 2.10.4). 
Only in the probability of working full-time do I find weak evidence that post-
enactment immigrants in less generous states might have increased their labor supply more 
than those in more generous states.  However, these differences are not statistically 
significant.  For each additional year in the U.S. during the first five years of residence, 
immigrants in less generous states have increases in full-time work by 0.77 (std. dev. 0.35) 
percentage points, compared to 0.30 (std. dev. 0.49) percentage points for immigrants in 
more generous states (columns 2.10.1 and 2.10.2).  The two coefficients, though, are not 
significantly different from each another. 
To check the robustness of the results, I narrow the focus of the analysis to the 
foreign-born population that is more likely to be living legally in the U.S. and therefore 
eligible for welfare benefits such as Medicaid.  I estimate equation (1) for the health 
insurance and labor supply outcomes of this ‘likely legal’ population.  The simplest and most 
straightforward way to do this is to eliminate from the analysis all of the persons who report 
Mexico as their country of birth.  Passel (2006) estimates that 80 of foreign-born population 
from Mexico who entered the U.S. between 1995 and 2005 were undocumented and also that 
the majority of the undocumented population living in the U.S in 2005 came from Mexico. 
Excluding the foreign-born from Mexico greatly reduces the sample size of the post-
enactment population, from 35,158 to 21,907.  However, the reduction of the number of 
observations is the largest change that is observed.  Table 2.11 presents the trends in health 
insurance and labor supply for the post-enactment non-citizen population from everywhere 
else but Mexico.  Compared with the results in Tables 2.6 and 2.10, the majority of the trends 
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for this smaller population are of similar sign and magnitude to those for the entire 
population.  Medicaid growth is still significant in the more generous states in the first five 
years; it is also larger in magnitude (0.91 percentage points vs. 0.74 percentage points), 
which is consistent with the fact that the sample now has fewer individuals who would not be 
eligible for Medicaid due to their legal status.  There is still no growth in Medicaid coverage 
among immigrants in less generous states in their first five years of U.S. residence.  
Interestingly, the main difference when the Mexican-born population is excluded is that 
immigrants in less generous states now experience statistically significant growth in 
Medicaid once they have reached the five-year residence requirement. 
The increase in private health insurance is still significant in the first five years in 
both more and less generous states, and the lack of access to Medicaid coverage results in 
significantly lower growth in overall health insurance coverage for immigrants in less 
generous states.  The labor supply outcomes are fairly similar to those that include the 
population from Mexico; none of these trends are significantly different between immigrants 
in more and less generous states. 
As described previously, Medicaid is a means-tested program that provides health 
insurance to particularly disadvantaged populations such as single mothers with dependent 
children.  To see if the trends in health insurance and labor supply I find for the entire 
population of non-citizens are similar for the population more likely to be eligible for 
Medicaid, I estimate equation (1) only for females with lower levels of education (those who 
have no more than a high school diploma).  These women are more likely to have low 
earnings and thus meet the means test for Medicaid and other welfare programs, and so they 
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are much more likely to qualify for Medicaid coverage than women with higher education or 
men (see Table 2.13). 
The results for the less-educated female non-citizens are reported in Table 2.12.  
Given the greatly reduced sample size, none of the trends for Medicaid coverage are 
precisely estimated, though the signs and magnitudes are consistent with the findings for the 
entire population.  Private health insurance coverage increases significantly for less-educated 
females in both more (2.15 percentage points per year) and less (2.49 percentage points per 
year) generous states during the first five years of residence (see columns 2.12.1 and 2.12.2); 
these trends are not significantly different from one another. 
For less-educated females in more generous states, overall health insurance grows by 
2.99 percentage points each year in the first five years; but in less generous states, that 
growth is only 1.89 percentage points.  Though these trends are not significantly different 
from one another, at least in magnitude they are consistent with the overall finding that the 
five year residence requirement leads to lower growth in overall health insurance for non-
citizens in less generous states.  After five years of U.S. residence, there is no significant 
growth in overall health insurance coverage for less-educated females in either more or less 
generous states. 
For the labor supply outcomes, almost all of the trends for less-educated females are 
not statistically significant.  However, the estimate in column 2.12.1 shows that labor force 
participation increases by 1.96 percentage points per year in the first five years for less-
educated females in more generous states.  There is no significant growth in labor force 
participation for the less-educated females in less generous states.  If the lack of access to 
Medicaid was stimulating non-citizens to participate more in the labor force, we would 
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expect to see the opposite, that labor force participation grew more in the less generous 
states.  This is consistent with the finding for the non-citizen population as a whole – there is 
little evidence that the five year residence requirement had any effect on labor supply.  
The majority of immigrants must be legal residents of the U.S. for at least five years 
before they are eligible to naturalize as citizens.12  Therefore, the CPS sample of non-citizen 
immigrants who have not yet reached the five year residency requirement is representative of 
the total population of immigrants with less than five years of residence.  However, after 
these immigrants have lived in the U.S. for five years, not only are they eligible for Medicaid 
and other welfare benefits, but they can also begin the process of becoming U.S. citizens.  
The population of non-citizens with more than five years of U.S. residents will no longer be 
representative of the entire immigrant population with more than five years of residence.  In 
generalizing these results, it is important to remember that the trends for those with less than 
five years of residence represent the trends for the entire immigrant population with less than 
five years of residence, while the trends for those with more than five years of residence 
represent the trends only for the segment of the immigrant population who do not become 
U.S. citizens as soon as they are eligible to do so. 
 
6 Discussion 
 The five year residence requirement of PRWORA might influence the initial location 
decisions of immigrants coming to the U.S. after 1996.  Therefore, my findings – that non-
citizens in more generous states experience increasing Medicaid coverage in their first five 
years of U.S. residence but those in less generous states have no growth in Medicaid – could 
                                                 
12 The main exceptions are those who serve in the military and those who are married to U.S. citizens.  The 
minimum waiting times for these groups are one and three years, respectively. 
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be a result of initial self-selection of immigrants into more generous states.  Immigrants who 
know they are at greater risk of needing Medicaid and other benefits could locate in more 
generous states instead of less generous states when they first come to the U.S. 
Kaushal (2005) investigated whether or not the passage of PRWORA affected the 
distribution of new permanent residents across states, using data from the Immigration and 
Naturalization Service from before and after the 1996 welfare reform.  She found that 
immigrants who were more likely to qualify for means-tested benefits (unmarried women in 
low-skilled occupations) were no more likely to immigrate into more generous states after 
the welfare reform than were immigrants who were less likely to qualify for benefits (high-
skilled and/or married women).  The availability of welfare benefits does not appear to 
influence the initial state of residence for these new immigrants.  Lack of information about 
U.S. welfare programs and how they vary across states is one possible reason Kaushal used 
to explain her findings.  Also, she notes that family-sponsored immigrants tend to locate near 
their families when they first arrive in the U.S., and employer-sponsored immigrants have 
jobs that determine their initial locations; these two factors play a much more important role 
in determining initial location for new immigrants than does the relative generosity of state 
safety net programs.  This evidence supports the idea that the trends I find in Medicaid 
coverage are likely not due to initial self-selection of immigrants into more generous states. 
Additionally, non-citizens already living in less generous states after 1996 might have 
an incentive to move to more generous states where welfare benefits such as Medicaid are 
not restricted to those who have lived in the U.S. for at least five years.  An out-migration of 
Medicaid-seeking immigrants from less generous to more generous states could potentially 
account for some of the differences in the trends in Medicaid coverage that I find.  While I 
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cannot directly address this concern using the CPS data, since CPS does not follow 
individuals but samples from the same physical residence even when households move, I can 
provide some evidence that those who would be more likely to receive Medicaid coverage in 
more generous states are not leaving the less generous states. 
First, I show that less-educated female immigrants would have a larger incentive to 
move from less to more generous states in order to receive Medicaid and other benefits, 
compared to more-educated females and compared to both less- and more-educated males.  I 
define immigrants as “less-educated” if they have no education beyond a high school 
diploma.  More than two thirds of the less-educated non-citizens are not high school 
graduates (see Table 2.2).  “More-educated” describes immigrants who have at least some 
college education or a higher degree.  Table 2.13 shows the participation rates in three 
means-tested government welfare programs for four separate groups of immigrants – less-
educated females, less-educated males, more-educated females, and more-educated males.  
As these means-tested programs primarily serve female-headed households with dependent 
children, it is not surprising that the participation rates in Medicaid, Food Stamps, and 
Temporary Aid to Needy Families (TANF) for less-educated female immigrants are higher 
than the participation rates for the other groups of immigrants.  If the five-year residence 
requirement provides incentives for immigrants in need of welfare benefits to move from less 
generous to more generous states, we would expect this effect to be most prominent among 
the population at greatest risk for receiving Medicaid benefits – less-educated females. 
Next, I present evidence that less-educated female immigrants are less likely to move 
from less to more generous states, compared to the other education-gender groups.  Table 
2.14 displays the percentage of each education-gender group that lives in less generous 
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states, both when these cohorts of immigrants initially arrived in the U.S., and about five 
years later.  If Medicaid availability in more generous states is prompting relocation from 
less to more generous states, then we would expect to see the proportion of less-educated 
females living in less generous states to fall over time.  While there is a slight decrease in the 
proportion of less-educated females living in less generous states, from 64.9 percent to 64.1 
percent, that this drop is much smaller than the decrease for less-educated males, and for 
more-educated males and females, none of whom have a great incentive to relocate to more 
generous states.13  The relatively stable proportion of less-educated females living in less-
generous states indicates that out-migration due to PRWORA is not a significant concern. 
 
7 Conclusion 
The 1996 welfare reform was successful in preventing the post-enactment cohorts of 
immigrants living in less generous states from gaining access to Medicaid during their first 
five years of residence in the U.S.  This in turn meant that post-enactment immigrants in less 
generous states experienced lower growth in overall health insurance coverage when 
compared to immigrants in more generous states.  Using the passage of PRWORA as the 
policy experiment, Borjas (2003) finds that immigrants in less generous states experience a 
decrease in Medicaid coverage but an increase in private health insurance coverage.  
However, when I compare post-enactment immigrants in more and less generous states, I do 
not find differences in private health insurance coverage. 
Because recent immigrants are a dynamic population, I focus on the trends in health 
insurance and labor supply among immigrants who arrived in the U.S. after the passage of 
                                                 
13 These percentages reflect net movements of immigrants across states and out of the country, and these 
different effects cannot be disentangled with the CPS data. 
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PRWORA in 1996.  I find that Medicaid coverage increases among immigrants living in 
more generous states with each additional year of residence, but for immigrants living in less 
generous states, there is no growth in Medicaid coverage in the first five years.  Post-
enactment immigrants in both more and less generous states experience an increase in their 
private health insurance coverage the longer they live in the U.S., and this upward trend is 
not higher for the immigrants in less generous states who were denied access to Medicaid 
benefits in their first five years of U.S. residence.  Hence, the five-year residence requirement 
does not increase the growth of private health insurance for immigrants in less generous 
states.  As a result of the federal restrictions, non-citizen immigrants in less generous states 
do not gain health insurance coverage as quickly as do those in more generous states. 
Upon reaching the five-year residence requirement, immigrants living in less 
generous states do not significantly increase their Medicaid coverage, even though they no 
longer face the residence restrictions imposed by PRWORA.  This could point to a lack of 
information among recent immigrants about their eligibility, or to a continued “chilling 
effect” of the welfare reform (Fix and Passel, 1999).  Although they may now qualify for 
Medicaid, these immigrants in less generous states may be concerned that receiving welfare 
benefits such as Medicaid could negatively affect their eligibility to live and work in the U.S. 
The five year residence requirement does not increase the labor supply of immigrants 
in less generous states.  For immigrants in all states, the first five years of U.S. residence are 
a period of significant growth in labor supply, as immigrants learn about the labor market in 
the U.S.  These trends were present before the passage of PRWORA in 1996, and they do not 





The March supplements to the Current Population Survey used in this paper are available 
from the Inter-University Consortium for Political and Social Research, which is located 
online at http://www.icpsr.umich.edu. 
 
Year of entry variable 
In the March supplement to the CPS, the respondents who report that they were not born in 
the United States are asked in what year they came to the U.S. to stay.  Using the matching 
criteria described in the next section of this Appendix to match individuals with two 
observations, I test whether or not the immigrants in the CPS have consistent replies to the 
question about their year of entry.  For all immigrants in the CPS (1998-2006) who have two 
observations within those survey years, over 95 percent give the same response for their year 
of entry both times they are asked the question.  The CPS grouping of the responses to the 
year of entry question changes slightly from year to year; immigrants who entered the U.S. in 
1998 would be grouped with the 1996 and 1997 entry cohorts in the 1999 CPS, but these 
same immigrants would be grouped with the 1999 entry cohort in the 2000 CPS.  Thus the 
responses for the year of entry question are likely to be even more than 95 percent consistent. 
 I use the responses to the year of entry question to determine which immigrants 
arrived after the passage of PRWORA, as so to limit my sample to the post-enactment 
immigrants.  I construct the variable Yistj – the number of years that immigrant i, living in 
state s, surveyed in year t, and born in country j, has lived in the U.S. – by taking the 
difference between the year of the CPS survey and the year of entry.  The variable Yistj is then 
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used to construct the indicator variable Ristj.  I assign an immigrant Ristj = 1 if Yistj is greater 
than or equal to 5, to indicate which immigrants have reached the five-year residence 
requirement.  The responses in the CPS data for the relevant population (those who arrived to 
stay in the U.S. in 1996 or later) are grouped together in two-year intervals. 
 The first problem caused by this grouping of the data is that there is a small fraction 
of pre-enactment immigrants in my sample.  These pre-enactment immigrants were not 
required to live in the U.S. for five years before they could be eligible for welfare benefits; 
only the post-enactment immigrants faced this residence requirement.  Post-enactment 
immigrants are those who arrived after the passage of PRWORA in August of 1996.  Since 
those who arrived in 1996 are grouped with those who arrived in 1997 in the CPS data, to use 
the observations of the post-enactment immigrants who arrived in late 1996 and in 1997, I 
must also include those who arrived before August of 1996.  Because the CPS does not ask 
about the month of arrival in the U.S., I cannot remove these pre-enactment immigrants from 
my data without also removing true post-enactment immigrants who arrived later in 1996 and 
in 1997, which would reduce my sample by more than one quarter (9,576 observations).   
The presence of these pre-enactment immigrants in my sample may inflate the 
magnitude of the trend in Medicaid coverage for immigrants in less generous states, since 
pre-enactment immigrants are not restricted by the five-year residence requirement.  This 
might reduce the estimated difference between the trends in Medicaid coverage for 
immigrants in more and less generous states in the first five years of U.S. residence.  Thus, 
my estimate of this difference in trends should be considered a lower bound of the true effect.  
If I assume that immigrants arrive uniformly throughout the two-year interval, we would 
expect that about 29 percent (7 months between January and July divided by 24 months in 
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two years) of the 1996-97 entry cohort are actually pre-enactment immigrants.  With 9,576 
observations in the 1996-97 cohort, roughly 2,793 of those observations are likely to be pre-
enactment immigrants who were not subject to the five-year residence requirement.  As that 
number is only about 8 percent of my entire sample of 35,158 immigrants, any bias should be 
fairly small.  When I remove the 1996-97 cohort from my dataset and estimate equation (1) 
for all of the dependent variables (Medicaid, private health insurance, overall health 
insurance, labor force participation, being employed, and working full-time), the results are 
not significantly different from those including the 1996-97 cohort (not shown). 
 Another issue arises in determining which cohorts of immigrants have indeed reached 
the five-year residence requirement, thus making them eligible for welfare benefits such as 
Medicaid.  I assign the value of Yistj based on the difference between the year of the survey 
and the year of arrival.  As the arrival years are grouped in two-year intervals, I use the 
second year of the grouping as the arrival year.  For example, in the 2004 survey, immigrants 
who report arriving in the U.S. in 1998 or 1999 (grouped together in the CPS data) are 
assigned a value of Yistj equal to 5 (2004 - 1999 = 5).  Assuming a uniform distribution of 
arrival times across the two-year interval, at the time of the survey in March 2004, roughly 
half of the 1998-99 cohort will have lived in the U.S. for more than 5 years (but less than 6 
years), and the other half will have lived in the U.S. for less than 5 years (but more than 4 
years), which means that half of the cohort have reached the five-year residence requirement 
and could be eligible for Medicaid benefits, and half have not reached the residence 
requirement.  In the regression results reported in this paper, I treat those cohorts of 
immigrants who have 5 years of residence as though everyone in the cohort has reached the 
residence requirement (even though some have not).  To check for the robustness of my 
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results, I remove the cohorts with Yistj equal to 5 from the data, and use this smaller dataset to 
estimate equation (1) for all of the reported outcomes (results not shown).  Removing these 
cohorts does not affect the magnitude of any of the results; the coefficients using the reduced 




The health insurance questions in the CPS ask the survey respondents to report their health 
insurance coverage for the previous year.  However, when comparing the CPS responses to 
other surveys, some researchers conclude that the CPS responses are actually more similar to 
point-in-time estimates (see, for example, Swartz, 1986).  The estimations in this paper also 
assume that the CPS responses are point-in-time estimates, but robustness checks assuming 
that the CPS responses refer to coverage in the previous year yield similar coefficients 
(results not shown). 
 For individuals who do not respond to the questions about Medicaid coverage in the 
CPS, their Medicaid coverage is imputed using responses to other questions such as TANF 
receipt.  To determine how my results could be affected by the imputed information, I 
eliminate the 9 percent of the sample (3,190 non-citizens) whose Medicaid coverage is 
imputed rather than reported.  Among those with imputed Medicaid information, 5.2 percent 
have Medicaid coverage as compared to 6.4 percent among those who answered the 
Medicaid question. 
 Eliminating those with imputed Medicaid coverage does not significantly affect the 
results for the trends in Medicaid coverage among non-citizens (results not shown).  For 
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those in more generous states, each additional year of U.S. residence results in a statistically 
significant 0.91 percentage point increase in Medicaid coverage, which is comparable to the 
0.74 percentage point increase for the entire population from Table 2.6.  For non-citizens in 
less generous states, there is no growth in Medicaid coverage in the first five years, the trend 
is -0.30 (comparable to -0.44 in Table 2.6).  As with the entire sample, there is no significant 
growth in Medicaid coverage once non-citizens have live in the U.S. for five years when I 
remove those with imputed Medicaid information.  Given the similarity between the results 
whether or not those with imputed Medicaid coverage are included, it does not appear that 
the data imputation is biasing my main results. 
 
Matching methodology 
In the CPS survey methodology, a housing unit is included in the sampling frame for four 
consecutive months, excluded for the following eight months, and then included again for 
four additional months.  Individuals interviewed in the CPS then have the potential to appear 
in two consecutive March supplements, due to the sampling design. Because individuals in 
the CPS do not have a unique identifier, I create one by matching individuals based on 
household and person identifiers, as well as state of residence, gender, race, ethnicity, age, 
education, and country of birth. 
 I eliminate any matches where the reported age or education status decreased or grew 
by an amount more than could be expected with the passage of one year.  About 40 percent 
of the sample have two observations.  Given that the CPS follows physical residences as 
opposed to individuals or households, and given the high mobility of recent immigrants, this 
low rate of matching is not surprising. 
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Specification Robustness Checks 
The Appendix Tables 2.A1 through 2.A6 compare the results of the probit and logit 
specifications side-by-side with the results from the linear probability model for all six health 
insurance and labor supply outcomes.  The coefficients for the difference-in-differences-in-
trends variables are remarkably similar across all three specifications.  The results therefore 
do not appear to be driven by the functional form of the econometric specification.  For 
clarity and for ease of comparison to the results in Borjas (2003), the main results reported 





Table 2.A1 Trends in Medicaid coverage comparing linear probability, probit, and logit 
specifications 
Variable \ Model Linear prob. Probit Logit 












































































































State, year, and country effects Yes Yes Yes 
No. observations 35,158 34,666 34,666 
R2 0.0579 - - 
Log pseudolikelihood - -6,895.8 -6,878.2 
Note: Robust standard errors, clustered by individual, are reported in parentheses below the coefficient.  Data 
from the March supplement to the CPS, 1998-2006.  Probit coefficients represent the marginal effects at the 
mean of the independent variables.  Logit coefficients are evaluated at the population mean of the dependent 
variable (p=0.079).  * indicates statistical significance at 5 percent. 
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Table 2.A2 Trends in private health insurance coverage comparing linear probability, probit, 
and logit specifications 
Variable \ Model Linear prob. Probit Logit 












































































































State, year, and country effects Yes Yes Yes 
No. observations 35,158 35,157 35,157 
R2 0.2429 - - 
Log pseudolikelihood - -19,244 -19,245 
Note: Robust standard errors, clustered by individual, are reported in parentheses below the coefficient.  Data 
from the March supplement to the CPS, 1998-2006.  Probit coefficients represent the marginal effects at the 
mean of the independent variables.  Logit coefficients are evaluated at the population mean of the dependent 
variable (p=0.416).  * indicates statistical significance at 5 percent. 
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Table 2.A3 Trends in overall health insurance coverage comparing linear probability, probit, 
and logit specifications 
Variable \ Model Linear prob. Probit Logit 












































































































State, year, and country  
  Effects Yes Yes Yes 
No. observations 35,158 35,157 35,157 
R2 0.2245 - - 
Log pseudolikelihood - -20,038 -20,034 
Note: Robust standard errors, clustered by individual, are reported in parentheses below the coefficient.  Data 
from the March supplement to the CPS, 1998-2006.  Probit coefficients represent the marginal effects at the 
mean of the independent variables.  Logit coefficients are evaluated at the population mean of the dependent 




Table 2.A4 Trends in labor force participation comparing linear probability, probit, and logit 
specifications 
Variable \ Model Linear prob. Probit Logit 












































































































State, year, and country 
  Effects Yes Yes Yes 
No. observations 35,139 35,138 35,138 
R2 0.2478 - - 
Log pseudolikelihood - -17,626 -17,607 
Note: Robust standard errors, clustered by individual, are reported in parentheses below the coefficient.  Data 
from the March supplement to the CPS, 1998-2006.  Probit coefficients represent the marginal effects at the 
mean of the independent variables.  Logit coefficients are evaluated at the population mean of the dependent 
variable (p=0.661).  * indicates statistical significance at 5 percent. 
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Table 2.A5 Trends in being employed (if in labor force) comparing linear probability, probit, 
and logit specifications 
Variable \ Model Linear prob. Probit Logit 












































































































State, year, and country 
  Effects Yes Yes Yes 
No. observations 23,243 23,008 23,008 
R2 0.0291 - - 
Log pseudolikelihood - -5,403 -5,405 
Note: Robust standard errors, clustered by individual, are reported in parentheses below the coefficient.  Data 
from the March supplement to the CPS, 1998-2006.  Probit coefficients represent the marginal effects at the 
mean of the independent variables.  Logit coefficients are evaluated at the population mean of the dependent 
variable (p=0.933).  * indicates statistical significance at 5 percent. 
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Table 2.A6 Trends in full-time work (if employed) comparing linear probability, probit, and 
logit specifications 
Variable \ Model Linear Prob. Probit Logit 












































































































State, year, and country 
  Effects Yes Yes Yes 
No. observations 21,675 21,582 21,582 
R2 0.0931 - - 
Log pseudolikelihood - -9,135 -9,130 
Note: Robust standard errors, clustered by individual, are reported in parentheses below the coefficient.  Data 
from the March supplement to the CPS, 1998-2006.  Probit coefficients represent the marginal effects at the 
mean of the independent variables.  Logit coefficients are evaluated at the population mean of the dependent 





Figure 2.1 Standard crowd-out model with government health insurance 
 
 
Notes: Individual i maximizes his utility over two goods, c and h, where c is a consumption good and h is health 
insurance.  The price of h is  p, and the price of c is normalized to 1.  Utility is maximized subject to c + ph = m, 
where m is total income.  U1 and U2 are two representative indifference curves that correspond to this initial 
budget constraint (solid black line). 
The government offers health insurance hg, (illustrated by point A).  The new budget constraint is the red 
dashed line.  Those who would have originally purchased little or no health insurance in the private market 















Figure 2.2 Model with government health insurance, where health insurance is modeled as 
discrete instead of continuous 
 
Notes: Health insurance is a discrete good, with only one private option, hp, with price of p.  Points B and C are 
the budget constraint.  Each individual i chooses the greater of ui(m – p, hp) and ui(m, 0).  There are two types of 
individuals.  Type H has a stronger preference for health insurance, while type L has a weaker preference for 
health insurance.  The government introduces a free health insurance plan hg, where hp > hg > 0; then the budget 
constraint becomes points B and D.  Type L locates at point D (on the higher indifference curve UL*), but type 
H will remain at B.
Health insurance 
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All states Less-generous states More-generous states  
Non-citizen immigrants who are 15 years old or older, from CPS 1998-2006. 
 
Figure 2.4 Private health insurance coverage among post-PRWORA non-citizen immigrants 
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All states Less-generous states More-generous states  
Non-citizen immigrants who are 15 years old or older, from CPS 1998-2006. 
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Figure 2.5 Overall health insurance coverage among post-PRWORA non-citizen immigrants 
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All states Less-generous states More-generous states  
Non-citizen immigrants who are 15 years old or older, from CPS 1998-2006. 
 
Figure 2.6 Labor force participation among post-PRWORA non-citizen immigrants by years 
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All states Less-generous states More-generous states  
Non-citizen immigrants who are 15 years old or older, from CPS 1998-2006. 
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Figure 2.7 Employment among post-PRWORA non-citizen immigrants by years of U.S. 
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All states Less-generous states More-generous states  
Non-citizen immigrants who are 15 years old or older, from CPS 1998-2006. 
 
Figure 2.8 Full-time work (>35 hours per week) among post-PRWORA non-citizen 
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All states Less-generous states More-generous states  
Non-citizen immigrants who are 15 years old or older, from CPS 1998-2006. 
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All states Less-generous states More-generous states  
Non-citizen immigrants who are 15 years old or older, from CPS 1994-1996. 
 
Figure 2.10 Private health insurance coverage among pre-PRWORA non-citizen immigrants 
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All states Less-generous states More-generous states
          
Non-citizen immigrants who are 15 years old or older, from CPS 1994-1996.
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Figure 2.11 Overall health insurance coverage among pre-PRWORA non-citizen immigrants 
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All states Less-generous states More-generous states  
Non-citizen immigrants who are 15 years old or older, from CPS 1994-1996. 
 
Figure 2.12 Labor force participation among pre-PRWORA non-citizen immigrants by years 
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All states Less-generous states More-generous states  
Non-citizen immigrants who are 15 years old or older, from CPS 1994-1996. 
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Figure 2.13 Employment among pre-PRWORA non-citizen immigrants by years of U.S. 
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All states Less-generous states More-generous states  
Non-citizen immigrants who are 15 years old or older and report being in the labor force, from CPS 1994-1996. 
 
Figure 2.14 Full-time work (>35 hours per week) among pre-PRWORA non-citizen 
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Table 2.1 More generous states provide Medicaid coverage to otherwise eligible adult non-
citizen immigrants who arrived after the 1996 welfare reform and who have been living in 




California     Minnesota 
Connecticut     Nebraska 
Delaware     New Jersey 
District of Columbia    Pennsylvania 
Indiana     Rhode Island 
Maine      Washington 




Alabama     Nevada 
Alaska      New Hampshire 
Arizona     New Mexico 
Arkansas     New York* 
Colorado     North Carolina 
Florida      North Dakota 
Georgia     Ohio 
Hawaii      Oklahoma 
Idaho      Oregon 
Illinois      South Carolina 
Iowa      South Dakota 
Kansas      Tennessee 
Kentucky     Texas 
Louisiana     Utah 
Maryland     Vermont 
Michigan     Virginia 
Mississippi     West Virginia 
Missouri     Wisconsin 





*Immigrants arriving in the U.S. after PRWORA were initially ineligible to receive Medicaid in the state of 
New York, until a court ruling in 2001 ended that practice. 
 
Source:  Chin K, Dean S, Patchan K.  2002.  How Have States Responded to the Eligibility Restrictions on 




Table 2.2 Variable means for the sample of non-citizen immigrants who arrived in the U.S. 
after the passage of PRWORA 
 Less-Generous States More Generous States 
Variable Mean (Std. Dev.) Mean (Std. Dev.) 
Years in the U.S. 3.45 (2.22) 3.63 (2.24) 
Less Generous State 1.00 (0.00) 0.00 (0.00) 
Resident for Five Years 0.32 (0.46) 0.35 (0.48) 
Age 32.1 (12.3) 32.7 (12.8) 
Female 0.48 (0.50) 0.50 (0.50) 
Married 0.49 (0.50) 0.48 (0.50) 
No High School 0.24 (0.42) 0.22 (0.41) 
High School Drop Out 0.19 (0.39) 0.18 (0.38) 
High School Graduate 0.23 (0.42) 0.22 (0.41) 
Some College 0.12 (0.33) 0.13 (0.34) 
College 0.15 (0.35) 0.15 (0.36) 
Advanced Degree 0.08 (0.27) 0.10 (0.30) 
Metropolitan Status 0.89 (0.32) 0.97 (0.18) 
State Unemployment Rate 4.96 (1.07) 5.34 (0.97) 
Labor Force Participation 0.67 (0.47) 0.65 (0.48) 
Employed (if in the labor force) 0.94 (0.24) 0.92 (0.27) 
Full-Time Work (if employed) 0.83 (0.38) 0.81 (0.39) 
Medicaid 0.06 (0.23) 0.11 (0.32) 
Private Health Insurance 0.42 (0.49) 0.41 (0.49) 
Any Health Insurance 0.48 (0.50) 0.53 (0.50) 
AFDC/TANF 0.01 (0.08) 0.01 (0.10) 
Food Stamps 0.06 (0.24) 0.06 (0.23) 
     
No. of Observations 21,834  13,324  
Note: This includes all non-citizen immigrants 15 years old or older, who reported arriving in the US in 1996 or 
later, from CPS 1998-2006.  For all immigrants, 23,243 report being in the labor force, and 21,675 report being 
employed.  For less (more) generous states, 14,529 (8,714) report being in the labor force, and 13,627 (8,048) 


















Table 2.3 Linear probability model for trends in Medicaid coverage 
Variable 2.3.1 2.3.2 2.3.3 










































Age - -0.002* (0.001) 
-0.001* 
(0.001) 
Age squared - 0.000* (0.000) 
0.000 
(0.000) 
Female - 0.030* (0.003) 
0.027* 
(0.003) 
Married - 0.010* (0.003) 
0.010* 
(0.003) 
No high school - 0.010* (0.004) 
0.022* 
(0.004) 
High school drop out - 0.020* (0.004) 
0.026* 
(0.004) 
Some college - -0.011* (0.005) 
-0.013* 
(0.005) 
College degree - -0.032* (0.004) 
-0.029* 
(0.004) 
Advanced degree - -0.039* (0.004) 
-0.034* 
(0.005) 
Metropolitan area - 0.008 (0.004) 
-0.001 
(0.005) 
State URATE - 0.002* (0.001) 
0.002 
(0.003) 
Fixed effects for state, year,  
  and country of birth No No Yes 
R2 0.0096 0.0228 0.0579 
No. observations 35,158 35,158 35,158 
Note: Robust standard errors, clustered by individual, are reported in parentheses below the coefficient.  Data 
from the March supplement to the CPS, 1998-2006.  * indicates statistical significance at 5 percent. 
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Table 2.4 Linear probability model for trends in private health insurance coverage 
Variable 2.4.1 2.4.2 2.4.3 










































Age - 0.001 (0.001) 
0.004* 
(0.001) 
Age squared - 0.000 (0.000) 
0.000* 
(0.000) 
Female - -0.008 (0.005) 
-0.018* 
(0.005) 
Married - 0.102* (0.006) 
0.100* 
(0.005) 
No high school - -0.148* (0.007) 
-0.065* 
(0.007) 
High school drop out - -0.059* (0.008) 
-0.015 
(0.008) 
Some college - 0.138* (0.010) 
0.074* 
(0.009) 
College degree - 0.302* (0.009) 
0.181* 
(0.009) 
Advanced degree - 0.420* (0.010) 
0.272* 
(0.011) 
Metropolitan area - -0.044* (0.009) 
-0.039* 
(0.010) 
State URATE - -0.022* (0.002) 
-0.008 
(0.006) 
Fixed effects for state, year,  
  and country of birth No No Yes 
    
R2 0.0044 0.173 0.2429 
No. observations 35,158 35,158 35,158 
Note: Robust standard errors, clustered by individual, are reported in parentheses below the coefficient.  Data 




Table 2.5 Linear probability model for trends in overall health insurance coverage 
Variable 2.5.1 2.5.2 2.5.3 










































Age - -0.015* (0.001) 
-0.012* 
(0.001) 
Age squared - 0.000* (0.000) 
0.000* 
(0.000) 
Female - 0.028* (0.005) 
0.015* 
(0.005) 
Married - 0.125* (0.006) 
0.123* 
(0.006) 
No high school - -0.138* (0.008) 
-0.041* 
(0.008) 
High school drop out - -0.047* (0.009) 
0.003 
(0.008) 
Some college - 0.130* (0.010) 
0.062* 
(0.009) 
College degree - 0.270* (0.009) 
0.151* 
(0.009) 
Advanced degree - 0.377* (0.009) 
0.234* 
(0.010) 
Metropolitan area - -0.037* (0.010) 
-0.036* 
(0.010) 
State URATE - -0.019* (0.002) 
-0.008 
(0.006) 
Fixed effects for state, year,  
  and country of birth No No Yes 
    
R2 0.0079 0.149 0.2245 
No. observations 35,158 35,158 35,158 
Note: Robust standard errors, clustered by individual, are reported in parentheses below the coefficient.  Data 
from the March supplement to the CPS, 1998-2006.  * indicates statistical significance at 5 percent. 
 
 58
Table 2.6 The effect of an additional year in the U.S. on Medicaid, private health insurance, 
and overall health insurance coverage – coefficients calculated from the estimates in Tables 
2.3-2.5 
 Less than five years residence More than five years residence 









































Note: Robust standard errors, clustered by individual, are reported in parentheses below the trends. 
*indicates statistically significantly different from zero at the 5 percent level. 
In the column 2.6.1, the reported trend is the coefficient on Yistj, the number of years spent in the U.S. 
In column 2.6.2, the reported trend is the sum of the coefficient on Yistj and the coefficient on Yistj* LGs, the 
interaction between the number of years in the U.S. and the indicator for living in a less-generous state. 
In column 2.6.3, the reported trend is the sum of the coefficient on Yistj and the coefficient on Yistj* Ristj, the 
interaction between the number of years in the U.S. and the indicator for having reached the five-year residence 
requirement. 
In column 2.6.4, the reported trend is the sum of the coefficient on Yistj, the coefficient on Yistj* LGs, the 
coefficient on Yistj* Ristj, and the coefficient on Yistj * LGs* Ristj. 
The coefficients in columns 2.6.1 and 2.6.2 are statistically significantly different from one another for 





Table 2.7 Linear probability model for trends in labor force participation 
Variable 2.7.1 2.7.2 2.7.3 










































Age - 0.049* (0.001) 
0.048* 
(0.001) 
Age squared - -0.001* (0.000) 
-0.001* 
(0.000) 
Female - -0.332* (0.005) 
-0.326* 
(0.005) 
Married - -0.091* (0.005) 
-0.086* 
(0.005) 
No high school - -0.062* (0.007) 
-0.092* 
(0.007) 
High school drop out - -0.096* (0.008) 
-0.109* 
(0.008) 
Some college - -0.056* (0.009) 
-0.026* 
(0.009) 
College degree - -0.036* (0.008) 
0.019* 
(0.009) 
Advanced degree - -0.019* (0.009) 
0.050* 
(0.010) 
Metropolitan area - -0.002 (0.009) 
0.004 
(0.009) 
State URATE - -0.010* (0.002) 
-0.012* 
(0.006) 
Fixed effects for state, year,  
  and country of birth No No Yes 
    
R2 0.0036 0.2226 0.2478 
No. observations 35,139 35,139 35,139 
Note: Robust standard errors, clustered by individual, are reported in parentheses below the coefficient.  Data 




Table 2.8 Linear probability model for trends in employment (if in labor force) 
Variable 2.8.1 2.8.2 2.8.3 










































Age - 0.006* (0.001) 
0.006* 
(0.001) 
Age squared - 0.000* (0.000) 
0.000* 
(0.000) 
Female - -0.034* (0.004) 
-0.033* 
(0.004) 
Married - -0.005 (0.004) 
-0.006 
(0.004) 
No high school - -0.020* (0.005) 
-0.022* 
(0.006) 
High school drop out - -0.023* (0.006) 
-0.025* 
(0.006) 
Some college - 0.007 (0.006) 
0.011 
(0.006) 
College degree - 0.016* (0.005) 
0.017* 
(0.006) 
Advanced degree - 0.025* (0.005) 
0.021* 
(0.006) 
Metropolitan area - -0.008 (0.006) 
-0.002 
(0.006) 
State URATE - -0.010* (0.002) 
-0.011* 
(0.004) 
Fixed effects for state, year,  
  and country of birth No No Yes 
    
R2 0.0027 0.0148 0.0291 
No. observations 23,243 23,243 23,243 
Note: Robust standard errors, clustered by individual, are reported in parentheses below the coefficient.  Data 




Table 2.9 Linear probability model for trends in full-time work (if employed) 
Variable 2.9.1 2.9.2 2.9.3 










































Age - 0.028* (0.002) 
0.028* 
(0.002) 
Age squared - 0.000* (0.000) 
0.000* 
(0.000) 
Female - -0.155* (0.006) 
-0.149* 
(0.006) 
Married - 0.002 (0.006) 
0.009 
(0.006) 
No high school - -0.018* (0.007) 
-0.036* 
(0.008) 
High school drop out - -0.038* (0.008) 
-0.049* 
(0.009) 
Some college - -0.080* (0.010) 
-0.066* 
(0.010) 
College degree - -0.028* (0.009) 
0.000 
(0.009) 
Advanced degree - -0.008 (0.009) 
0.041* 
(0.011) 
Metropolitan area - 0.019 (0.010) 
0.002 
(0.011) 
State URATE - -0.004 (0.003) 
-0.015* 
(0.006) 
Fixed effects for state, year,  
  and country of birth No No Yes 
    
R2 0.0019 0.0663 0.0931 
No. observations 21,675 21,675 21,675 
Note: Robust standard errors, clustered by individual, are reported in parentheses below the coefficient.  Data 
from the March supplement to the CPS, 1998-2006.  * indicates statistical significance at 5 percent. 
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Table 2.10 The effect of an additional year in the U.S. on labor force participation, being 
employed, and full-time work – coefficients calculated from the estimates in Tables 2.7-2.9 
 Less than five years residence More than five years residence 









































Note: Robust standard errors, clustered by individual, are reported in parentheses below the coefficient. 
*indicates statistically significantly different from zero at the 5 percent level. 
In the column 2.10.1, the reported trend is the coefficient on Yistj, the number of years spent in the U.S. 
In column 2.10.2, the reported trend is the sum of the coefficient on Yistj and the coefficient on Yistj* LGs, the 
interaction between the number of years in the U.S. and the indicator for living in a less-generous state. 
In column 2.10.3, the reported trend is the sum of the coefficient on Yistj and the coefficient on Yistj* Ristj, the 
interaction between the number of years in the U.S. and the indicator for having reached the five-year residence 
requirement. 
In column 2.10.4, the reported trend is the sum of the coefficient on Yistj, the coefficient on Yistj* LGs, the 
coefficient on Yistj* Ristj, and the coefficient on Yistj * LGs* Ristj. 
The coefficients in column 2.10.1 are not statistically significantly different from those in 2.10.2, and the 




Table 2.11 The effect of an additional year in the U.S. on Medicaid, private health insurance, 
and overall health insurance coverage – excluding those born in Mexico 
 Less than five years residence More than five years residence 








 2.11.1 2.11.2 2.11.3 2.11.4 
Medicaid 































































Note: Robust standard errors, clustered by individual, are reported in parentheses below the coefficient. 
*indicates statistically significantly different from zero at the 5 percent level. 
Sample is foreign-born non-citizens who arrived in or after 1996, excluding those born in Mexico. 
In the column 2.11.1, the reported trend is the coefficient on Yistj, the number of years spent in the U.S. 
In column 2.11.2, the reported trend is the sum of the coefficient on Yistj and the coefficient on Yistj* LGs, the 
interaction between the number of years in the U.S. and the indicator for living in a less-generous state. 
In column 2.11.3, the reported trend is the sum of the coefficient on Yistj and the coefficient on Yistj* Ristj, the 
interaction between the number of years in the U.S. and the indicator for having reached the five-year residence 
requirement. 
In column 2.11.4, the reported trend is the sum of the coefficient on Yistj, the coefficient on Yistj* LGs, the 
coefficient on Yistj* Ristj, and the coefficient on Yistj * LGs* Ristj. 
The coefficients in columns 2.11.1 and 2.11.2 are only statistically significantly different from one another for 
Medicaid and Overall insurance.  The coefficients in 2.11.3 and 2.11.4 are only significantly different from one 




Table 2.12 The effect of an additional year in the U.S. on Medicaid, private health insurance, 
and overall health insurance coverage – less-educated females 
 Less than five years residence More than five years residence 








 2.12.1 2.12.2 2.12.3 2.12.4 
Medicaid 































































Note: Robust standard errors, clustered by individual, are reported in parentheses below the coefficient. 
*indicates statistically significantly different from zero at the 5 percent level. 
Sample is foreign-born female non-citizens who have no more than a high school diploma. 
In the column 2.12.1, the reported trend is the coefficient on Yistj, the number of years spent in the U.S. 
In column 2.12.2, the reported trend is the sum of the coefficient on Yistj and the coefficient on Yistj* LGs, the 
interaction between the number of years in the U.S. and the indicator for living in a less-generous state. 
In column 2.12.3, the reported trend is the sum of the coefficient on Yistj and the coefficient on Yistj* Ristj, the 
interaction between the number of years in the U.S. and the indicator for having reached the five-year residence 
requirement. 
In column 2.12.4, the reported trend is the sum of the coefficient on Yistj, the coefficient on Yistj* LGs, the 
coefficient on Yistj* Ristj, and the coefficient on Yistj * LGs* Ristj. 
The coefficients in columns 2.12.1 and 2.12.2 are not statistically significantly different from one another at the 
five percent level.  The coefficients in 2.12.3 and 2.12.4 are not significantly different from one another at the 






Table 2.13 Participation rates in means-tested government welfare programs for newly 
arrived immigrants in the U.S. 
 Percent Participating in Means-Tested Programs 
 Medicaid Food Stamps TANF No. obs. 
Less-educated females 11.0 9.7 2.2 1,566 
Less-educated males 4.2 6.8 0.7 1,873 
More-educated females 2.5 3.0 0.7 1,019 
More-educated males 2.5 2.4 0.6 970 
Note: Data from the March supplement to the CPS, 1998-2000.  Sample includes all foreign-born, both citizens 
and non-citizens, ages 15 or older, who entered the U.S. in 1996-99 and are in their first or second year of U.S. 
residence.  Less-educated refers to those with at most a high school degree.  More-educated refers to those with 
at least some college education.  The Food Stamp variable is a family-based variable.
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Table 2.14 Percentage of different immigrant populations residing in less generous states 
 Percent Living in Less Generous States 
 1-2 Years of U.S. Residence 
6-7 Years of U.S. 
Residence 
Less-educated females 64.9 64.1 
Less-educated males 68.2 64.5 
More-educated females 65.0 61.3 
More-educated males 66.8 58.0 
Note: Data from the March supplement to the CPS, 1998-2006.  Sample includes all foreign-born, both citizens 
and non-citizens, ages 15 or older, who entered the U.S. in 1996-99.  Less-educated refers to those with at most 
a high school degree.  More-educated refers to those with at least some college education.  The fractions in this 
table are calculated as, for example, the number of less-educated females living in less generous states divided 
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 Highly-skilled foreign-born workers are in great demand in the U.S. labor market.  In 
each of the last five fiscal years, the Congressionally-mandated quota of H-1B visas (a 
temporary work visa for foreign workers with specialized skills) has been exhausted, 
typically within days after the visas become available (National Foundation for American 
Policy 2007b).  In addition to visa limits, employers looking for skilled foreign workers face 
significant financial costs.  Hiring foreign-born workers can be much more expensive than 
hiring native workers.  The National Foundation for American Policy (2007b) estimates that 
employers pay close to $6,000 in legal and processing fees for each foreign national they hire 
on a temporary employment-based visa (such as an H-1B visa).  In addition, there are likely 
to be many other costs associated with recruiting foreign-born workers, such as international 
travel for interviews, international relocation costs, etc.  Given these higher costs, we would 
expect to find that employers offer foreign-born workers lower wages than similarly skilled 
native workers, in order to offset the additional costs they incur to hire the foreign-born 
workers. 
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 On the labor supply side, high-skilled foreign born workers who desire to live and 
work permanently in the U.S., and who apply to become permanent residents of the U.S., 
may be willing to receive lower wages than similar natives due to the process they must 
undergo to become immigrants.1  There are at least two potential sources of job market 
friction faced by foreign-born workers who desire to be legal permanent residents.  The first 
comes from the aforementioned costs that employers must pay to hire foreign-born workers, 
limiting these workers to finding employment with companies who are willing to undergo 
those additional costs. 
The second source of job friction comes from the process by which a foreign-born 
worker becomes a permanent resident.  Most employment-based immigrants wait at least five 
years from the time they apply to become permanent residents to the time they receive their 
green cards (National Foundation for American Policy 2007a), but there are often time limits 
on temporary employment visas.  For one common example, the time limit on an H-1B visa 
is six years.2  Though the H-1B visa can be transferred from company to company (the six 
year limit follows the worker, not the position), green card applications cannot be transferred 
to another employer.  To change jobs after they have applied for permanent residence but 
before they have received their green cards means that employment-based immigrants must 
restart the entire process.  Foreign-born workers risk losing their place in the green card 
queue, or even not being able to get a green card, if they change jobs before they have 
completed the process to become legal permanent residents. 
                                                 
1 Technically, an “immigrant” is defined by the U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Service as someone who 
holds a permanent resident visa (green card).  All other non-citizens in the U.S., such as tourists, international 
students, and those with work visas, are considered to be “temporary aliens.” 
2 The initial period for the H-1B visa is three years, and it can be renewed once for three additional years.  
Holders of H-1B visas are not required to return to their country of origin before adjusting to permanent 
residence.  This is not true of some other temporary visas, such as J visas for visiting scholars. 
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The receipt of a green card enables a foreign national to work for any employer 
without the need for that employer to apply for a visa or a green card on his behalf.  Thus, 
these immigrants can more easily move from job to job.  Sponsoring employers who want to 
retain the new permanent resident workers may need to compete with other employers and 
potentially increase the wages they offer to their immigrant workers. 
To estimate the wage premium associated with the increase in job mobility when an 
employer-sponsored immigrant becomes a legal permanent resident, I use the recently 
released New Immigrant Survey (Jasso, Massey, Rosenzweig, and Smith 2006), which 
provides wage observations for employer-sponsored immigrants both before and after they 
have become legal permanent residents.  Once employer-sponsored immigrants have 
received their green cards, they have are just as unrestricted in the labor market as are native 
U.S. workers.  I construct a control group of otherwise similar native workers using the 
Merged Outgoing Rotation Groups of the Current Population Survey.  To determine the 
effect of receiving a green card on the wages of employer-sponsored immigrants, I employ a 
difference-in-differences matching estimator (Blundell and Costa Dias 2002). 
The following section presents a theoretical framework where the costs born by 
employers on behalf of their foreign-born workers drive the initial wage differences between 
immigrants and natives.  Additionally, I discuss the significant differences between the 
immigrant and native populations that motivate the use of the matching strategy.  In the third 
section, I describe the propensity score matching estimator that I use to construct an 
appropriate control group for the employer-sponsored immigrants from among native 
workers and the difference-in-differences strategy I implement to compare their wages.  
Section 4 describes both the New Immigrant Survey and the Merged Outgoing Rotation 
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Groups of the Current Population Survey that I use for the analysis.  In the fifth section, I 
present the empirical results, which show that employer-sponsored immigrants experience at 
least a 13.5 percent wage increase (over and above the wage increase of similar native 
workers) when they receive their green cards.  I also demonstrate that employer-sponsored 
immigrants who change jobs experience larger wage increases than those who stay in the 
same job, supporting the hypothesis that the wage increases are due to greater job mobility.  
In Section 6, I present evidence that the wage increases experienced by employer-sponsored 
immigrants are not likely driven by the time spent in the U.S., since their post-green card 
wages are similar to those of employer-sponsored immigrants who arrived in the U.S. with 
green cards.  The final section concludes. 
 
2 Theoretical Framework 
Consider two identical (in terms of skills or marginal product of labor) workers (i = N, F), 
where N is a native-born worker, and F is a foreign-born worker, employed in two time 
periods (t = 0, 1).  In the first period (t = 0), both workers receive the same total 
compensation 0C  in exchange for their labor.  This compensation involves two components: 
,000 ii bwC +=  
 
where 0iw  is the wage and 0ib  is a sponsorship benefit for individual i.  The sponsorship 
benefit 0ib  represents the costs that an employer undertakes in order to hire a foreign-born 
worker and sponsor that worker for a legal permanent resident visa.  Worker N has no need 
of the sponsorship benefit, and so prefers 00 =Nb , while the worker F would like to be able 
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to continue to live and work in the United States, and so prefers 00 >Fb .  Since the two 
workers receive the same compensation, 0C  , N will have higher wages than F: 
00000 FFNN bwbwC +=+=  
⇒>= ,0,0 00 FN bb  
.00 FN ww >  
 In the second period (t = 1), F has become a legal permanent resident, and no longer 
desires the sponsorship benefit.  Now both N and F prefer 01 =b .  The two workers still 
receive the same total compensation, which now consists only of wages for both workers: 
,11111 FFNN bwbwC +=+=  
,0, 11 =FN bb  
.111 FN wwC ==  
 Because F prefers 00 >Fb in the first period (t = 0) but then prefers 00 =Fb in the 
second period (t = 1), the wage change experienced by F across the two time periods will be 
larger than the wage change experienced by N: 
).()( 0101 NNFF wwww −>−  
 
 To estimate the wage premium associated with receiving a green card for immigrants 
who are sponsored by their employers, I calculate the difference between the wage change 
for the native worker and the wage change for the foreign-born worker: 
)()( 0101 NNFF wwwwalueGreenCardV −−−=  
which can be rearrange and written as: 
).()()1( 0011 NFNF wwwwalueGreenCardV −−−=  
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 The primary complication associated with estimating this value of a green card is 
finding an appropriate group of native workers that are otherwise identical to the employer-
sponsored immigrants.  On average, employer-sponsored immigrants are quite dissimilar 
from the native population in the U.S. in ways that would be expected to affects wages.  
However, to calculate the wage premium of a green card requires that the two types of 
workers be viewed as substitutes by employers, such that they would receive identical 
compensation. 
 A comparison of employer-sponsored immigrants from the New Immigrant Survey 
and native workers from the Merged Outgoing Rotation Groups of the Current Population 
Survey highlights the differences between these two populations (see Table 3.1).  For 
examples, less than a quarter of employer-sponsored immigrants are female, while over half 
of native workers are female.  The contrasts in the education profiles of these two groups are 
particularly striking.  Forty percent of employer-sponsored immigrants have a bachelor’s 
degree, which is more than twice the percentage among native workers (18.9 percent).  
Another forty percent of the employer-sponsored immigrants have obtained graduate 
degrees, compared to less than ten percent of native workers.  Naturally, differences in 
schooling lead to significant differences between the wage profiles of the two groups. 
 On average, the native workers are older than the employer-sponsored immigrants.  
The median age for the employer-sponsored immigrants is between 35 and 39 in 2004, 
compared to a median age between 50 and 54 for the native workers.  This would tend to 
narrow the wage gap between the two groups, as native workers will have more experience, 
which is rewarded in the labor market.  Employer-sponsored immigrants are more 
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geographically concentrated than natives, with 47.5 percent of them located in the six 
traditional gateway states (California, Florida, Illinois, New Jersey, New York, and Texas); 
only 29.5 percent of native workers live in those six states.  The top industries where 
employer-sponsored immigrants work are also different from the top industries where natives 
are employed.  Table 3.2A lists the top ten industries that for employer-sponsored 
immigrants, and Table 3.2B lists the top ten for native workers.  Over one fifth of the 
immigrants are employed in computer system design, while the largest industry among 
natives is elementary and secondary schools.3  Consistent with their higher levels of 
education, employer-sponsored immigrants are concentrated in higher paying industries. 
 Along all of these dimensions, employer-sponsored immigrants are different from 
native workers in ways that we would expect to affect wages.  Therefore, native workers in 
general would not make a good control group for employer-sponsored immigrants.  To 
address the differences between these two populations, and to generate an appropriate control 
group for the employer-sponsored immigrants from among the native workers, I implement a 
matching strategy as described in the following section.  
 
3 Econometric Specification 
To estimate the impact of legal permanent residence and the associated increase in job 
mobility on the wages of employer-sponsored immigrants, I use the difference-in-differences 
strategy already outlined in equation (1) in the previous section: 
).()()1( 0011 NFNF wwwwalueGreenCardV −−−=  
 
                                                 
3 See the Appendix (Table 3A.2 in particular) for a similar discussion of family-sponsored immigrants as 
compared to employer-sponsored immigrants. 
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Instead of a dollar amount for the GreenCardValue, I calculate the percentage wage premium 
associated with receiving legal permanent residence.  To this end, I use the log of wages 
instead of the levels and compute the expectation to obtain: 
)}.(ln)(ln{)}(ln)(ln{)2( 0011 iNiFiNiF wEwEwEwEtaluePercenGreenCardV −−−=  
 
where i is an index for all individuals, ).,...,3,2,1( Ii =   Using data from the NIS, I can 
calculate the means of both the first wages, )(ln 0iFwE , and the current wages, )(ln 1iFwE , 
for the employer-sponsored immigrants.  As discussed in the previous section, using the 
means of the wages for the entire population of natives from the MORG of the CPS would 
not lead to accurate estimates of )(ln 0iNwE  and )(ln 1iNwE  because the natives and the 
employer-sponsored immigrants differ along a number of demographic characteristics that 
affect their wages.  To calculate appropriate values for )(ln 0iNwE  and )(ln 1iNwE to use in 
computing the difference-in-differences equation (2), I implement a matching strategy that 
selects a control group of native workers who are otherwise similar to the employer-
sponsored immigrants. 
 To estimate the wage premium associated with receiving a green card for employer-
sponsored immigrants, I implement a difference-in-differences propensity score matching 
estimator as originally developed by Rosenbaum and Rubin (1983).  The difference-in-
differences matching technique is further discussed in Blundell and Costa Dias (2002).  
Because there is no longitudinal data set containing native workers that is comparable to the 
NIS, I need to perform two separate matching procedures, one for the employer-sponsored 
immigrants’ first wage, and another for their current wage. 
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 In a standard difference-in-difference set-up, you have two observations of an 
outcome for the ‘treated’ group – one observation before the treatment takes place and the 
other observation after the treatment.  You also have two observations for the ‘control’ group 
to align with the observations for the treatment group.  The control group does not receive 
any treatment.  In the present analysis, the treatment is the increase in job mobility that 
comes with legal permanent residence for employer-sponsored immigrants, which is the 
treatment group.  The NIS provides wage observations for these immigrants both before and 
after they receive their green cards.  What is different in this set-up is that the control group 
of native workers is essentially treated in both time periods.4  Native workers do not need to 
receive green cards; they always have the job mobility that foreign-born workers sponsored 
by their employers only gain when they become legal permanent residents.  Still, throughout 
the analysis I refer to the employer-sponsored immigrants as the ‘treatment’ group and the 
native workers as the ‘control’ group. 
 The purpose of matching is to ensure that the distribution of covariates (that are 
contained in a vector Z) which could affect the outcome of interest (weekly wages) are the 
same in both the treatment group (of employer-sponsored immigrants) and the selected 
control group (of native workers).  Matching essentially randomizes the treatment by 
selecting controls with similar distributions of covariates as the treated.  Though the 
matching procedure can be done using the entire vector of covariates, Rosenbaum and Rubin 
(1983) show that the dimensionality problem of matching on a large number of covariates 
can be avoided by matching on a single function of the covariates Z.  This function, )(ZP , 
                                                 
4 Another potential method to measure the value of a green card would be to compare the wages of employer-
sponsored immigrants before and after green card receipt to the wages of foreign-born workers who did not 
receive green cards.  This would fit more closely with a typical difference-in-differences framework, since the 
control group would not receive the treatment.  However, I am not aware of any comparable dataset that would 
allow me to identify foreign-born workers who did not receive green cards. 
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called the propensity score, is simply the conditional probability of being in the treatment, in 
this case, the probability of being an employer-sponsored immigrant.  Let 
ionsoredEmployerSp  be an indicator variable equal to 1 if individual i is a member of the 
treatment group, i.e., an employer-sponsored immigrant, and equal to 0 if i is a member the 
control group, i.e., a native worker.  The propensity score I estimate using a logit 
specification is given by the following equation: 
]|1[)|1Pr()()3( iiiiii ZonsoredEmployerSpEZonsoredEmployerSpZP ==== . 
 
 Because there is no longitudinal data set containing native workers that is comparable 
to the NIS, I need to perform two separate matching procedures.  I estimate the logit 
propensity score twice, once for the first observation of the employer-sponsored immigrants, 
and then again for the immigrants’ current (post-green card) observation.  The fitted values 
from the propensity score estimations, called p-scores, give the probability that an individual 
is a member of the treatment group.  The next step in the matching strategy is to use the p-
scores to choose a control group of native workers who are otherwise similar to the 
employer-sponsored immigrants.  With nearest neighbor matching, each member of the 
treatment group (employer-sponsored immigrants) is paired with one (or more) members 
from the entire control group with the closest p-score value.  These neighbors form the 



















Note the similarity between this and the original equation (1) from the Theoretical 
Framework.  The main difference is that I have now conditioned the values of )(ln 0iNwE  
and )(ln 10iNwE  on the p-score estimated in equation (3). 
 
4 Data 
For information on employer-sponsored immigrants, I use newly available data from the 
2003 New Immigrant Survey (NIS).  This survey is a nationally representative sample of 
foreign-born individuals who became legal permanent residents of the United States between 
May and November of 2003.5  In the first round of this (future) panel survey, new legal 
permanent residents were interviewed between June 2003 and June 2004, after they had 
received their green cards.  Out of the sampling frame of 12,500 immigrants, 8,573 
completed the initial interview, resulting in an overall response rate of 68.6 percent.  The NIS 
is unique in the wealth of information that it provides about new legal permanent residents.  
The respondents answer questions about their work experience and wages before they came 
to the United States, as well as their work experience and wages in the U.S., both before and 
after receiving green cards.   
 From the surveyed population of new immigrants, I limit my sample to those who 
report having an employer sponsor, who are principal immigrants (that is, those whose own 
employers are the sponsor, as opposed to the employers of their spouses or parents), and who 
adjusted their status to legal permanent resident (that is, they were already living in the U.S. 
on another type of visa when they applied for green cards, as opposed to those who applied 
for and received their green cards while living in another country).  Of the 8,573 new 
                                                 
5 NIS data is available at http://nis.princeton.edu/. 
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permanent residents in the NIS, 491 individuals met all of these criteria, and additionally 
worked for pay in the U.S. both before and after they received their green cards, and reported 
the wages for the jobs they held. 
 The descriptive statistics for this population of employer-sponsored immigrants are 
reported in the first column of Table 3.1.  Note that three quarters of these immigrants are 
male, and 80 percent have at least a bachelor’s degree.  The educational attainment of these 
immigrants is much higher than that of the immigrant population as a whole, or of the native 
U.S. population.  Seventy-five percent were between the ages of 29 and 43 when they 
received their green cards in 2003, and almost two thirds arrived in the U.S. between 1996 
and 2000.  The top ten industry categories in which these immigrants worked when they first 
arrived in the U.S. are listed in Table 3.2A.  One fifth of the employer-sponsored immigrants 
were employed in “computer system design and related services” before receiving their green 
cards, and “colleges and universities, including junior colleges” were the next largest 
employer for this population when they first arrived in the United States. 
 The ideal dataset to use in examining the effects of increased mobility on wages 
would have information on immigrants’ U.S. wages just before and just after they received 
their green cards.  However, rather than asking about the immigrants’ U.S. wages just before 
receiving green cards, the NIS has detailed information on the first U.S. job, as well as 
information on the current (post-green card) U.S. job.  Survey respondents also answer basic 
demographic questions and provide information on their green card sponsor. 
 To construct an appropriate control group for the employer-sponsored immigrants in 
the NIS, I use the Merged Outgoing Rotation Groups (MORG) from the Current Population 
Survey (CPS).  This survey also contains basic demographic questions and information on 
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wages and industry of employment for U.S. workers.  I use only observations of native-born 
citizens in the CPS to construct a control group for the employer-sponsored immigrants, 
since I do not know which foreign-born workers in the CPS have green cards and which do 
not.  About twenty-five percent of the natives in the CPS have imputed wage data, which 
could lead to biased estimates of the wages of the control group (see Hirsch and Schumacher, 
2003).  Therefore, I exclude those with imputed wage information in the MORG, and only 
use those observations with reported wages.6 
Given that I have longitudinal data for the employer-sponsored immigrants from the 
New Immigrant Survey, an ideal dataset from which to draw the control group of natives 
would also be longitudinal.  However, existing longitudinal datasets do not properly align 
with the age cohorts of the NIS or do not include enough wage information.  For example, 
the National Longitudinal Survey of Youth 1979 (NLSY79) surveyed individuals born 
between 1957 and 1964, meaning that the NLSY79 population overlaps with less than thirty 
percent of the employer-sponsored immigrants in the NIS (see Table 1).  Likewise, the 
National Longitudinal Survey of Youth 1997 (NLSY97) surveyed young men and women 
born between 1980 and 1984.  This NLSY97 population then is younger than all but 0.4 
percent of the employer-sponsored immigrants in the NIS (see Table 1). 
 The Survey of Income and Program Participation (SIPP) is another longitudinal 
dataset that could possibly be used to construct a control group of natives to compare to the 
employer-sponsored immigrants in the NIS.  While the 2004 SIPP contains an Employment 
History topical module with questions about the earliest work experiences of the survey 
participants, the module does not include information on wages, and so cannot be used to 
compare wage changes between natives and employer-sponsored immigrants. 
                                                 
6 See the Appendix for details on how the CPS and the NIS data are coded so as to be comparable. 
 82
 Additionally, the population of employer-sponsored immigrants in the NIS is highly 
educated, with more than 80 percent holding a bachelor’s degree or more, and more than 40 
holding a graduate degree.  Even the larger longitudinal datasets are unlikely to contain 
enough individuals with advanced levels of education from which to select a matched control 
group which is sufficiently similar to the employer-sponsored immigrants in the NIS to make 
the propensity score matching procedure a viable option.  For these reasons, the MORG of 
the CPS represents the best available option for constructing an appropriate control group for 
the employer-sponsored immigrants in the NIS.   
 In the empirical implementation of the estimator from equation (4), I divide the NIS 
data into two separate datasets, one that contains the current wage observation and all the 
covariates, and another that contains the first wage observations and all the covariates.  The 
immigrants in the NIS are only asked about their current educational attainment, not the 
educational attainment they had at the time of their first job in the U.S., so current 
educational attainment is used to proxy for educational attainment at the time of the first 
wage.  Gender and year of birth are assumed to be the same over time.  Industry is reported 
for both the first wage and the current wage.  Region for the current wage observation is the 
current state or region of residence, while region for the first wage is assigned the state or 
region to which the green card was mailed. 
 I combine the data on the employer-sponsored immigrants’ first wages from the NIS 
with the data on native workers in the MORG (1983-2002) and estimate a logit regression, 
with the indicator for being an employer-sponsored immigrant (as opposed to a native 
worker) as the dependent variable.  The fitted value from this logit regression is the 
propensity score – the probability of being in the treatment group, i.e., the probability of 
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being an employer-sponsored immigrant.  Similarly, I combine the data on the same 
immigrants’ current wage observations from the NIS with 2003-2004 MORG to estimate a 
logit propensity score.  The vector of covariates used to estimate the propensity score, Z, 
includes variables that affect wages, and also variables that could predict whether or not an 
individual in the sample is an employer-sponsored immigrant.  Since the employer-sponsored 
immigrants are highly educated, indicators for educational attainment are included in Z.  
Immigrants have a different geographical distribution in the U.S than natives, and so 
indicators for state/region belong in Z.  Gender, year-of-birth, industry, and year of the 
survey dummies are also included in Z.7 
 To construct appropriate control groups to compare to the employer-sponsored 
immigrants, I use nearest-neighbor matching.  For each employer-sponsored immigrant, 
nearest-neighbor matching selects one (or more) native workers with the closest propensity 
score to that of the immigrant.  The matching is done with replacement, and ties are equally 
weighted.  Also, native workers chosen as the nearest neighbor for more than one of the 
employer-sponsored immigrants are assigned weights to reflect the frequency with which 
they are matched to observations in the treatment group.  For robustness, I vary the number 
of nearest neighbors to use in the control groups, choosing one, five, and ten nearest 
neighbors.  I calculate the difference between the (unweighted) log weekly wages of the 
employer-sponsored immigrants and the log weekly wages of the matched neighboring 
natives, weighted by the number of times they are used as nearest neighbor (since the 
matching is done with replacement) for the first observation, and for the current observation.  
The green card value is then the difference between these two wage differences. 
                                                 
7 See the Appendix for more details about these covariates. 
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 With nearest-neighbor matching estimation, the estimated standard errors do not take 
into account the fact that the propensity score is estimated.  To correct for this, I perform a 
bootstrap procedure, which estimates the distribution of the wage difference coefficient and 
which provides a better standard error for the coefficient.  For the difference in the current 
wages between the employer-sponsored immigrants and the native controls, I sample with 
replacement from the native population in the MORG to generate a sample of natives with 
the same number of individuals.  I combine this sample of natives with all of the employer-
sponsored immigrants in the NIS and run the logit propensity score estimation, which is then 
used to select the matched control group of natives who have the closest propensity scores to 
those of the employer-sponsored immigrants.  The wage difference is then the difference 
between the wages of the employer-sponsored immigrants and the matched natives.  I repeat 
this two hundred times, each time creating a new sample of natives by sampling with 
replacement from the natives in the MORG, which gives me a distribution and a standard 
error for the wage difference.  I follow this same procedure to generate a distribution and 
standard error for the first wage difference. 
 
5 Results 
I use matching techniques to compare the wages of employer-sponsored immigrants to those 
of a group of otherwise similar native workers.  First, I specify the vector of covariates Z 
used in the estimation of the propensity score, i.e. the probability of being an employer-
sponsored immigrant.  The vector of controls Z should include all characteristics that may 
affect both treatment (having an employer sponsor) and outcome (wages).  I include the 
standard Mincerian covariates such as the education level of the individual and age (from a 
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series of indicators for the year-of-birth cohort).  Additional controls included in Z are 
indicator variables for gender, industry of employment, region of residence, and year of the 
survey.8 
 The results of the propensity score estimation are reported in Table 3.3.  Because 
there is no longitudinal data for natives that is comparable to the NIS (see discussion in Data 
section), I have to perform two matching procedures.  First, I need to find a group of 
otherwise similar natives for the first observation of the employer-sponsored immigrants, and 
then do the same for their second (current) observation.  The first column of Table 3.3 
presents the estimates that correspond to the first observation, and in the second column are 
the estimates corresponding to the current observation, both estimated using a logit model.  
As described in the Empirical Strategy section, the dependent variable for this logit 
estimation is an indicator equal to one for employer-sponsored immigrants and zero for 
native workers.  As expected, the estimated coefficients confirm that higher levels of 
education significantly increase the likelihood that an individual is a member of the treatment 
group of employer-sponsored immigrants.  The overall fit of the logit propensity score 
model, both for the first wage observation and the current wage observation, is fairly good, 
with pseudo-R square measures of 0.32.   The fitted values from these logit regressions are 
the propensity scores used to select a control group from the native citizens similar to the 
treatment group of employer-sponsored immigrants. 
 The left side of Table 3.4A presents the differences in covariates for the first 
observation between the employer-sponsored immigrants from the NIS and the native 
workers from the MORG of the CPS in the original unmatched sample.  As previously 
                                                 
8 See Table 3.A1 in the Appendix for details about the regional categories used in the NIS.  Also, see the 
Appendix for a description of the industry variable. 
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discussed, the two groups of workers have quite dissimilar personal characteristics.  On 
average, employer-sponsored immigrants were born more recently and have more education.  
Almost all of the differences between these two populations are statistically significant at the 
5 percent level, indicating that direct comparison of wages between the two groups without 
correcting for their characteristics would be inappropriate.   
 Based on this evidence, the goal of the matching procedure is to select an appropriate 
control group of untreated individuals (native workers).  The matching procedure is 
successful if members in the selected control group have similar observable characteristics to 
the members of the treatment group (employer-sponsored immigrants).  The right side of 
Table 3.4A formally verifies that there are no significant differences in covariates left 
between employer-sponsored immigrants and native workers in the single nearest-neighbor 
matched sample.  For example, the difference between employer-sponsored immigrants and 
native workers in the proportion who are female is only 1 percentage point (22.6 percent 
among employer-sponsored immigrants and 21.6 percent among natives).  The difference in 
the proportion of females between the two groups in the original unmatched sample, on the 
other hand, is 29.2 percentage points.  After matching, the difference in the proportion of 
females between the two groups is small and no longer statistically significant.  Similarly, the 
differences in the rest of the covariates in Z in the original sample disappear in the matched 
sample.  Also, the average propensity score difference between the two groups (employer-
sponsored immigrants and native workers) in the matched sample is very small at 0.00065, 
providing evidence that the balancing property of the propensity score is ensured.   
In a similar manner, Table 3.4B demonstrates how the propensity-score matching for 
the current observations results in a control group of native citizens that have characteristics 
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similar to those of the employer-sponsored immigrants.  On the left side of Table 3.4B, note 
that there are significant differences between natives and immigrants in their gender 
composition, educational attainment, and year-of-birth cohort.  As reported on the right side 
of the table, the single nearest-neighbor propensity score matching results in a control group 
that closely resembles the treatment group of employer-sponsored immigrants.  After the 
matching procedure, no significant differences remain between the matched natives and the 
immigrants. 
In addition to using the single nearest neighbors to construct an appropriate control 
group for the employer-sponsored immigrants, I also create larger control groups of native 
workers by choosing the five nearest and ten nearest neighbors for each employer-sponsored 
immigrant.  Choosing a greater number of neighbors may not reduce the differences between 
the employer-sponsored immigrants and the natives as much as choosing just a single 
neighbor, since each additional native neighbor is farther away from the treated immigrant in 
terms of the propensity score.  However, both when the five nearest neighbors are chosen and 
when the ten nearest neighbors are chosen, there are no significant differences between the 
treated immigrants and the matched control natives along any of the covariates used in the 
propensity score logit regression (results not shown).  The large sample of natives in MORG 
allows me to select a larger number of neighbors for the control group and still have a control 
group that is comparable to the treatment group. 
 Based on the evidence presented so far, the matching procedure appears to be 
effective in eliminating the selection bias that may affect the naïve estimator of the 
differences in wages between the treated (employer-sponsored immigrants) and the controls 
(native workers).  I next turn to the matching estimator of the differences in wages between 
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the two groups and present the estimates of the effect of legalization and the associated 
increase in job mobility on weekly wages using difference-in-differences nearest-neighbor 
matching. 
 The three panels of Table 3.5 present the difference-in-difference wage results from 
matching the employer-sponsored immigrants in the NIS to a single nearest neighbor (3.5A), 
five nearest neighbors (3.5B), and ten nearest neighbors (3.5C) among native U.S. citizens in 
the Merged Outgoing Rotation Groups of the CPS.  All matching is done with replacement, 
and observations from the control group with the same propensity scores are equally 
weighted. 
 In all three specifications, employer-sponsored immigrants experience an increase in 
their wages following the receipt of a green card, and in two of the three specifications, the 
increase is statistically significant at the 5 percent level.9  The estimates range from a weekly 
wage increase of 13.5 percent (Table 3.5A) to an increase of 16.5 percent (Table 3.5B).  Note 
that there is a trade-off between variance and bias.  The more neighbors chosen for the 
control group, the lower the standard error, but the greater potential bias, since the 
counterfactual is being constructed using observations that are less and less like the treated 
observation.  As the sign and magnitude of the estimate is not particularly sensitive to the 
number of nearest neighbors chosen, bias does not appear to be a major concern. 
 The first U.S. wages of employer-sponsored immigrants are between 3.7 and 6.7 
percent lower in magnitude than the counterfactual wages constructed using the nearest 
neighbor matching, but these differences are not statistically significant at the 5 percent level.  
The lower initial wages for the employer-sponsored immigrants are consistent with the 
hypothesis that foreign-born workers who want to become legal permanent residents of the 
                                                 
9 All difference-in-difference estimates are statistically significant at the 10 percent level. 
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United States are willing to accept lower wages in exchange for the benefit of having their 
employers sponsor them for green cards.  For the current wages, employer-sponsored 
immigrants have 6.8 to 11.8 percent higher wages than their native counterparts, and these 
differences are statistically significant at the 5 percent level for two out of the three 
specifications. 
 For robustness, I implement the propensity score matching estimator with the 
additional restriction of an exact match on the year of the survey.  For each employer-
sponsored immigrant in the NIS, the nearest neighbor is now chosen only from among the 
natives in the MORG of the CPS whose wage observations occur in the same year as the 
wage observations of the employer-sponsored immigrant.10  The results of this estimation are 
presented in Tables 3.6A through 3.6C.  Overall, these results confirm the previous findings.  
Employer-sponsored immigrants initially have lower wages than similar natives, but the 
immigrants have higher wages after they receive their green cards.  In this specification, the 
receipt of a green card is accompanied by a 16.1 to 18.2 percent wage increase for employer-
sponsored immigrants. 
 Employer-sponsored immigrants experience a significant increase in their wages 
following adjustment to permanent residence.  Their lack of job mobility while they are 
waiting to receive their green cards limits them to wages that are lower in magnitude than 
those of comparable native workers, but once these employer-sponsored immigrants become 
permanent residents, their wages are (significantly) higher than those of comparable natives 
because they are able to search for the highest paying employment for their skills. 
                                                 
10 Due to the very small number of employer-sponsored immigrants who first worked in the U.S. in 1983 and 
1984, these immigrants are restricted to match with natives from the pooled 1983 and 1984 CPS MORG data. 
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 Wage changes following adjustment to legal permanent residence could happen in 
two ways.  Immigrants released from their ties to the sponsoring employers could accept jobs 
with other employers at higher wages, or the threat of outside opportunities could be enough 
to induce the sponsoring employers to offer higher wages in order to retain their immigrant 
employees.  In Table 3.7, I examine the average log weekly wages (inflated to constant 2006 
dollars) for employer-sponsored immigrants both before and after they received their green 
cards, separating those who remained in the same job after becoming legal permanent 
residents from those who changed jobs.  The average current log weekly wages are the same 
(7.092) for employer-sponsored immigrants who changed jobs and for those who stayed in 
the same job.  However, the immigrants who changed jobs had much lower weekly wages 
than those who stayed in the same job when they first arrived in the U.S. (6.270 vs. 6.726).  
Job changers have much larger growth in wages following their adjustment to legal 
permanent resident status.  This difference suggests that the wage change experienced by 
employer-sponsored immigrants after they receive their green cards is due to largely to those 
who change jobs, and thus that the green card wage premium is due to increased job 
mobility. 
 To further explore the role that changing jobs plays in the wage value of a green card, 
I estimate the following difference-in-differences linear regression on the log of weekly 
wages, comparing the wages of those who stayed in the same job to those who changed jobs 
before and after becoming legal permanent residents: 
ititititit WChangedJobTimeChangedJobTimegesLnWeeklyWa νβδδδδ +++++= *)5( 3210
 
where itgesLnWeeklyWa is the log of the weekly wage for employer-sponsored immigrant i 
at time )1,0(∈t ; tTime is an indicator equal to 1 for the current (post-green card) wage 
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observation and 0 for the first wage observation; and 3δ  is the coefficient on the interaction 
between those two variables, the difference-in-differences coefficient.  The matrix itW holds 
other covariates that affect the wage including gender, education, year-of-birth cohort, and 
region of residence as previously described.  The coefficients from regression (5) are 
presented in Table 3.8. 
 As expected, the first wages are significantly lower than the current wages, by 30.1%.  
When controlling for the socio-demographic characteristics, the wage change for employer-
sponsored immigrants who change jobs after receiving their green cards is 49.7% larger than 
for those who stay in the same job.  The regression results confirm the findings in Table 3.7, 
that the wage increase experienced by employer-sponsored immigrants is driven largely by 




An alternative explanation for these findings is that the wages of employer-sponsored 
immigrants increase more than those of similar natives over time because the education and 
skills that the immigrants obtained in their native countries are not completely transferable to 
the U.S. labor market upon their initial arrival.  The wage increases for employer-sponsored 
immigrants could be due to increasing skill transferability the longer they live in the U.S., 
instead of being the result of the greater job mobility that accompanies permanent resident 
status.  Jasso, Rosenzweig, and Smith (2002) use the NIS-P (the pilot survey of the NIS) to 
show that the skill transferability of immigrants is initially low, but that it increases with 
greater exposure to the U.S. labor market.  They find that skill transferability is greater for 
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immigrants who are younger and who are male, compared to those who are older and who 
are female. 
 To test whether or not increasing skill transferability among the sample of employer-
sponsored immigrants may be causing the immigrant wage increases following green card 
receipt, I compare the wages of (principal) employer-sponsored immigrants in the NIS who 
arrived in the U.S. with green cards (new arrivals) to my sample of (principal) employer-
sponsored immigrants who adjusted to permanent resident status after living in the U.S for a 
number of years (adjustees).  If increasing skill transferability is driving the wage increases 
for immigrants, then I would expect to find that new arrivals have significantly lower current 
wages than adjustees, who have already lived and worked in the U.S. for years (about half of 
adjustees arrived in the U.S. in 1997 or earlier).  Using OLS, I estimate the following 
equation: 
iiii NewArrivalgesLnWeeklyWa εβαα +++= X10)6(  
where gesLnWeeklyWa is the log of the weekly wage for the current job at the time of the 
survey, either in 2003 or 2004.11  The variable NewArrival  is an indicator equal to 1 if the 
employer-sponsored immigrant arrived in the U.S. with a green card, and equal to 0 if the 
employer-sponsored immigrant was already living in the U.S. when he or she received a 
green card. 
 The vector X contains other characteristics which affect wages and which differ 
between the two populations of principal employer-sponsored immigrants.  For example, 
there are a greater proportion of women among new arrivals compared to adjustees, so the 
gender of the immigrant is one of the variables in X .  Also, although more than three 
                                                 
11 See the Appendix for more information about the coding of the wages. 
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quarters of both new arrivals and adjustees have attained at least a college degree, the 
proportion of adjustees with advanced degrees is higher than the proportion of new arrivals 
with advanced degrees (39% vs. 22%).  Educational attainment is also included in X , using 
indicators for having less than a high school degree, having some college education or an 
associates degree, having a bachelors degree, and having an advanced degree (having a high 
school diploma is the omitted category).  New arrivals are younger on average than adjustees, 
which would result in their earning lower wages because they have fewer years of experience 
working.  Indicators for year-of-birth cohort are included in X to control for the effect of age 
(as a proxy for labor market experience).  Regional wage differences persist in the United 
States, and new arrivals and adjustees differ in their geographic distribution in the U.S.  A 
greater fraction of new arrivals than adjustees live in Texas, while a greater fraction of 
adjustees live in New England.  This geographical pattern would also tend to affect wages, so 
regional indicators are included in X .12   
 The result for the estimation of equation (6), without the inclusion of any covariates, 
is presented in Table 3.9, column 3.9.1.  As expected given their characteristics, new arrivals 
have significantly lower weekly wages than do adjustees.  However, once the above-
mentioned covariates are included in the regression, the wage difference between new 
arrivals and adjustees falls greatly in magnitude, and I can no longer reject the null 
hypothesis that there is no difference between the wages of newly arrived employer-
sponsored immigrants and those employer-sponsored immigrants who have lived in the U.S. 
for a number of years (column 3.9.2).  Further controlling for the industries in which the 
immigrants work also results in a coefficient which is very small (-0.019) and not 
significantly different from zero (column 3.9.3). 
                                                 
12 See Table 3.A1 in the Appendix for the regional categories used in the NIS. 
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 As new arrivals do not have significantly lower wages than adjustees, it appears that 
skill transferability and length of time in the U.S. have little effect on the wages of employer-
sponsored immigrants.  This is not surprising, given that employer-sponsored immigrants are 
a highly educated population, with skills valued in many different countries.  These results 
provide further support that the wage increase experienced by employer-sponsored 
immigrants following their adjustment to permanent residence is due to the increased job 
mobility that accompanies the receipt of a green card. 
 In all specifications of the nearest neighbor propensity score matching, the employer-
sponsored immigrants have significantly higher wages than the matched natives, who have a 
similar distribution of covariates.  One possible explanation is that employer-sponsored 
immigrants may be more willing to locate in areas where natives prefer not to live (such as 
rural areas, or urban city centers).  Employers in these less desirable locations may offer 
higher wages for high-skilled jobs than employers in more desirable locations, to compensate 
their workers for the lack of amenities in the area.  For example, foreign-born physicians are 
more likely than native physicians to locate their practices in rural areas (Brooks, Marden, 
and Clawson 2003).  If this is true for other high-skilled professionals, that may be part of the 
reason why the employer-sponsored immigrants have higher wages than comparable natives 
after they receive their green cards. 
 
7 Conclusion 
Using a difference-in-differences nearest-neighbor propensity score matching estimator and 
data from both the NIS and the MORG of the CPS, I estimate the wage premium associated 
with the increase in job mobility that accompanies the arrival of a green card for employer-
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sponsored immigrants.  These immigrants may receive lower wages prior to adjusting to 
legal permanent residence due to the costs that employers must undergo to sponsor their visas 
and due to their inability to change jobs while their green card applications are in process, 
which takes an average of five years.  For foreign-born workers, becoming legal permanent 
residents eliminates any additional costs that employers must pay for their visas and also 
allows the workers to change jobs freely without affecting their ability to live and work in the 
U.S. 
 In my analysis, employer-sponsored principal immigrants who adjust to legal 
permanent resident status experience large and significant wage increases following the 
receipt of their green cards.  The estimates of the wage increases are between 13.5% and 
16.5%.  Immigrants who change jobs experience larger wage increases than those who 
remain in the same job from the time they first work in the U.S. until after they become legal 
permanent residents.  This implies that the wage premium associated with the receipt of a 
green card is due to greater job mobility.  Additionally, current wages for employer-
sponsored immigrants who arrive in the U.S. with green cards are not significantly lower 
than the wages of green card holders who have lived in the U.S. for a number of years before 
adjusting their status to legal permanent resident.  Thus, increasing skill transferability with 
time spent in the U.S. does not appear to be the cause for the wage increases experienced by 




Merged Outgoing Rotation Groups of the CPS and the New Immigrant Survey 
Many data issues arose in formatting the data in the MORG of the CPS and in the NIS in 
such a way that the data were directly comparable.  The following details the creation of the 




In the CPS, survey respondents are asked about their current age, as of their most recent 
birthday.  In the NIS, survey respondents are asked to report their year of birth, and the year-
of-birth responses are aggregated into ten categories, beginning with those who were born 
before 1940, and combining the remainder together in five year intervals (e.g., 1940-1944, 
1945-1949, 1950-1954, …), ending with the 1980-1984 interval. 
 There were two options to consider in formatting this data.  The first was to convert 
the NIS year-of-birth intervals into ages, and the second was to convert CPS ages into year-
of-birth intervals.  In the first option – assigning each NIS respondent the central age that 
would be associated with the reported year-of-birth interval – nearly all of the NIS 
respondents would suffer from measurement error in their constructed ages, as the 
constructed age could be as much as two and a half years more or less than the actual age.  
Instead, I chose to convert the CPS ages into year-of-birth intervals comparable to those in 
the NIS, so as to reduce the amount of measurement error in this explanatory variable. 
 For the CPS outgoing rotation group interviewed in December, the year of birth can 
be fairly accurately calculated as the difference between the current year and the reported 
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age.  By December, the majority of the survey respondents have passed their birthdays for 
that year (assuming a fairly uniform distribution of birthdays across the year, at least 11/12 of 
the respondents have their birthdays before they are surveyed in December).  However, for 
the outgoing rotation group interviewed in January, the majority of respondents have not yet 
passed their birthdays for that year, and the difference between their current age and the 
survey year will be one year later than the actual birth year of most of the respondents (again, 
about 11/12 of the respondents have birthdays after January).  To account for this 
misalignment between ages and birth years, I assigned a birth year that was equal to the 
difference between the survey year and the respondent’s age advanced by one year (birth 
year = survey year – [age +1]) for all of the observations that were recorded in the first half 
of the calendar year (January through June).  In the last half of the calendar year (July 
through December), I assigned the respondents a birth year that was the difference between 
the survey year and the reported age (birth year = survey year – age), to account for the fact 
that the respondents are more likely to have passed their birthdays in the second half of the 
year than in the first half of the year. 
 While there is still some measurement error involved in this assignment strategy, it is 
largely mitigated by the aggregation of the birth year information into five year intervals.  
For example, an individual who reports being 30 years old in the 2004 CPS could have been 
born in 1974 (if the survey is taken after her birthday in the survey year), or she could have 
been born in 1973 (if the survey is taken before her birthday in the survey year).  The month 
of the outgoing rotation group will determine which of these birth years will be assigned to 
the respondent.  However, whether or not the assigned birth year is the true birth year is 
largely irrelevant, since both birth years are aggregated together in the 1970-1974 year-of-
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birth interval.  The respondent will be correctly assigned to the appropriate year-of-birth 
interval. 
 With this assignment strategy, miscoding only occurs when the two possible birth 
years belong to two different year-of-birth intervals.  For example, an individual who reports 
being 30 years old in the 2000 CPS could have been born in 1970 or in 1969, depending on 
his month of birth and the month in which the survey is administered.  These two years 
belong to different year-of-birth intervals, so there is a possibility that the respondent will be 
assigned the wrong birth year and thus be placed in the wrong year-of-birth interval.  
Assuming a uniform distribution of ages of the respondents in CPS (which is fairly true 
across the ages of the population of interest), about twenty percent of the respondents will be 
assigned a birth year such that their other likely birth year is in a different year-of-birth 
interval.  Not all of these assignments will be wrong; I would expect roughly half of these 
respondents to be assigned to the wrong year-of-birth interval, which means that around ten 
percent of the CPS sample is classified into a year-of-birth interval which does not 
correspond to their actual year of birth.  This misclassification would be more likely to occur 
among respondents surveyed in the middle of the year, as opposed to the beginning or the 
end of the year, when the assignment strategy is likely to be more accurate. 
 
State/region 
The geographical information attached to the current wage observations for NIS respondents 
is the state of residence at the time of the survey.  For their first U.S. wage, the new 
immigrants are assigned the state to which their green cards were mailed.  Less than five 
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percent of sample had moved to a different state/region in between when their green cards 
were mailed and when they were surveyed. 
The state-level geographical information is aggregated to the nine Census divisions in 
the public use NIS dataset, unless the state of residence was one of the six traditional 
gateway states (California, Florida, Illinois, New Jersey, New York, and Texas), which are 
home to the majority of immigrants living in the U.S.  These six states were coded as 
individual states, not as a part of the larger Census divisions.  See Appendix Table 3.A1 for a 
list of the states which were included in each division.  The state-level geographical 
information in the CPS was aggregated to align with the state and division categories in the 
NIS.   
 
Education 
For CPS data in 1992 and later years, aligning the educational attainment responses with the 
nine education categories in the NIS was fairly straightforward.  Those who reported their 
highest grade attended as 6th grade or lower in the CPS were considered to have no 
education.  Those who reported attending 7th or 8th grade were classified as having finished 
elementary school.  Those who reported attending 9th through 12th grade but not having a 
high school diploma were classified as having finished middle school.  Among all employer-
sponsored immigrants in the NIS, less than 2 percent reported educational attainment less 
than a high school diploma.  High school graduates and those with some college but no 
degree in the CPS were classified as high school graduates.  Both types of Associates degrees 
in the CPS were combined into one Associates degree category as they are in the NIS.  All 
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other degree categories in the CPS had a one-to-one correspondence with degree categories 
in the NIS. 
 Before 1992 in the CPS, survey respondents were asked the highest grade that they 
attended, and in a separate question, they were asked whether or not they completed that 
grade.  The responses are truncated at 18 years, so it is not possible from the responses to 
these questions to separate those who received Masters degrees from those who received 
PhDs or MDs.  Only 12 percent of employer-sponsored immigrants in the NIS report their 
first wage occurred before 1992, so few of these pre-1992 respondents in the CPS are used in 
the control group. 
 For the CPS surveys conducted before 1992, respondents who did not finish 5th grade 
were classified as having no education.  Those who finished 5th grade but did not finish 8th 
grade were considered to have finished elementary school.  Those who finished 8th grade but 
did not finish 12th grade were considered middle school graduates.  Those who reported 
finishing 12th grade but who did not finish at least two years of college were considered to be 
high school graduates.  Finishing at least two years of college, but not four years, puts the 
respondent in the Associates degree category.  Respondents were coded as having a 
Bachelors degree if they had completed at least four years of college but had not completed 
six or more.  Those who had completed six or more years of college were assigned to the 
Masters degree category. 
 This same assignment system was also used to assign a highest degree completed to 
the NIS respondents who reported years of schooling but did not report a highest degree 




The NIS uses an industry classification system based on the 2002 North American Industry 
Classification (NAICS).  This same classification is also used in the MORG of the CPS from 
2000 through 2004.  However, the industry classification in earlier years of the CPS is based 
on the Standard Industry Classification (SIC).  There is no one-to-one correspondence 
between these two systems.  However, in the 2000, 2001, and 2002 CPS data, each 
respondent has a value for both the NAICS-based industry code and the SIC-based industry 
code.  For each SIC value in the 2000-2002 CPS data, I determined the unique NAICS value 
into which it was most likely to map.  All of those SIC values in the earlier data were then 
assigned to the most common NAICS value.  On average in the 2000-2002 CPS data, over 
two thirds of an SIC value mapped into the NAICS value it was assigned.  CPS data before 
1983 used an earlier version of the SIC to categorize the respondents’ industries, so CPS data 
before 1983 was not used. 
 
Wages 
The CPS contains information on the hourly and weekly earnings of U.S. workers.  Hourly 
workers are asked to report their hourly wages and the usual number of hours they work.  
Weekly earnings are calculated for hourly workers by multiplying the hourly wage by the 
usual number of hours worked.  Non-hourly workers are asked to report their weekly wages.  
Thus either hourly wage or weekly wage could be the dependent variable in my regressions.  
Given that the employer-sponsored immigrants, with their higher-than-U.S.-average levels of 
education, are more likely to have salaried jobs than hourly jobs, it is likely that natives with 
high propensity scores will also be salaried and thus be reporting their earnings as the amount 
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they earn in a week.  Weekly earnings, then, are the more appropriate measure to use as the 
dependent variable. 
 In the NIS, for both the first U.S. wage and the current wage, respondents reported 
their earnings in a variety of ways – by the hour, by the day, by the week, by two-week pay 
periods, by the month, and by the year.  To construct weekly wages for each individual, I 
multiplied hourly wage data by the reported usual number of hours worked.  I assumed a 
five-day workweek and multiplied the daily wage data by five.  Weekly wages remained as 
they were reported.  Bi-weekly wages were divided by two, and monthly wages are divided 
by four.  Annual earnings were divided by the reported usual number of weeks worked in a 
year. 
 In the MORG, the weekly earnings data are top-coded, while the earnings data in the 
NIS are not top-coded.  This difference could bias the results, making it appear that the 
employer-sponsored immigrants have higher wages than the natives whose wages are top-
coded.  For better comparisons between the two wage distributions, I top-coded the NIS 
wage data following the top-coding scheme of the MORG.  For wage reported in 1983-1988, 
weekly wages were top-coded at $999.  For wages in 1989-1997, the highest value was 
$1923.  And for 1998-2004, wages were truncated at $2884.  This top-coding was binding for 
about 5% of wage observations in the NIS. 
 For equation (5) and the corresponding Table 3.9, all of the wage observations are 
from the NIS, which is not top-coding.  Therefore, top-coding is unnecessary, and the weekly 




Restricting the CPS sample 
To generate a control group that was comparable to employer-sponsored immigrants in the 
NIS, I limited the CPS sample to those who reported being in the labor force, who were not 
attending school, either full-time or part-time.  I further limited the sample by excluding the 
CPS respondents who reported being self-employed, because they did not have wage 
observations.  Among those with wage observations, I limited my control group to those who 
reported their wages, excluding those with allocated wages, since the presence of allocated 
wages has the potential to bias the results (Hirsch and Schumacher, 2003).  Only native U.S. 
citizens, born in the U.S. (but not its territories) were considered.  It was necessary that the 
control group not face any of job mobility limitations associated with being an employer-
sponsored immigrant.  Since the CPS does not ask the foreign-born about their visa status, I 
could not be sure that there were no employer-sponsored immigrants in the control group 
unless I removed all foreign-born respondents.  However, the CPS only introduced the 
questions regarding country of birth and citizenship status in 1994, so I am unable to remove 
the foreign-born from the 1983-1993 CPS data.  Lastly, I limited the industries in the CPS to 
the industries in the NIS that employed immigrants who were sponsored by their employers.  
This step was unnecessary, as these observations would not have been included in the 
propensity score calculation anyway (since they would perfectly predict not being an 
employer-sponsored immigrants), but excluding them helped to reduce the CPS data to a 
more manageable size. 
 
Weights in the New Immigrant Survey 
Since certain sub-populations of legal permanent residents were oversampled in the NIS to 
allow for better analysis, sampling weights were created to allow analysts to produce a 
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representative sample of the entire population of new legal permanent residents.  The sub-
population of employer-sponsored immigrants were over-sampled relative to their 
representation among the entire population of new legal permanent residents.  (Employer-
sponsored immigrants constitute 16.5 percent of the NIS sample, but they are less than ten 
percent of the legal permanent resident population.)  However, there is no oversampling in 
the NIS from the employer-sponsored immigrant sub-population.  The sample of employer-
sponsored immigrants is therefore representative of the population of employer-sponsored 
immigrants.   Since my analysis focuses only on employer-sponsored immigrants and does 
seek to generalize to the entire population of new legal permanent residents, it is not 
necessary for me to use the NIS sampling weights.  (See Jasso, Massey, Rosenzweig, and 
Smith 2004 for more details about the sampling frame of the NIS). 
 
Family sponsored immigrants in the New Immigrant Survey 
The initial choice of control group for the employer-sponsored immigrants in the NIS was the 
sample of family-sponsored immigrants in the NIS.  Since family-sponsored immigrants 
would not be dependent on their employers for their adjustment to legal permanent residence, 
they would be free to move from job to job even before receiving their green cards (for those 
who had authorization to work in the U.S.).  However, family-sponsored immigrants are very 
different demographically from employer-sponsored immigrants.  Appendix Table 3.A2 
presents the means of a selection of demographic variables for the employer-sponsored 
immigrants and the family-sponsored immigrants.  Note that the average weekly wages for 
the employer-sponsored immigrants are more than twice that of the family-sponsored 
immigrants.  There is a smaller proportion of women among the employer-sponsored 
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immigrants.  Only one third of those with a family sponsor have a bachelor’s degree or 
higher, compared to over seventy percent for the employer-sponsored immigrants.  The 
employer-sponsored immigrants on average have been working in the U.S. for longer than 
the family-sponsored immigrants.  The geographical distributions of these two types of 
immigrants are also dissimilar, as the family-sponsored immigrants are more likely to live in 
California or Texas, and less likely to live in New England or the South Atlantic states.   
 While the characteristics of the native citizens in the CPS are also very different from 
those of the employer-sponsored immigrants, the CPS has a much larger population from 
which to draw an appropriate control group.  Among the treatment group, there are 41 
employer-sponsored immigrants who hold PhDs.  Only 1.4% of the native citizens in the 
CPS have a PhD. (see Table 3.3B), but that translates into about 1800 individuals to use in 
selecting a control group, compared to only 15 family-sponsored immigrants in the NIS with 
a PhD.  Applying the nearest-neighbor propensity score to the sample of family-sponsored 
immigrants results in a control group that is still significantly different from the treatment 
group of employer-sponsored immigrants along many important dimensions (results not 
shown).  In contrast, the control group selected from the CPS using the propensity score is 
not significantly different from the employer-sponsored immigrants along any of the 
covariates (see Tables 3A and 3B).  Therefore, the sample of natives from the CPS is used in 
the main analysis. 
 
Pooling male and female wages 
While it is standard practice in labor economics to separate males and females when 
considering wages, due to the distinctly different patterns of labor force participation 
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exhibited by the two groups, I have pooled the males and females together, controlling for 
any effect of gender with an indicator variable in the logit propensity score regressions.  
There are two main motivations behind the choice to pool the wages for male and female 
employer-sponsored.  First, it is reasonable to assume that the labor force participation 
patterns of female employer-sponsored immigrants are fairly similar to those of male 
employer-sponsored immigrants, given that the application for a green card is dependent on 
the immigrant having an employer-sponsor (and so necessarily being employed).  Recall that 
the analysis focuses on principal employer-sponsored immigrants, meaning that the female 
immigrants that appear in the sample are adjusting to legal permanent residence through an 
application by their own employers, and not the employers of their spouses. 
  Second, an examination of the distribution of industries of male and female 
employer-sponsored immigrants supports the pooling of the wages.  In Tables 3.A3 and 3.A4 
I present the top ten industries of the first U.S. job for male and female employer-sponsored 
immigrants, respectively.  The largest industry of employment for both male and female 
employer-sponsored immigrants is Computer System Design and Related Services.  Male 
and female employer-sponsored immigrants share three of their top four industries and five 
of their top ten industries (see industry descriptions in italics).  These similar industry 
patterns further validate the assumption that the employment patterns of male and female 






Inverse probability weighting 
As an additional robustness check, I also estimate the wage value of a green card using an 
inverse probability weighting strategy instead of a nearest-neighbor propensity score 
matching strategy.  The main difference between these two methods is that inverse 
probability weighting uses information from all of the native citizen controls, while matching 
uses only those controls who most closely resemble the employer-sponsored immigrants.  
 For inverse probability weighting, as with the propensity score matching, I first pool 
the observations of the employer-sponsored immigrants with the natives from the MORG of 
the CPS from 1983 through 2002.  I then estimate a logit propensity score with the indicator 
for employer-sponsored immigrants as the dependent variable.  The employer-sponsored 
immigrants are then pooled with the natives from the MORG of the CPS from 2003 and 
2004, and I estimate another logit propensity score predicting the probability of being an 
employer-sponsored immigrants.  The results from these propensity score estimations are 
presented in Table 3.3 – these estimations are the same as in the first stage of the nearest-
neighbor propensity score matching strategy. 
 The observations for the native citizens are weighted by the normalized inverse of the 
propensity scores – the fitted values from the logit regressions.  Those native citizens who 
most closely resemble the employer-sponsored immigrants will have larger weights, while 
those natives who are not similar to the immigrants will have smaller weights.  Using these 
inverse probability weights, I compare the wages for employer-sponsored immigrants to 
those of native citizens, both before and after the immigrants become legal permanent 
residents.  The results are presented in Table 3.A5. 
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 As with the findings using the nearest-neighbor propensity score matching estimation, 
the first wages of employer-sponsored immigrants are slightly lower than those of the 
weighted native citizens.  Following the receipt of a green card, the wages of the immigrants 
are 13 percent higher than those of the weighted natives.  Overall, receiving a green card is 
accompanied by a 16.2 percent wage increase for employer-sponsored immigrants, a result 
which is of similar magnitude to those found using the matching strategy (see Tables 3.5A 




Table 3.A1 States and divisions in the NIS 
 
GATEWAY STATES_________________________________________ 
  California       New Jersey 
  Florida       New York 
  Illinois       Texas 
 
CENSUS DIVISIONS_________________________________________ 
NEW ENGLAND    WEST NORTH CENTRAL  
  Connecticut       Iowa  
  Maine       Kansas 
  Massachusetts      Minnesota  
  New Hampshire      Missouri 
  Rhode Island       Nebraska 
  Vermont       North Dakota 
        South Dakota 
MIDDLE ATLANTIC      
  Pennsylvania     WEST SOUTH CENTRAL 
        Arkansas 
SOUTH ATLANTIC      Louisiana 
  Delaware       Oklahoma 
  District of Columbia       
  Georgia     MOUNTAIN  
  Maryland       Arizona 
  North Carolina      Colorado 
  South Carolina      Idaho 
  Virginia       Montana 
  West Virginia      Nevada 
        New Mexico 
EAST SOUTH CENTRAL     Utah 
  Alabama       Wyoming 
  Kentucky 
  Mississippi     PACIFIC 
  Tennessee       Alaska 
        Hawaii 
EAST NORTH CENTRAL     Oregon 
  Indiana       Washington 
  Michigan 
  Ohio 
  Wisconsin 
      
Note: The six gateway states are identified individually in the 2003 New Immigrant Survey.  The remaining 
states are not identified individually, but instead are grouped by their Census Division.
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Table 3.A2 Variable means for employer-sponsored immigrants and for family-sponsored 








Weekly wages (2003-04) $1079.11 $440.54 
Female 0.226 0.474 
Education   
  Less high school 0.063 0.238 
  High school diploma 0.077 0.317 
  Associates degree 0.043 0.111 
  College degree 0.401 0.213 
  Masters degree 0.301 0.081 
  PhD 0.100 0.026 
  MD/JD 0.014 0.014 
Year of birth   
  Born before 1940 0.006 0.009 
  Born 1940-1944 0.016 0.019 
  Born 1945-1949 0.022 0.032 
  Born 1950-1954 0.059 0.048 
  Born 1955-1959 0.094 0.063 
  Born 1960-1964 0.196 0.099 
  Born 1965-1969 0.228 0.155 
  Born 1970-1974 0.316 0.227 
  Born 1975-1979 0.059 0.243 
  Born in 1980 or later 0.004 0.106 
First worked in the U.S.   
  1983-1990 0.123 0.104 
  1991-1995 0.201 0.181 
  1996-2000 0.629 0.354 
  after 2000 0.047 0.361 
State/region   
  California 0.165 0.241 
  Florida 0.024 0.070 
  Illinois 0.065 0.055 
  New Jersey 0.094 0.046 
  New York 0.084 0.106 
  Texas 0.043 0.114 
  New England 0.145 0.058 
  Middle Atlantic 0.090 0.039 
  South Atlantic 0.102 0.025 
  East South Central 0.004 0.011 
  East North Central 0.092 0.021 
  West North Central 0.045 0.042 
  West South Central 0.000 0.005 
  Mountain 0.018 0.107 
  Pacific 0.031 0.060 
No. observations 491 568 
Note: Author’s calculations from the2003 New Immigrant Survey. 
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Table 3.A3 Top ten industries for first U.S. job among male employer-sponsored immigrants 





7380 Computer system design and related services 25.0% 
7870 Colleges and universities, including junior colleges 8.3% 
8680 Restaurants and other food services 8.2% 
770 Construction 4.0% 
9160 Religious organizations 3.9% 
7390 Management, scientific, and technical consulting services 3.4% 
6970 Securities, commodities, funds, trusts, and other financial investments 3.1% 
6680 Wired telecommunications carriers 2.9% 
7860 Elementary and secondary schools 1.9% 
7290 Architectural, engineering, and related services 1.7% 
Author’s calculations from the 2003 New Immigrant Survey. 






Table 3.A4 Top ten industries for first U.S. job among female employer-sponsored 





7380 Computer system design and related services 10.5% 
8680 Restaurants and other food services 8.3% 
9290 Private households 7.0% 
7870 Colleges and universities, including junior colleges 5.2% 
8190 Hospitals 5.2% 
9160 Religious organizations 5.2% 
7860 Elementary and secondary schools 3.9% 
7460 Scientific research and development services 3.5% 
8180 Other health care services 3.5% 
7690 Services to buildings and dwellings 3.1% 
Author’s calculations from the 2003 New Immigrant Survey. 












Table 3.A5 Log weekly wages for employer-sponsored immigrants and all native citizen 




















Difference-in-differences   0.162* (0.052) 
Notes for Table 3.A4: 
*Statistically significant with p<0.05. 
Robust standard errors 
Native Citizens controls from the Merged Outgoing Rotation Groups of the CPS, 1983-2004, are weighted with 
the normalized inverse of the propensity score, which is estimated using a logit specification. 
Employer Sponsored Immigrants are principal immigrants with employer sponsors, who adjusted their status to 











Female 0.226 0.518 
Education   
  Less high school 0.063 0.114 
  High school diploma 0.077 0.488 
  Associates degree 0.043 0.113 
  College degree 0.401 0.189 
  Masters degree 0.301 0.082 
  PhD 0.100 0.007 
  MD/JD 0.014 0.007 
Year of birth   
  Born before 1940 0.006 0.158 
  Born 1940-1944 0.016 0.088 
  Born 1945-1949 0.022 0.122 
  Born 1950-1954 0.059 0.143 
  Born 1955-1959 0.094 0.156 
  Born 1960-1964 0.196 0.147 
  Born 1965-1969 0.228 0.101 
  Born 1970-1974 0.316 0.056 
  Born 1975-1979 0.059 0.023 
  Born in 1980 or later 0.004 0.006 
First worked in the U.S.   
  1983-1990 0.123 - 
  1991-1995 0.201 - 
  1996-2000 0.629 - 
  after 2000 0.047 - 
State/region   
  California 0.165 0.071 
  Florida 0.024 0.041 
  Illinois 0.065 0.040 
  New Jersey 0.094 0.037 
  New York 0.084 0.059 
  Texas 0.043 0.047 
  New England 0.145 0.091 
  Middle Atlantic 0.090 0.044 
  South Atlantic 0.102 0.123 
  East South Central 0.004 0.050 
  East North Central 0.092 0.116 
  West North Central 0.045 0.101 
  West South Central 0.000 0.035 
  Mountain 0.018 0.100 
  Pacific 0.031 0.047   
No. observations 491 1,503,397 
Note: Employer Sponsored Immigrants from the 2003 NIS. 
Native Citizens from the 1983-2002 MORG of the CPS. 
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7380 Computer system design and related services 21.9% 
7870 Colleges and universities, including junior colleges 8.7% 
8680 Restaurants and other food services 7.7% 
9160 Religious organizations 3.8% 
0770 Construction 3.5% 
7860 Elementary and secondary schools 3.3% 
7390 Management, scientific, and technical consulting services 3.0% 
6970 Securities, commodities, funds, trusts, and other financial investments 2.8% 
6680 Wired telecommunications carriers 2.6% 
8190 Hospitals 2.5% 
Author’s calculations from the 2003 New Immigrant Survey. 











7860 Elementary and secondary schools 9.6% 
0770 Construction 8.4% 
8190 Hospitals 7.3% 
8680 Restaurants and other food services 6.6% 
7870 Colleges and universities, including junior colleges 3.6% 
4970 Grocery stores 3.5% 
6990 Insurance 3.3% 
6870 Banking and related activities 3.0% 
8270 Nursing care facilities 2.5% 
6170 Truck transportation 2.3% 
Author’s calculations from the 1983-2002 MORG of the CPS. 













Table 3.3 Logit propensity score models: dependent variable – employer-sponsored 
immigrant indicator 
Variables Employer Sponsored Immigrant 









































































Industry, Region, and Year indicators Yes Yes 
Pseudo R2 0.321 0.318 
Log Likelihood -3008.13 -2203.78 
Observations 1,503,888 130,251 
Note: * indicates statistical significance at p<0.05.  The omitted education variable is “No schooling 
completed.”  The omitted birth cohort is those born before 1940. 
The first observation combines data on employer-sponsored immigrants from the 2003 NIS with native citizens 
from the MORG of the CPS, 1983-2002.  The current observation combines data from the 2003 NIS with data 
from the MORG of the CPS, 2003-2004.
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Table 3.4A Comparisons between employer-sponsored immigrants and native citizens  
in the original (unmatched) and the (single nearest-neighbor) matched sample, for the 
characteristics corresponding to the first weekly wages 












Female 0.226 0.518 -12.95 0.226 0.216 0.38 
No schooling 
completed 0.014 0.008 1.64 0.014 0.022 -0.95 
Elementary school 0.020 0.014 1.11 0.020 0.018 0.23 
Middle school 0.029 0.092 -4.88 0.029 0.041 -1.05 
High school diploma 0.077 0.488 -18.21 0.077 0.079 -0.12 
Associates degree 0.043 0.113 -4.9 0.043 0.037 0.49 
Bachelors degree 0.401 0.189 12 0.401 0.428 -0.84 
Masters degree 0.301 0.082 17.77 0.301 0.257 1.57 
PhD 0.100 0.007 25.04 0.100 0.108 -0.42 
MD/JD 0.014 0.007 1.91 0.014 0.010 0.58 
Born before 1940 0.006 0.158 -9.23 0.006 0.006 0 
Born 1940-1944 0.016 0.088 -5.62 0.016 0.014 0.26 
Born 1945-1949 0.022 0.122 -6.73 0.022 0.033 -0.98 
Born 1950-1954 0.059 0.143 -5.29 0.059 0.081 -1.37 
Born 1955-1959 0.094 0.156 -3.8 0.094 0.079 0.79 
Born 1960-1964 0.196 0.147 3.07 0.196 0.204 -0.32 
Born 1965-1969 0.228 0.101 9.31 0.228 0.214 0.54 
Born 1970-1974 0.316 0.056 25.07 0.316 0.312 0.14 
Born 1975-1979 0.059 0.023 5.21 0.059 0.053 0.42 
Born 1980 or later 0.004 0.006 -0.65 0.004 0.004 0 
Average P-Score diff - 0.00065 
Observations 491 1,503,397  491 1,543  
Note: *t-tests for differences between Employer-Sponsored Immigrants and Native Citizens. 

















Table 3.4B Comparisons between employer-sponsored immigrants and native citizens  
in the original (unmatched) and the (single nearest-neighbor) matched sample, for the 
characteristics corresponding to the current weekly wages 












Female 0.226 0.541 -14.01 0.226 0.212 0.54 
No schooling 
completed 0.014 0.003 2.63 0.014 0.008 0.91 
Elementary school 0.020 0.005 4.44 0.020 0.014 0.73 
Middle school 0.029 0.048 -2.05 0.029 0.024 0.4 
High school diploma 0.077 0.487 -18.13 0.077 0.084 -0.35 
Associates degree 0.043 0.111 -4.81 0.043 0.043 0 
Bachelors degree 0.401 0.226 9.25 0.401 0.420 -0.58 
Masters degree 0.301 0.091 16.14 0.301 0.310 -0.28 
PhD 0.100 0.014 15.63 0.100 0.094 0.32 
MD/JD 0.014 0.015 -0.18 0.014 0.004 1.68 
Born before 1940 0.006 0.001 2.09 0.006 0.002 1.00 
Born 1940-1944 0.016 0.050 -3.4 0.016 0.012 0.54 
Born 1945-1949 0.022 0.091 -5.31 0.022 0.016 0.69 
Born 1950-1954 0.059 0.123 -4.28 0.059 0.051 0.56 
Born 1955-1959 0.094 0.139 -2.88 0.094 0.092 0.11 
Born 1960-1964 0.196 0.138 3.65 0.196 0.206 -0.4 
Born 1965-1969 0.228 0.124 6.94 0.228 0.196 1.25 
Born 1970-1974 0.316 0.121 13.12 0.316 0.342 -0.88 
Born 1975-1979 0.059 0.111 -3.68 0.059 0.079 -1.26 
Born 1980 or later 0.004 0.069 -5.7 0.004 0.004 0 
Average P-Score diff - 0.00027 
Observations 491 129,760  491 1,255  
Note: *t-tests for differences between Employer-Sponsored Immigrants and Native Citizens. 
Employer Sponsored Immigrants from the 2003 NIS; Native Citizens from the MORG of the CPS, 2003-2004. 
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Table 3.5A Log weekly wages for employer-sponsored immigrants and the matched control 




















Difference-in-differences   0.135 (0.074) 
 
Table 3.5B Log weekly wages for employer-sponsored immigrants and the matched control 




















Difference-in-differences   0.165* (0.059) 
 
Table 3.5C Log weekly wages for employer-sponsored immigrants and the matched control 




















Difference-in-differences   0.145* (0.053) 
Notes for Tables 3.5A-3.5C: 
*Statistically significant with p<0.05. 
Native Citizens controls are chosen using a nearest-neighbor propensity score matching strategy.  Propensity 
score is estimated using a logit specification.  Ties are equally weighted. 
Standard errors on the differences are bootstrapped to account for the estimated propensity score. 
Employer Sponsored Immigrants are principal immigrants with employer sponsors, who adjusted their status to 
lawful permanent residence, surveyed in the 2003 New Immigrant Survey. 
Native Citizens are from the Merged Outgoing Rotation Groups of the CPS, 1983-2004. 
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Table 3.6A Log weekly wages for employer-sponsored immigrants and the matched control 




















Difference-in-differences   0.182* (0.070) 
 
Table 3.6B Log weekly wages for employer-sponsored immigrants and the matched control 




















Difference-in-differences   0.164* (0.059) 
 
Table 3.6C Log weekly wages for employer-sponsored immigrants and the matched control 




















Difference-in-differences   0.161* (0.035) 
Notes for Tables 3.6A-3.6C: 
*Statistically significant with p<0.05. 
Native Citizens controls are chosen using a nearest-neighbor propensity score matching strategy.  Propensity 
score is estimated using a logit specification.  Ties are equally weighted.  Exact match on the year of the survey. 
Standard errors on the differences are bootstrapped to account for the estimated propensity score. 
Employer Sponsored Immigrants are principal immigrants with employer sponsors, who adjusted their status to 
lawful permanent residence, surveyed in the 2003 New Immigrant Survey. 
Native Citizens are from the Merged Outgoing Rotation Groups of the CPS, 1983-2004. 
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Table 3.7 Log weekly wage changes for employer-sponsored immigrants, comparing those 
who were still in their first job after becoming legal permanent residents to those who had 
changed jobs 
 Kept the same job Changed jobs
First wage 6.726 (0.759) 
6.270 
(0.939) 
Current wage 7.092 (0.838) 
7.092 
(0.810) 
Change in wages 36.6% 82.2% 
No. observations 193 231 
Weekly wages are inflated to constant 2006 dollars before taking the natural logarithm.
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Table 3.8 Regression on log weekly wages for employer-sponsored immigrants, difference-
in-difference results comparing those who changed jobs to those who stayed in the same job 
Variable  
Changed jobs 0.301* 
 (0.060) 
Time (=1 for post green card wage) -0.462* 
 (0.069) 




Elementary school 0.287 
 (0.153) 
Middle school 0.557* 
 (0.169) 
High school diploma 0.504* 
 (0.147) 
Associates degree 0.649* 
 (0.164) 
Bachelors degree 1.179* 
 (0.132) 






Born 1940-1944 0.43 
 (0.293) 
Born 1945-1949 0.477 
 (0.262) 
Born 1950-1954 0.610* 
 (0.239) 
Born 1955-1959 0.556* 
 (0.239) 
Born 1960-1964 0.524* 
 (0.228) 
Born 1965-1969 0.429 
 (0.227) 
Born 1970-1974 0.449* 
 (0.226) 
Born 1975-1979 0.262 
 (0.244) 
Born in 1980 or later 0.309 
 (0.326) 
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New Jersey 0.360* 
 (0.080) 




New England 0.228* 
 (0.088) 
Middle Atlantic 0.175 
 (0.093) 
South Atlantic 0.107 
 (0.095) 
East South Central 0.202* 
 (0.091) 
East North Central 0.199* 
 (0.088) 







No. observations 0.357 
Note: *p<0.05, standard errors are robust to heteroskedasticity.  Employer-sponsored immigrants from the 2003 
NIS.  No schooling completed is the omitted schooling variable; born before 1940 is the omitted birth cohort 
variable.  California is the omitted region; West South Central also omitted due to no positive observations. 
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Table 3.9 Log weekly wages for principal employer-sponsored immigrants in  
the NIS, comparing those who arrived in the U.S. with a green card to those  
who were already living in the U.S. when they received their green cards 
 7.1 7.2 7.3 






Female - -0.300* (0.056) 
-0.219* 
(0.060) 
Less than high school degree - -0.263* (0.095) 
-0.009 
(0.098) 
Some college - 0.024 (0.128) 
-0.068 
(0.128) 
College degree - 0.652* (0.082) 
0.200* 
(0.107) 
Advanced degree - 0.865* (0.083) 
0.393* 
(0.112) 
Born before 1940 - 0.023 (0.372) 
0.135 
(0.356) 
Born 1940-1944 - 0.457 (0.388) 
0.376 
(0.305) 
Born 1945-1949 - 0.518* (0.270) 
0.491* 
(0.274) 
Born 1950-1954 - 0.579* (0.278) 
0.539* 
(0.271) 
Born 1955-1959 - 0.579* (0.251) 
0.503* 
(0.256) 
Born 1960-1964 - 0.598* (0.246) 
0.492* 
(0.254) 
Born 1965-1969 - 0.482* (0.241) 
0.364 
(0.246) 
Born 1970-1974 - 0.407* (0.240) 
0.232 
(0.249) 
Born 1975-1979 - 0.315 (0.243) 
0.220 
(0.253) 
    
Year dummies No Yes Yes 
State/region dummies No Yes Yes 
Industry dummies No No Yes 
    
R-squared 0.0143 0.2876 0.6334 
No. observations 914 914 914 
*Statistically significant with p<0.10. 
High school degree is the omitted education category. 
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As immigration to the United States has grown over the last few decades, so has the 
importance of immigrants in the U.S. workforce.  A large proportion of workers in some 
industries – agriculture, construction, domestic services – and in some education classes – 
those with no high school education and those with PhDs in some disciplines – are now 
persons who were not born in the U.S.  Immigrants to the United States constitute a sizable 
and growing fraction of the workforce, but their experiences with job displacement have not 
been extensively explored.  In this paper, I investigate how job displacement affects workers 
differently based on their immigrant and citizenship status.  I focus particularly on two post-
displacement outcomes – the duration of unemployment and the re-employment wage. 
 There are many reasons why displacement outcomes might differ between 
immigrants and natives.  Displaced workers who are willing and able to relocate 
geographically in order to find a new job often fare better than those who are geographically 
constrained – movers would likely have shorter jobless spells and higher re-employment 
wages because there are more jobs available to them.  Immigrants and natives may differ in 
this geographic mobility.  On one side, displaced immigrants, particularly recent immigrants, 
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may have less attachment to a particular region and may be more willing than natives to 
relocate within the U.S. to find new employment (Chiswick 2000).  On the other side, 
immigrants may be more dependent on the social capital in ethnic enclaves, and thus may be 
less mobile than natives (Boman 2006).  These differences in geographic mobility may lead 
to differences in post-displacement outcomes. 
 Another mobility that may affect post-displacement outcomes is occupational 
mobility.  Research by Green (1999) indicates that immigrants have more occupational 
mobility than natives.  This greater flexibility in the labor market may help to alleviate some 
of the negative effects of job displacement. 
 Another possibility is that immigrants, particularly those who are undocumented or 
have only temporary legal status, might remain in jobs that are relatively poor matches if they 
do not want to draw attention to themselves by searching for better jobs.  Displacement might 
be less harmful for these immigrants because it might allow them to find jobs that are 
relatively better fits, and pay relatively higher wages.1 
 In the following section, I outline both a job search model and a returns-to-human-
capital wage model that will help to motivate the differences in the post-displacement 
outcomes of immigrants (both non-citizens and naturalized citizens) and native workers.  I 
describe the Displaced Workers Survey data that I use in this analysis in section 3.  In the 
two sections following the data description, I outline the empirical strategies that I use to 
compare the re-employment wages and the duration of unemployment among natives, 
naturalized citizens, and non-citizens. In section 6, I present and discuss the main results of 
my estimation.  I consider how the minimum wage and the reasons for displacement may be 
                                                 
1 The author would like to thank Dr. Sherrie Kossoudji for suggesting this possible scenario. 
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affecting the differences between natives and immigrants in section 7.  The final section 
summarizes the main findings and concludes. 
 
2 Theoretical Framework 
In my analysis, I focus on the two central aspects of job displacement – the unemployment 
duration following displacement and the re-employment wage.  I consider a simple version of 
the standard job search model.2  I assume job offers arrive to a searching unemployed worker 
at random intervals according to a Poisson process with offer arrival rate π.  Workers are 
assumed to maximize the expected present value of income over an infinite time horizon at a 
known and constant discount rate r.  The net income flow (unemployment benefit) for an 
unemployed worker is b and is time-invariant throughout any given spell of unemployment.  
The optimal policy in this model is a constant reservation wage.    
A job offer is summarized by a wage rate w; when a job is accepted it lasts forever.  
Successive job offers are independent realizations from a known wage offer distribution with 
a finite mean, μ, variance, σ, cumulative distribution F(w), and density f(w).   There is no 








bw .)()(π  
 
 This equilibrium condition allows me to investigate the consequences of exogenous 
changes in the wage offer distribution, and the offer arrival rate, π, on the expected re- 
                                                 
2 See, for example, Devine and Kiefer (1991), as well as Burdett and Ondrich (1985).   
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employment wage, ][ rw ww|wE ≥ , and  the  expected  jobless  spell, τ





rwFdwwf ))(1()( . 
While the job search model is particularly helpful in framing the discussion of the 
duration of unemployment, perhaps a more appropriate model to consider with respect to the 
re-employment wages of immigrants and natives would be a human capital model, where 
wages are a function of multiple types of human capital, such as education, work experience, 
firm-specific human capital, and industry-specific human capital.  Following Neal (1995), let 
the wages on the pre-displacement job be given by 
11 *** εβγθα ++++= XFirmTenurenureIndustryTeenceWorkExperiw  
 
and the wages on the post-displacement job by 
22 ** εβθα +++= XnureIndustryTeenceWorkExperiw  
 
if the worker remains in the same industry and 
33 * εβα ++= XenceWorkExperiw  
 
if the worker changes industry between the pre-displacement and the post-displacement job.  
The vector X  contains worker characteristics that affect wages, such as educational 
attainment. 
Both of these models help to illustrate why we might expect to see differences 
between immigrants and natives (and between non-citizens and naturalized citizens) in the 
duration of unemployment and the re-employment wages.  In the human capital model, 
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immigrants, particularly those who have not lived in the United States for very long, are 
likely to have much lower levels of firm-specific and industry-specific human capital.  Thus 
the differences between the post-displacement wages ( 32 , ww ) and pre-displacement wages 
( 1w ) of immigrants is likely to be much lower than that difference for native workers.  The 
lack of industry- and firm-specific tenure among the immigrant workers may mean that their 
wages do not fall as much as the wages of native workers. 
In the standard job search model, lower unemployment benefits (b) will depress the 
reservation wage and thus the re-employment wage.  In general, immigrants, particularly 
non-citizens, may have less information about their eligibility for unemployment benefits, 
and they may also not meet job tenure or other legal qualifications to receive them.  
Therefore, lower access to unemployment benefits would tend to reduce immigrants’ re-
employment wages as compared to natives.  Additionally, immigrant workers, particularly 
those who have not lived in the U.S. for very long, may lack the necessary information about 
the U.S. labor market to have a job offer arrival rate (π) that is similar to that of native 
workers.  This would tend to both lower the re-employment wage and lengthen the jobless 
spell. 
Workers with less skill and education have lower probabilities of leaving 
unemployment, i.e. longer unemployment duration, and also lower re-employment wages 
(Farber 2005; Addison and Portugal 1989).  On average, displaced immigrants have lower 
levels of education (see Table 4.1) and English language ability than do displaced natives.  
One might then expect to see worse post-displacement outcomes for immigrant workers as 
compared to native workers.  
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However, foreign-born workers in the U.S. tend to have a much stronger relationship 
with the labor market than natives; their labor force participation rates are much higher and 
they are more likely to work multiple jobs (LaLonde and Topel 1992).  Higher search 
intensity on the part of the immigrants could increase the arrival rate of job offers (π), which 
would lead to shorter jobless spells and higher re-employment wages.  Networks of 
immigrants from the same country may serve as a source of job offers for displaced 
immigrants, which could also increase the offer arrival rate and result in higher re-
employment wages and less time spent unemployed.  
Naturalized citizens and non-citizens may also have very different post-displacement 
outcomes from each other.  Grouping the two together could potentially mask differences 
within the immigrant population and between natives and these subgroups of immigrants.  
Naturalized citizens, who have lived longer in the U.S. and are likely to have better English 
language skills as well as other human capital valued in the labor market, might be more 
similar to native workers more in their post-displacement outcomes.  Non-citizens may be 
more disadvantaged compared to naturalized citizens, and they are more likely to differ from 
the native population. 
 
3 Data 
To investigate the differences in the effects of job displacement between foreign-born and 
native workers, I use data from the only large-scale and nationally representative survey of 
displaced workers – the Displaced Workers’ Survey (DWS), a biennial supplement to the 
January or February Current Population Survey (CPS) conducted by the U.S. Bureau of 
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Labor Statistics (BLS).3  The first DWS was instituted in January of 1984, but workers in the 
survey were not identified by their citizenship status and country of birth until February of 
1994.  Therefore, I limit my analysis to the years following 1994. 
 The surveys conducted in and before 2002 relied upon the Standard Industry 
Classification system for industry and occupation categories, while the surveys after 2002 
utilized the North American Industry Classification System for industry and occupation 
categories.  As these two systems cannot be correlated, my analysis must trade-off between a 
larger sample size and consistent controls for industry and occupation.  I complete the 
primary analysis using all available data from 1994 through 2006 (seven DWS cross-
sections), which contains information about individuals displaced between the years of 1991 
and 2005.  I also include robustness checks using only the data from 1994 through 2002 but 
controlling for displaced workers’ former industries and occupations. 
In addition to personal characteristics found in the regular monthly CPS, the DWS 
collects information on both old and new employment for displaced workers – previous and 
current wages, hours, current industry, industry of displacement, reason for displacement, 
occupation, and duration of unemployment.  I use data on workers who were between the 
ages of 20 and 65 at the time of the survey, displaced from a full-time job but still in the 
labor force at the time of the survey.4  I supplement the DWS with data on the annual 
unemployment rate in each state, to better control for the labor market conditions in the local 
economy; this data is available from the Bureau of Labor Statistics (BLS).  Consumer Price 
                                                 
3 DWS data used in this paper is available through the Inter-University Consortium for Political and Social 
Research. 
4 Also, as suggested by Angrist and Krueger (1999), I “winsorized” displaced workers’ pre-displacement and 
re-employment wages at the tails, replacing values in the lower or upper 1 percent tails with values at the 1st 
and 99th percentiles, respectively. 
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Index (CPI) data from the BLS are also used to adjust the wage amounts from all years of the 
survey into 2006 dollars. 
Summary statistics are presented in Table 4.1, for the sample of individuals between 
the ages of 20 and 65 who were displaced from full-time employment within the three years 
prior to being surveyed.  This sample is split into displaced male and displaced female 
workers, and further sub-divided into natives and immigrants, as the comparison of post-
displacement outcomes between natives and immigrants is the focus of this paper.  Note that 
immigrants constitute roughly 10 percent of both the male and the female samples; 
immigrants are defined as individuals who were not born in the United States and who were 
not born U.S. citizens.  Some of the immigrants, however, have become naturalized citizens.  
About one third of male immigrants in the DWS sample are naturalized citizens, and 45 
percent of the female immigrants have naturalized.  The remaining immigrants are non-
citizens. 
In this sample, immigrants overall have noticeably different patterns of educational 
attainment when compared to natives.  About 30 percent of immigrant workers displaced 
from full-time employment, both male and female, have less than a high school degree; while 
the same proportion for natives is less than 10 percent.  At the other end of the education 
spectrum, a higher proportion of immigrants have obtained advanced degrees when 
compared with natives (10.9 percent versus 6.9 for males, 10.5 percent versus 5.8 percent for 
females).  Higher proportions of immigrants are married and live in metropolitan areas than 
natives.  On average, immigrants have fewer years of tenure on their pre-displacement jobs, 
and longer jobless spell durations than natives. 
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Next, Table 4.2 provides summary statistics for workers who were displaced from 
full-time employment and re-employed full-time by the time of the survey.  For both male 
and female displaced workers, the weekly wages from their post-displacement jobs are lower 
than the weekly wages from their pre-displacement jobs (reported in 2006 dollars); this wage 
decrease is roughly $94 per week for displaced native male workers and $73 per week for 
displaced native female workers.  Notice, however, that immigrants who are re-employed 
experience much smaller wage losses after displacement.  Average weekly wages for 
displaced immigrant workers decrease by $39 for men and by $37 for women.  Both male 
and female natives experience on average a 10 percent wage drop following displacement 
and re-employment; but for immigrants, both male and female, the average wage drop 
following displacement and re-employment is only 5 percent. 
 
4 Empirical Framework: Re-employment Wages 
The unit of analysis is a displaced worker in the DWS.  Regression equation (1) below relates 
the first outcome of interest, the logarithm of the weekly re-employment wage for an 
individual i, currently employed in year of the survey k, displaced from previous employment 
in year t, and residing in state s, to a host of personal characteristics as well as an indicator 
for being a non-citizen immigrant and another indicator for being a foreign-born naturalized 
citizen (with natives being the excluded category):   
.)ln((1) 3210 iktsstkikts
employmentre
ikts zenNativeCitiNonCitizenw εστδβββ ++++++′+=
− βX  
 
In equation (1), iktsX  is a vector of personal characteristics, containing the typical covariates 
used in the re-employment wage literature (see, for example, Addison and Portugal, 1989).  
 135
Included in iktsX  are the standard Mincerian controls for age and age squared (to proxy for 
experience) and education (indicators for no high school, high school dropout, some college, 
college graduate, and advanced degree, with high school graduates as the omitted category).  
I control for race and marital status – demographic characteristics that affect wages.  The 
vector iktsX  contains an indicator for living in a metropolitan area, since wages in 
metropolitan areas tend to be higher than in rural areas, and also an indicator for union status.  
I include tenure on the lost job among the covariates; this controls for the loss of job-specific 
human capital when workers are displaced.   I will estimate the wage equation both with and 
without tenure as a covariate, to determine how controlling for tenure may mediate some of 
the differences between immigrants and natives.  Farber (2005) and others find a strong 
negative relationship between the length of tenure on the lost job and the change in earnings 
from the pre-displacement job to the re-employment job.  The final covariate is state 
unemployment rate, which helps to control for the local labor market conditions the displaced 
worker faced.  Higher state unemployment rates would likely lower the re-employment wage 
by reducing the frequency with which job offers arrive.  Regression (1) is run separately for 
male and for female workers. 
To control for time-invariant state of residence characteristics (such as the generosity 
of unemployment benefits, which in the model tend to increase re-employment wages), I 
include state of residence fixed effects – sσ .  Year of displacement and year of the survey 
fixed effects, kt δτ   and , are added to absorb annual economy-wide shocks in the year of 
displacement and year of the survey.  The individual specific error term, iktsε , is assumed to 
be have mean zero.  I estimate equation (1) by Ordinary Least Squares (OLS). 
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Since not every displaced worker is re-employed by the date of the survey, I do not 
have information on the re-employment wages for those who are still unemployed at the date 
of the interview.  A selection problem may arise, since those who were most recently 
displaced have had little time to find new jobs.  As the re-employment wage regression (1) is 
linear, and as it includes controls for both year of displacement and year of the survey, it also 
effectively controls for the number of years since displacement, thus mitigating the potential 
selection bias.5   
I also employ a conventional two-step selection adjustment procedure to control for 
the potential selection bias (see Heckman, 1979).  Because they are intrinsically associated 
with the re-employment censoring mechanism, following Addison and Portugal (1989), the 
year of displacement and the year of the survey dummies are excluded from the wage 
equation (1) and only enter the re-employment (selection) probit equation.  Additionally, I 
include reason for displacement dummies in the selection equation, as they might affect the 
probability of re-employment.  
 
5 Empirical Framework: Unemployment Duration 
The jobless spell durations in the DWS are recorded in weeks.  Following McCall (1996), I 
group the durations into two-week intervals, to reduce the possible bias from piling the 
reported unemployment durations at even weeks as evident from inspection of the data.  
Since the unemployment duration data are discrete, again following McCall (1996) I take a 
grouped data approach (see Kiefer, 1988; Han and Hausman, 1990; Meyer, 1990; Lancaster, 
1990; and Wooldridge, 2002). 
                                                 
5 Number of years since displacement is a linear combination of the dummies for the survey year and the 
dummies for the year of displacement.   
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 First, I convert the unit of analysis from a displaced worker to a jobless spell interval 
(two-week period) at risk of leaving the unemployment pool.  I divide the time line into 81 
intervals, [0,2), [2, 4), …, [160, ∞) as there are no observed durations greater than 160 
weeks.  Following Wooldridge (2002), for a displaced worker i, I define ci,m to be a binary 
censoring indicator equal to unity if the duration is right-censored in the interval m, m = 1, 2, 
…, 81, and zero otherwise.  Note that ci,m =1 implies that ci,m+1 =1, as well.  There are two 
potential sources of right-censoring in the data.  First, durations in the DWS were top-coded 
at 168 weeks.  The longest reported duration for this sample of displaced workers was 160 
weeks, so this top-coding is not binding.  Second, some workers were still unemployed at the 
date of the survey; this is the only source of right-censoring in this population.  I define yi,m to 
be a binary indicator equal to unity if displaced worker’s i unemployment duration ends in 
the mth interval and zero otherwise. Hence, yi,m =1 implies that yi,m+1 =1.  If duration is 
censored in the mth interval (ci,m =1), I set yi,m ≡1.  For each displaced worker i, I observe (yi,m, 
ci,m ). 
 Given a hazard function ),;( ηZ itφ , where η  is the vector of parameters to be 
estimated, and iZ  the matrix of personal and industry characteristics, I can now calculate all 
the probabilities that yi,m takes on a value of zero or one given (yi,m-1, …, yi,1), (ci,m, …, ci,1), 
and iZ .
6  Wooldridge (2002) calculates the only two such probabilities that are not 
identically zero or one: ),(1)0,,0|1P( ,1,, ηZZ immiimimi cyy α−==== − , and 












),;(exp),( ηZηZ φα . 
                                                 
6 Note that by definition, these probabilities only depend on yi,m-1, ci,m, and iZ .   
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where di is a censoring indicator equal to unity if duration of displaced worker i is 
uncensored, and N is the number of displaced workers included in the analysis. 
 Before I can implement conditional MLE, I need to specify the hazard function, 
),;( ηZ itφ .  The following Weibull hazard function captures a monotonically increasing or 
monotonically decreasing hazard: 
1)(exp),;()3( −= ϕϕφ tt ii ηZηZ . 
 
If φ > 1, the hazard exhibits positive duration dependence, and if φ > 1, it exhibits negative 
duration dependence.7  For further computational simplicity, one can assume that the grouped 
data is continuous instead of discrete and estimate the Weibull model maximizing the 
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where the Weibull distribution with covariates has the following conditional density 
])(expexp[)(exp);|( 1 ϕϕϕ tttf iiii ηZηZηZ −=
− . 
 
The choice of the Weibull model is appealing because it has an accelerated failure 
time (AFT) representation.  The estimated coefficients in the AFT representation can be 
interpreted as semi-elasticities of the expected unemployment duration with respect to a 
                                                 
7 If φ = 1, the Weibull hazard reduces to an exponential one and has no duration dependence.   
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given covariate.  This is useful as I am primarily interested in how the observed covariates, in 
particular the immigrant and citizenship status, affect the jobless spell duration.   
 Unlike the re-employment wage regressions, the jobless spell duration regressions 
avoid potential selection issues by incorporating duration information from both re-employed 
workers and workers who are still unemployed at the time of the survey (but who report 
being in the labor force).  For the latter group, I only observe interrupted (right-censored) 
spells, which were accommodated in the likelihood function. 
 The matrix iZ  includes a vector of personal characteristics, which were described in 
the previous section.  They include education, current age, current age squared, tenure on the 
lost job, state unemployment rate in the year of displacement, and dummies for race, marital 
status, and metropolitan area residence status.  In addition, iZ  includes state of residence 
fixed effects ( sσ ), and year of displacement and year of the survey fixed effects ( kt δτ   , ).  
Finally, iZ  includes indicators for non-citizens and naturalized citizens, which are the 
covariates of interest.  I estimate (4) separately for male and female displaced workers. 
 
6 Results 
To translate the coefficients from the Weibull hazard specification described in the previous 
section into AFT coefficients, it is necessary to divide the hazard coefficients by the negative 
of the duration dependence parameter α.  The advantage of considering the estimates in the 
AFT models is that the coefficients are easily interpreted as semi-elasticities.  The following 
results on the jobless spell duration are reported as AFT coefficients. 
Without controlling for any covariates other than the immigrant and citizenship status 
of the worker, displaced male naturalized citizens are estimated to experience 31.9 percent 
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longer jobless spell durations than displaced male native workers (Table 4.3, column 4.3.1).  
However, there is no significant difference between the duration of unemployment between 
native workers and non-citizens.  Among displaced female workers, both non-citizens and 
naturalized citizens have significantly longer unemployment durations than native workers 
when no other covariates are included in the estimation, 29.5 percent longer for non-citizens 
and 31.9 percent longer for naturalized citizens (Table 4.4, column 4.4.1). 
The importance of immigrant and citizenship status to jobless spell duration falls 
when educational attainment variables are included as controls (Table 4.3, column 4.3.2 for 
males, and Table 4.4, column 4.4.7 for females).  When controls for education are added, the 
coefficients for being a non-citizen fall much more than the ones for being a naturalized 
citizen, reflecting that naturalized citizens have a more similar education profile to natives 
than non-citizens do.  Including the state unemployment rate in the year of displacement, as 
well as other personal characteristics, and the tenure on the previous job further reduces the 
importance of immigrant and citizenship status on the jobless spell duration for both male 
and female displaced workers (third columns of Tables 4.3 and 4.4).  With these controls 
included in the regression specification, only displaced male naturalized citizens have 
significantly longer durations of unemployment than native males.  Further controlling for 
state, year of displacement, and year of the survey effects (fourth columns of Tables 4.3 and 
4.4), reduces the coefficients for both male and female naturalized citizens and non-citizens.  
Still, for displaced male workers, naturalized citizens have significantly longer jobless spells 
than native workers.  These immigrants experience a 17.6 percent longer duration of 
unemployment, which at the mean, translates into about 5.5 addition weeks of 
unemployment. 
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As an additional robustness check, I limit the sample to those who were surveyed in 
2002 or earlier, so that I can include consistent industry and occupation controls in the 
regressions.  Neither naturalized citizens nor non-citizens have significantly different jobless 
spells when compared to natives when industry and occupation are included in the 
regression, but, at least for the displaced male workers, this is partly due to the loss in sample 
size (from 10,096 to 6,585) and the corresponding increase in the standard errors when 2004 
and 2006 data is removed. 
While it is only (male) naturalized citizens that experience longer jobless spell 
duration than their native counterparts, the significant differences when considering re-
employment wages are between native citizens and non-citizens.  Tables 4.5 and 4.6 report 
the results from the OLS estimation of equation (1).  In these specifications, only workers 
who were displaced from full-time jobs and re-employed in full-time jobs are included.8  
Displaced non-citizen males experience re-employment wages that are on average 23.6 
percent lower than those of otherwise similar displaced native males (column 4.5.1).  This re-
employment wage gap is similar to the white-black re-employment wage gap, which for 
males is 20.2 percent.  For naturalized citizens, however, the re-employment wage gap is 
only about half the size of the gap for non-citizens, 11.0 percent versus 23.6 percent.  This 
likely reflects the fact that naturalized citizens have lived in the U.S. longer and are more 
familiar with the U.S. labor market. 
A similar pattern emerges for displaced female workers.  Female non-citizens have 
re-employment wages that are 23.4 percent lower that those of similar natives, and this wage 
                                                 
8 For robustness, I include also the displaced workers who were re-employed part-time, while controlling for 
hours worked in the regression (results not shown).   The re-employment wage gap between displaced 
immigrant and native workers, both for males and for females, is not significantly different from the gap 
reported in Tables 4.5 and 4.6 when these displaced workers are excluded. 
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gap is larger in magnitude than the white-black re-employment wage gap.  There is no 
difference in the re-employment wages of naturalized citizens and native workers who are 
female. 
Compare the wage re-employment wage gaps in the first columns of Tables 4.5 and 
4.6 to the pre-displacement wage gaps in the second columns of those same tables (where the 
dependent variable is the natural log of the pre-displacement weekly wages).  The re-
employment wage gap between displaced native foreign-born workers (both non-citizens and 
naturalized citizens) is smaller in magnitude than the wage gap that existed prior to 
displacement.  This is not the case for black workers – for males the black-white wage gap is 
almost the same for both re-employment and pre-displacement wages, and for females, the 
re-employment black-white wage gap is actually larger.  Prior to displacement, non-citizen 
males were earning 29.5 percent less than their native counterparts, but that falls to 23.6 
percent less after displacement and re-employment.  For displaced non-citizen females, the 
former gap was 30.4 percent, but it falls to 23.4 percent when they are re-employed.  
Displacement in some way appears to reduce the wage gap between native and foreign-born 
workers, particularly for the non-citizens. 
To further explore the idea that displaced and re-employed non-citizens experience 
relative wage gains in comparison to native workers, I modify equation (1) such that the 
dependent variable is the natural log of the ratio of the weekly re-employment wages to the 
weekly pre-displacement wages.  This wage ratio is significantly higher for non-citizens than 
it is for natives.  From the third column of Table 4.5 (males) and Table 4.6 (females), non-
citizens experience wage gains relative to natives following displacement and re-
employment.  For males, their re-employment wages relative to their pre-displacement wages 
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are 5.9 percent higher than the ratio for native wages; and for females, the difference is 7.0 
percent.  This is consistent with my earlier findings that the wage gap between non-citizens 
and natives is higher in the pre-displacement wage than in the re-employment wage.  
Naturalized citizens, on the other hand, do not experience these relative wage gains following 
displacement and re-employment.  For displaced black workers as well, there is no relative 
wage gain. 
I do not have re-employment wages for every displaced worker due to the fact that 
many of them have not been re-employed at the time of the survey.  To correct for the 
potential selection into re-employment, I use a two-step Heckman procedure.  These results 
are presented in Table 4.7 for males and Table 4.8 for females.  The first columns of these 
tables present the results for the probit regression.  Here, I use all of the displaced workers, 
those who have been re-employed and those who have not.  The dependent variable is an 
indicator equal to 1 if the individual is re-employed at the time of the survey.  In addition to 
the other control variables included in equation (1), I use the reasons for displacement as well 
as the year of displacement and year of the survey dummies to identify the probability of re-
employment.9  Note that year of displacement and the year of the survey are intimately 
related to the re-employment probability since these determine the time since displacement, a 
strong predictor of re-employment at the time of the survey.   
In column 4.7.2 (males) and in column 4.8.2 (females), the inverse Mills ratio 
calculated from the selection regression is included among the controls.  In the end, 
correcting for selection does not significantly change the re-employment wage gap between 
displaced non-citizen and native males, which remains around 23 percent.  For displaced 
                                                 
9 I do not include the year of displacement and year of the survey dummies in the re-employment wage 
regressions in Tables 4.7 and 4.8.  These controls only enter into the selection regression. 
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female workers as well (column 4.8.2), correcting for selection does not affect the magnitude 
of the re-employment wage gap between non-citizens and natives, which is also estimated 
around 23 percent.  When I include the inverse Mills ratio as a covariate, both male and 
female displaced non-citizen workers still have statistically significantly higher ratios of re-
employment wages to pre-displacement wages than natives do (columns 4.7.3 and 4.8.3). 
 
7 Discussion 
As discussed in the Theoretical Framework, greater tenure on the pre-displacement job leads 
to lower re-employment wages (and thus a lower re-employment to pre-displacement wage 
ratio), due to the loss of firm-specific or industry-specific human capital.  For foreign-born 
workers, particularly non-citizens who have only lived in the U.S. for a few years and have 
little tenure on their pre-displacement jobs, this lack of tenure may partially explain why their 
wages do not fall as much as those of natives following displacement.  In Table 4.9, I 
compare the differences in the re-employment to pre-displacement wage ratio between non-
citizens, naturalized citizens, and natives when tenure on the previous job is excluded as a 
covariate to the results when tenure is included.  The relative wage gain experienced by non-
citizen workers following displacement is about ten percent larger in magnitude when tenure 
is excluded as an explanatory variable, for both males and females.  The lack of tenure on the 
previous job for non-citizens then accounts for some of the difference in the wage ratio 
between non-citizens and natives, but even when controlling for tenure, a significant 
difference remains between the two populations. 
 Another possible explanation for the finding that foreign-born workers, particularly 
non-citizens, experience relative (in comparison to natives) wage gains following 
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displacement and re-employment involves the minimum wage.  In this sample, immigrants 
have lower levels of education than native workers, and so would be more likely to be re-
employed at minimum wage jobs.  It is possible that, in the absence of the minimum wage, 
immigrant workers would experience a proportionally similar decrease in their wages to that 
of native workers following displacement and re-employment. 
 To examine the potential effect of the minimum wage on the re-employment wages, I 
first compare the minimum wage in the state of residence in the year of the survey to the re-
employment wage.10  Though the re-employment wages used in the analysis are weekly 
wages, for this comparison I use hourly wages.  For those individuals who do not report 
hourly wages, I divide their weekly wages by the number of hours they report working in the 
previous week. 
 Overall, a very small percentage of the displaced workers have re-employment wages 
that are constrained by the minimum wage, only 3.3 percent for males and 5.0 percent for 
females (see Table 4.10).  However, non-citizen immigrants are much more likely to be 
working at the minimum wage than natives or naturalized citizens, with 8.2 percent of non-
citizen males and 13.3 percent of non-citizen females employed at minimum wage jobs.  For 
robustness, I replicate the regressions from Tables 4.5 and 4.6 without those individuals who 
receive the minimum wage (or lower).  There are very few changes when the minimum wage 
earners are excluded (results not shown).  For non-citizen males, the relative wage gain is 5.5 
percent (st. dev. 2.3), which is comparable to the 5.9 percent (from Table 4.5.3) that resulted 
when minimum wage earners were included.  Eliminating those at the minimum wage 
                                                 
10 State and federal minimum wage data available for even years from 1994-2006 from the U.S. Department of 
Labor at: http://www.dol.gov/esa/programs/whd/state/stateMinWageHis.htm.  Where state and federal law set 
different minimum wage rates, the higher standard applies.  In about 80 percent of the states across the seven 
years, the federal minimum wage is the higher standard. 
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actually increases the magnitude of the relative wage gain among non-citizen females, from 
7.0 percent in Table 4.6.3 to 9.1 percent (st. dev. 3.0).  Thus, the lower bound of the 
minimum wage does not appear to be driving the relative wage gain experienced by non-
citizens following displacement and re-employment. 
 The differences between natives and immigrants in their reasons for displacement 
could potentially be driving some of the differences in their duration of unemployment and 
re-employment wages.  From Table 4.1, notice that, compared to native workers, both male 
and female immigrants are more likely to be displaced due to a plant closing or insufficient 
work, and less likely to be displaced due to a shift or position being abolished.  Further sub-
dividing the immigrants into non-citizens and naturalized citizens shows that for males, non-
citizens are more likely to have been displaced due to insufficient work (49.7% vs. 38.6% for 
the naturalized citizens), and naturalized citizens are more likely to have been displaced due 
to plant closing (43.3% vs. 39.1% for the non-citizens) or having their position or shift 
abolished (25.6% vs. 18.1% for the non-citizens).  Among displaced female immigrants, 
reasons for displacement are fairly similar between naturalized citizens and non-citizens.  
These differences in the reasons for displacement, particularly for the displaced males, could 
help explain why naturalized citizens have longer jobless spells. 
 To examine how the reasons for displacement might be affecting the results for the 
duration of unemployment, I include indicators for these reasons in the vector of covariates 
iZ  and maximize the likelihood function in equation (4).  These results, for both male and 
female displaced workers, are presented in Table 4.11, side-by-side with the coefficients 
from Tables 4.3 and 4.4 where the reasons for displacement are not included.  In both column 
4.11.1 and column 4.11.3, we see that the reasons for displacement are significant covariates 
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affecting the duration of unemployment.  Displacement that is due to having a shift or 
position abolished increases the duration of unemployment more than displacement due to 
insufficient work or plant closing or relocating.  However, including the reasons for 
displacement in the duration regressions does not change the differences between immigrants 
and natives.  Displaced males who are naturalized citizens still have jobless spells that 
significantly longer than those of natives (see column 4.11.1). 
 Including the reasons for displacement in the estimation of the re-employment wage 
and the ratio of the re-employment wage to the pre-displacement wage does not affect the 
coefficients for either the non-citizens or the naturalized citizens (not shown).  In contrast to 
the unemployment duration, where the reasons for displacement themselves have statistically 
significant coefficients, these reasons do not significantly affect the re-employment wage for 
males.  This further validates the use of the reasons for displacement as instruments in the 
Heckman selection regression, since the reasons affect the duration of unemployment (which 
is related to the probability of leaving unemployment) but not the re-employment wages. 
 Another possibility is that the wages of non-citizens do not fall as much as those of 
native workers following displacement due to the lack of job mobility that results from the 
lack of citizenship.  Non-citizens, particularly those who are undocumented or who have only 
temporary legal status, may prefer not to draw attention to themselves by searching for better 
and higher-paying jobs.  They might remain in jobs that are relatively poor matches 
(compared to the match between native workers and their jobs) if they believe that course of 
action will help them to stay in the U.S. longer.  Also, foreign-born workers who want their 
employers to sponsor them for legal permanent residence may be willing to forego wages in 
return for the benefit of receiving a green card (Kandilov 2008).  Involuntary job loss may 
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allow both these groups of non-citizens to find jobs that are relatively better fits, and pay 




When naturalized citizens and non-citizens experience job displacement, their post-
displacement labor market outcomes do differ from those of native workers.  On average, 
displaced male naturalized citizens have longer jobless spell duration than displaced native 
workers, and this effect is both economically and statistically significant.  At the mean, a 
difference in duration of unemployment of 17.6 percent corresponds to 5.5 additional weeks 
of unemployment for the displaced naturalized citizens. 
 For re-employment wages, it is non-citizen immigrants that have significant 
differences from the native population.  Both male and female non-citizens have lower re-
employment wages when compared to native workers, but the re-employment wage gap is 
smaller than the wage gap prior to displacement.  Following displacement and re-
employment, non-citizens experience a 5.9 percent (for males) and 7.0 percent (for females) 
wage increase relative to native workers.  Displacement and subsequent re-employment 
seems to narrow the wage gap between immigrants and natives, as non-citizens do not 
experience as great of a drop in wages post-displacement as natives do.  This is not the case 
for other potentially disadvantaged workers (such as black workers), and these results do not 
appear to be driven by the minimum wage acting as a lower bound for the re-employment 
wages of non-citizens.  
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 This paper examines not only the differences between immigrants and natives, but 
also the differences within subgroups of the immigrant population (specifically, between 
non-citizens and naturalized citizens) in post-displacement outcomes.  In doing so, it sheds 
further light on how the citizenship status of immigrants affects their relationship with the 
U.S. labor market.  In this case, the differences between naturalized citizens and non-citizens 
are likely due to the amount of time that they have lived in the U.S.  On average, naturalized 
citizens in this sample have 11 more years of U.S. residence than non-citizens (21 years vs. 
10 years).  The longer jobless spells experienced by male naturalized citizens may reflect that 
they have greater access to unemployment benefits than non-citizens do.  Additionally, they 
may have better credit or stronger social support as a result of being more established as U.S. 
citizens. 
 For non-citizens, there are a variety of factors that could lead to the smaller wage 
decreases following displacement.  Their shorter tenure in the U.S. may indicate that they are 
still adapting to the U.S. labor market.  LaLonde and Topel (1992) show that in the first few 
years after arriving in the U.S., immigrants experience fairly rapid growth in wages.  The 
longer immigrants live in the U.S., the more they learn about the U.S. labor market and the 
more they are able to move to better and higher-paying jobs.  Non-citizens on average have 
less tenure on their pre-displacement jobs, which helps to decrease the wage gap between 
pre-displacement and re-employment wages.  As I show in Table 4.9, though, this only 
explains a small portion of the differences between displaced non-citizens and natives.  
Higher re-employment wages for non-citizen immigrants are consistent with the idea that 
these non-citizens are more intense in their job searches following displacement.  Finally, 
displaced non-citizens may experience relative wage gains following displacement if they 
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had previously avoided job search due to undocumented or temporary status, and involuntary 




Piecewise-constant proportional hazard 
Another more flexible choice for the hazard function, ),;( ηZ itφ , in the duration of 
unemployment specification is a piecewise-constant proportional hazard  
,)(exp),;()5( miit φφ ηZηZ =  
 
for m =1, 2, …, 81, and  m-1 ≤ t < m.  To check for robustness, I also use this piecewise-
constant proportional hazard function and compare the results to the ones found using the 
Weibull hazard.  For identification, I estimate interval-specific baseline hazard rate, mφ , for 
all intervals in which there is at least one exit from the unemployment pool, and I suppress 
the constant in iZ .  With the hazard rate assumptions in place,  
])(exp[exp),( miim φα ηZηZ −≡ , 
 
for m =1, 2, …, 81, and I use conditional maximum likelihood to estimate (2), where 
mφ and ,η are the parameters to be estimated.  The matrix iZ  includes the same covariates 
described in the Empirical Framework section of the paper.  I estimate (2) separately for male 
and female displaced workers. 
 In the first two columns of Table 4.A1, I report the results for the hazard of leaving 
unemployment, using the flexible specification (5) in the log-likelihood function (2), 
separating the sample into male (column 4.A1.1) and female (column 4.A1.2) workers.  
Consistent with the findings in the main analysis, the likelihood of leaving the unemployment 
pool is significantly lower for displaced male naturalized citizens compared to displaced 
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male native workers.  For female naturalized citizens and for both male and female non-
citizens, the hazard of leaving unemployment is not significantly different from that of 
natives. 
 For comparison, the next two columns (4.A1.3 for males and 4.A1.4 for females) 
display the results for the hazard of leaving unemployment using the Weibull hazard model 
from equation (3).  Note that the coefficients from the Weibull specification are very similar 
in sign and magnitude to the coefficients that result from the more flexible proportional rate 
hazard model.  Thus the restricting assumption that the hazard rate of leaving unemployment 
is monotonically decreasing does not seem to bias the estimated coefficients on the 
covariates, since using the more flexible piecewise-constant proportional hazard results 
comparable coefficients. 
 The final two columns of Table 4.A1 repeat the AFT representations of the Weibull 
hazard model that were presented in the fourth columns of Tables 4.3 and 4.4.  To translate 
the coefficients from the Weibull hazard specification into AFT coefficients, it is necessary 
to divide the hazard coefficients by the negative of the duration dependence parameter α.  As 
discussed in the main analysis, the advantage of considering the estimates in the AFT models 
is that the coefficients are easily interpreted as semi-elasticities. 
 
Controlling for pre-displacement wages in the re-employment wage regressions 
In the third columns of Tables 4.5 through 4.7, I report the results from estimating equation 
(1) on the dependent variable of the natural log of the ratio of the weekly re-employment 
wage to the weekly pre-displacement wage.  This is mathematically equivalent to including 
the (log of the) pre-displacement wage as an independent variable in a regression where the 
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re-employment wage is the dependent variable, and restricting the coefficient on the pre-
displacement wage to equal 1.  However, that restriction may not be supported by the data 
(see Addison and Portugal 1989).  As a robustness check, I estimate equation (1) with the 
pre-displacement wage included in the covariates, without restricting the value of the 
coefficient.  The results are presented in Table 4.A2, and include also specifications where I 
correct for selection.   
 For both male and female displaced workers, the wages they were receiving before 
displacement are highly correlated with their re-employment wages, but the coefficients are 
not equal to 1.  The re-employment wage gap between non-citizens and natives is now 6.8 
percent for males and 7.5 percent for females.  These are similar in magnitude to the black-




Table 4.A1 Hazard of leaving unemployment and duration of unemployment 







 4.A1.2 4.A1.2 4.A1.3 4.A1.4 4.A1.5 4.A1.6 























































































































































































Degrees of freedom 78,063 55,949 10,010 6,602 10,010 6,602 
α - - 0.927 0.923 0.927 0.923 
Log pseudolikelihood -23,534.3 -15,939.1 -15,152.1 -9,934.8 -15,152.1 -9,934.8 
No. observations 78,212 56,094 10,096 6,688 10,096 6,688 
Note: Robust standard errors are reported.   State-year unemployment rates are from the BLS; all other variables 
from the DWS, 1994 - 2006.  All specifications include fixed effects for state of residence, year of the survey 






Table 4.A2 Re-employment wages controlling for pre-displacement wages 
 Re-employment wages Heckman selection correction for re-employment wages 
 Male Female Male Female 



































































































































Inverse Mills ratio - - -0.069* (0.031) 
-0.028 
(0.037) 
Degrees of freedom 6,445 3,967 6,464 3,986 
R2 0.482 0.496 0.477 0.492 
No. observations 6,532 4,054 6,532 4,054 
Note: Robust standard errors are reported.  Wages are adjusted using CPI data from the BLS to reflect 2006 
dollar amounts.  State-year unemployment rates are from the BLS.  All other variables are from the DWS,  
1994 - 2006.  All specifications include fixed effects for state of residence, survey year, and displacement year. 
For workers who were displaced from full-time work and re-employed full-time. 




Table 4.1 Variable means for workers displaced from full-time employment 
 Male Displaced Workers Female Displaced Workers 
Variable All Native Imm. All Native Imm. 
Immigrant 0.112 0.000 1.000 0.097 0.000 1.000 
Citizen 0.929 1.000 0.362 0.946 1.000 0.439 
No High School 0.031 0.013 0.171 0.022 0.006 0.172 
High School Dropout 0.090 0.083 0.139 0.065 0.059 0.117 
High School Diploma 0.334 0.347 0.238 0.331 0.339 0.255 
Some College 0.290 0.305 0.172 0.333 0.349 0.185 
College Degree 0.182 0.183 0.172 0.188 0.190 0.166 
Advanced Degree 0.073 0.069 0.109 0.062 0.058 0.105 
Black 0.078 0.079 0.069 0.124 0.128 0.086 
Married 0.623 0.613 0.705 0.490 0.477 0.606 
Metropolitan Area Resident 0.793 0.774 0.942 0.808 0.791 0.969 
Employed in Manufacturing 0.187 0.186 0.192 0.149 0.137 0.259 
Duration of unemployment  














































Reason: Plant Closed Down 
or Moved 0.363 0.358 0.406 0.417 0.412 0.463 
Reason: Insufficient Work 0.394 0.386 0.456 0.269 0.260 0.359 
Reason: Position or Shift 
Abolished  0.243 0.256 0.137 0.314 0.328 0.179 
       
No. observations 10,096 8,965 1,131 6,688 6,039 649 
Note: State-year unemployment rates are from the BLS; all other variables from the DWS, 1994 - 2006. 
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Table 4.2 Variable means for workers displaced from full-time work and re-employed full-
time 
 Male Displaced Workers Female Displaced Workers 
Variable All Native Imm. All Native Imm 
Immigrant 0.106 0.000 1.000 0.087 0.000 1.000 
Citizen 0.929 1.000 0.332 0.954 1.000 0.469 
No High School 0.026 0.011 0.154 0.016 0.004 0.135 
High School Dropout 0.077 0.068 0.147 0.044 0.040 0.084 
High School Diploma 0.329 0.339 0.241 0.316 0.324 0.242 
Some College 0.298 0.313 0.174 0.353 0.366 0.225 
College Degree 0.194 0.196 0.175 0.205 0.206 0.188 
Advanced Degree 0.077 0.073 0.110 0.066 0.060 0.126 
Black 0.064 0.064 0.064 0.102 0.104 0.082 
Married 0.665 0.657 0.728 0.493 0.484 0.579 
Metropolitan Area Resident 0.800 0.784 0.936 0.813 0.798 0.969 
Employed in Manufacturing 0.201 0.201 0.199 0.155 0.145 0.261 























































Reason: Plant Closed Down 
or Moved 0.372 0.368 0.407 0.418 0.412 0.472 
Reason: Insufficient Work 0.376 0.368 0.443 0.243 0.235 0.326 
Reason: Position or Shift 
Abolished  0.251 0.264 0.150 0.339 0.352 0.202 
       
No. observations 6,532 5,837 695 4,054 3,701 353 
Note: Wages are adjusted using CPI data from the BLS to reflect 2006 dollar amounts.  State-year 
unemployment rates are from the BLS; all other variables from the DWS, 1994 - 2006. 
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Table 4.3 Duration of unemployment (Weibull AFT), male 
































































































Controls for state, 
year of survey, and 
year of displacement 
No No No Yes Yes 
Controls for industry 
and occupation of 
displacement 
No No No No Yes 
Degrees of freedom 10,388 10,383 10,103 10,010 6,236 
α 0.850 0.851 0.901 0.927 0.966 
Log pseudolikelihood -16,530.7 -16,510.5 -15,576.0 -15,152.1 -9,555.4 
No. observations 10,391 10,391 10,119 10,096 6,585 
Note: Robust standard errors are reported.   State-year unemployment rates are from the BLS; all other variables 
from the DWS, 1994 - 2006.  All specifications include fixed effects for state of residence, year of the survey 
(DWS), and year of displacement. 




Table 4.4 Duration of unemployment (Weibull AFT), female 
































































































Controls for state, 
year of survey, and 
year of displacement 
No No No Yes Yes 
Controls for industry 
and occupation of 
displacement 
No No No No Yes 
Degrees of freedom 6,809 6,804 6,687 6,602 4,038 
α 0.867 0.870 0.897 0.923 0.974 
Log pseudolikelihood -10,681.0 -10,646.7 -10,262.9 -9,934.8 -6,215.0 
No. observations 6,812 6,812 6,703 6,688 4,370 
Note: Robust standard errors are reported.   State-year unemployment rates are from the BLS; all other variables 
from the DWS, 1994 - 2006.  All specifications include fixed effects for state of residence, year of the survey 
(DWS), and year of displacement. 
* indicates statistical significance at 5 percent. 
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Degrees of freedom 6,446 6,446 6,446 
R2 0.289 0.379 0.041 
No. observations 6,532 6,532 6,532 
Note: Robust standard errors are reported.  Wages are adjusted using CPI data from the BLS to reflect 2006 
dollar amounts.  State-year unemployment rates are from the BLS.  All other variables are from the DWS,  
1994 - 2006.  All specifications include fixed effects for state of residence, survey year, and displacement year. 
For workers who were displaced from full-time work and re-employed full-time. 
* indicates statistical significance at 5 percent. 
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Degrees of freedom 3,968 3,968 3,968 
R2 0.331 0.391 0.068 
No. observations 4,054 4,054 4,054 
Note: Robust standard errors are reported.  Wages are adjusted using CPI data from the BLS to reflect 2006 
dollar amounts.  State-year unemployment rates are from the BLS.  All other variables are from the DWS,  
1994 - 2006.  All specifications include fixed effects for state of residence, survey year, and displacement year. 
For workers who were displaced from full-time work and re-employed full-time. 
* indicates statistical significance at 5 percent. 
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Table 4.7 Heckman (probit) selection (into re-employment) equation, re-employment wages, 




wages Wage ratio 

































































































(0.032) - - 
Reason: Position or 
Shift Abolished 
-0.023 
(0.038) - - 
Degrees of freedom 12,219 6,465 6,465 
R2 or Pseudo R2 0.141 0.282 0.037 
No. observations 12,307 6,532 6,532 
Note: Omitted Reason: Plant or company closed down or moved.  Robust standard errors are reported.   Wages 
are adjusted using CPI data from the BLS to reflect 2006 dollar amounts.  State-year unemployment rates are 
from the BLS; all other variables from the DWS, 1994 - 2006.  All specifications include fixed effects for state 
of residence.  Only the probit in 4.7.1 includes controls for the year of displacement and the year of the survey. 
* indicates statistical significance at 5 percent. 
 163
Table 4.8 Heckman (probit) selection (into re-employment) equation, re-employment wages, 
re-employment/pre-displacement wage difference, female 
 Probit:  
re-employment 
Re-employment 
wages Wage ratio 

































































































(0.042) - - 
Reason: Position or 
Shift Abolished 
-0.064 
(0.043) - - 
Degrees of freedom 7,848 3,987 3,987 
R2 or Pseudo R2 0.148 0.327 0.055 
No. observations 7,936 4,054 4,054 
Note: Omitted Reason: Plant or company closed down or moved.  Robust standard errors are reported.   Wages 
are adjusted using CPI data from the BLS to reflect 2006 dollar amounts.  State-year unemployment rates are 
from the BLS; all other variables from the DWS, 1994 - 2006.  All specifications include fixed effects for state 
of residence.  Only the probit in 4.7.1 includes controls for the year of displacement and the year of the survey. 
* indicates statistical significance at 5 percent. 
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Table 4.9 Ratio of re-employment wages to pre-displacement wages, with and without 
controlling for tenure on the previous job 
 4.9.1 4.9.2 4.9.3 4.9.4 






















































































































Degrees of freedom 6,479 6,446 3,977 3,968 
R2 0.040 0.041 0.055 0.068 
No. observations 6,564 6,532 4,062 4,054 
Note: Robust standard errors are reported.  Wages are adjusted using CPI data from the BLS to reflect 2006 
dollar amounts.  State-year unemployment rates are from the BLS.  All other variables are from the DWS,  
1994 - 2006.  All specifications include fixed effects for state of residence, survey year, and displacement year. 
For workers who were displaced from full-time work and re-employed full-time. 
* indicates statistical significance at 5 percent. 
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Table 4.10 Percentage of re-employment wages that are less than or equal to the state 
minimum wage in the year of the survey 
 
% with hourly re-employment wages 
at or below the state minimum wage 
MALES  
All displaced workers 3.3 
Natives 2.9 
Non-citizens 8.2 




All displaced workers 5.0 
Natives 4.7 
Non-citizens 13.3 
Naturalized citizens 3.6 
Blacks 7.3 







Table 4.11 Duration of unemployment (Weibull AFT), reasons for displacement 
 Displaced Males Displaced Females 





































































































































Controls for state, 
year of survey, and 
year of displacement 
Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Degrees of freedom 10,008 10,010 6,600 6,602 
α 0.929 0.927 0.924 0.923 
Log pseudolikelihood -15,127.6 -15,152.1 -9,925.1 -9,934.8 
No. observations 10,096 10,096 6,688 6,688 
Note: Omitted Reason: Plant or company closed down or moved.  Robust standard errors are reported.  Robust 
standard errors are reported.   State-year unemployment rates are from the BLS; all other variables from the 
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In this conclusion, I highlight the main findings of the previous three chapters.  While the 
1996 welfare reform was successful in reducing Medicaid coverage among recent cohorts of 
immigrants to the United States, it has not affected the private health insurance coverage or 
labor supply of these immigrants.  Non-citizen immigrants who lacked access to Medicaid 
experience half of the growth in overall health insurance coverage compared to those who 
were eligible for Medicaid.  For employer-sponsored immigrants, receiving a green card is 
accompanied by a wage increase of at least 13 percent, which is consistent with the idea that 
these immigrants have limited job mobility prior to becoming legal permanent residents of 
the U.S.  Finally, for non-citizen immigrants who are displaced from their job and re-
employed, their wages do not fall as much as the wages of similar displaced and re-employed 
native workers.  Naturalized citizens experience longer duration of unemployment when 
compared to native workers.
